NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 40 | Number 3

Article 9

4-1-1962

Ninth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law
North Carolina Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
North Carolina Law Review, Ninth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 40 N.C. L. Rev. 482 (1962).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol40/iss3/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NINTH ANNUAL SURVEY OF NORTH
CAROLINA CASE LAW*
The Ninth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law is designed to review cases decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court
during the period covered and to supplement past and future Surveys
in presenting developments in North Carolina case law over a period
of time.
It is not the purpose of the Survey to discuss all the cases that
were decided during the period of its coverage. It is intended to
discuss only those decisions which are of particular importancecases regarded as being of significance and interest to those concerned with the work of the Court, and decisions which reflect substantial changes and matters of first impression in North Carolina.
Where a case embraced within the period covered by the Survey has
been the subject of a note in this Law Review, the holding is briefly
stated and the note is cited.
Most of the research for and writing of this Survey was accomplished by selected members of the Student Board of Editors of the
Law Review, working under the supervision of the Faculty of the
School of Law of the University of North Carolina. Some sections,
however, represent the individual work of a faculty member.
Student members of the Law Review or candidates for membership and the sections for which they are responsible are: C. Edwin
Allman (Domestic Relations); Jerry W. Amos (Torts); Carl A.
Barrington, Jr. (Damages, Eminent Domain and Sales); Frank W.
Bullock, Jr. (Municipal Corporations); David M. Connor (Administrative Law and Public Utilities); Joseph S. Friedberg (Criminal
Law and Procedure); Robert L. Gunn (Insurance and Real Property); Glen B. Hardymon (Civil Procedure (Pleading and Parties)); Loran A. Johnson (Equitable Remedies and Trusts); H.
Morrison Johnston, Jr. (Credit Transactions and Negotiable Instruments); J. Donnell Lassiter (Contracts and Wills and Administration); Herbert A. Sandman (Taxation); Thomas M. Starnes
(Constitutional Law, Labor Law and Evidence); Samuel S. Woodley, Jr. (Agency and Workmen's Compensation).
* The period covered embraces the decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court reported in 253 N.C. 459 through 255 N.C. 746.
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Throughout this Survey the North Carolina Supreme Court will
be referred to as the "Court" unless it appears by its full title. The
United States Supreme Court will be designated only by its full
name. North Carolina General Statutes will be signified in text and
textual footnotes by "G.S."

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

In State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. McKinnon1 the defendant
was an intracity carrier exempt from control of the Utilities Commission except as to rates and controversies concerning extensions
and services.2 In a hearing before the Commission, the defendant
was charged with transporting charter parties of high school bands
and athletic teams, and passengers to or from religious services,
beyond its territorial limits in violation of the Bus Act of 1949.3
The Commission held that the defendant was authorized to transport
charter parties from one part of its operating area to another within
its municipal franchise or an adjacent zone fixed by the Commission,
but not beyond.
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court which
reversed the Commission, holding that the transportation of high
school athletic teams and bands, and passengers to or from religious
services were exempt activities under G.S. §§ 62-121.47(a) and
(f).' The Court pointed out that in 1949 the Commission had ruled
that an exempt carrier under G.S. § 62-121.47(h),r such as the
defendant, could engage in any or all of the exempted activities under
the Bus Act,' and that this ruling was silent as to any territorial
restrictions. Moreover, in 1955 the defendant received a letter from
the Director of Motor Passenger Transportation of the Commission
authorizing exempted carriers to engage in other exempted activities, and this letter expressly stated that there were no territorial
restrictions.
1
2 254

N.C. 1, 118 S.E.2d 134 (1961).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-121.47(a) (8) (1960).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-121.43 to -121.79 (1960).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§62-121.47(a) (1), (6) (1960).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-121.47(a) (8) (1960).

'N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 62-121.47 (1960).
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The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant carrier could
engage in other exempted activities, such as the transportation of
high school bands and athletic teams, and passengers to or from
religious services, without regard to territorial restrictions so long
as the requests for such services arose within the area for which the
carrier holds a certificate of exemption. The Court stated that the
complete reversal of the interpretation of a statute which has been
adhered to over a long period of time by the Commission should not
be made unless it clearly appears that the original interpretation was
7
in error.
In Faizan v. Grain Dealers Mit. Ins. Co.8 plaintiff brought an
action to recover on an automobile insurance policy. Plaintiff's
policy provided that the expiration date was February 22, 1959, at
12:01 a.m. In January 1959 defendant insurer notified plaintiff that
the policy would expire unless a renewal premium was received by
February 5, 1959. Plaintiff failed to pay the renewal premium. On
February 9, 1959, the insurer notified plaintiff that the policy would
terminate on February 24, 1959.
On February 22, 1959, at 2:30 a.m., plaintiff was involved in
an accident. Plaintiff contended that the policy was still effective
because of the February 9 notice of the insurer that the policy would
terminate on February 24, and because defendant had failed to give
notice of termination to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and to
plaintiff as required by the Assigned Risk Plan provisions of the
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act of 1957.0
The Supreme Court, in affirming a superior court's judgment
for the defendant, stated that G.S. § 20-310 only requires advance
notice of termination to the plaintiff when the insurer terminates
the policy, not when the insured terminates it; and, therefore, the
letter of February 9 incorrectly stating that the termination date

'See in accord with this statement Los Angeles City School Dist. v.
Simpson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 70, 245 P.2d 629 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952), where
the court said that a course of administrative procedure or administrative
construction of a statute which has been long continued will be accorded great
respect by the courts and will be upheld if not clearly erroneous, and Wadsworth v. Dambach, 99 Ohio App. 269, 133 N.E.2d 158 (1954), where the
court said that the administrative interpretation of a given law, while not
conclusive, if long continued, is to be reckoned with most seriously and is
not to be disregarded unless judicial construction makes it imperative to
do so.
8254 N.C. 47, 118 S.E.2d 303 (1961); also discussed under INsuRANcE,
Automobile Liability Insurance, infra.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-310 (1957).
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was February 24 was not required. As to defendant's contention
that the Commissioner's Handbook of Rules interpreted the statute
to mean the same thing, the Court, by way of dictum, stated that
the construction placed upon legislation by the officer charged with
its administration will be given due consideration by the courts, but
where the administrative interpretation conflicts with that of the
courts, the latter must prevail."0 The Court found that the insurer
had also given proper notice to the Commissioner of the termination
of the plaintiff's policy in this case.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

In State v. Ball" the defendant was convicted -for drunken driving on January 11, 1960. On January 18, 1960, the Department of
Motor Vehicles received notice of the conviction and, as required
by G.S. § 20-17,"2 notified the defendant that his license was revoked
for one year. The dates specified were from January 23, 1960 to
January 23, 1961.
On January 21, 1961, the defendant was arrested for driving on
a public highway while his license was revoked. At the trial the
defendant contended that the revocation of his license should have
been effective January 18, 1960, the date the Department received
notice of his conviction, and if that were the case, the year's revocation would have been over when he was arrested on January 21,
1961.
The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, stating that the
statute did not require instantaneous revocation upon receipt of the
record of conviction and, furthermore, if the defendant deemed the
January 23, 1960 date improper for revocation, he should have
" This is in accord with prior North Carolina decisions. E.g., Campbell
v. Currie, 251 N.C. 329, 111 S.E.2d 319 (1959); Dayton Rubber Co. v. Shaw,
244 N.C. 170, 92 S.E.2d 799 (1956). See also Bowles v. Mannie & Co., 155

F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1946), where the court stated that the construction given
to a statute by those charged with the duty of executing it is always entitled
to respectful consideration and ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons; Woods v. Benson Hotel Corp., 177 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1949), where the
court said that the construction and interpretation of a statute as applied to
a justiciable controversy is a judicial function, and when administrative interpretation and judicial construction conflict, the latter must prevail.
11255 N.C. 351, 121 S.E.2d 604 (1961).
1" "The Department shall forthwith revoke the license of any operator or

chauffeur upon receiving a record of such operator's or chauffeur's conviction

for any of the following offenses when such conviction has become final: ...
(2) Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor . . . ." N.C. Gmx. STAT. § 20-17 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
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applied to the Department to correct its records. The Court stated
that he could not, when on trial for a criminal offense, collaterally
attack the record of revocation which did not on its face disclose
invalidity."3
JUDICIAL REVIEW

In McGinnis v. Old Fort FinishingPlant 4 the plaintiff appealed
to the Industrial Commission from a ruling denying a claim of
compensation by a deputy commissioner. In his application for
review to the full Commission, the plaintiff did not contend as a
ground for appeal that the defendant had waived the applicable
statute of limitations. 5
After a hearing, the full Commission affirmed the deputy commissioner. The plaintiff appealed to the superior court, and, for
the first time, he maintained that the defendant had waived the
statute of limitations. Both the superior court and the Supreme
Court affirmed the Commission. The Supreme Court pointed to
Rule XXI of the Commission which provides that all grounds for
appeal to the full commission must be set out and that all grounds
not set out are deemed waived and abandoned.
The Court concluded that the position taken by the plaintiff in
the superior court was a change of theory which, according to prior
decisions, is not permissible.'
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES

In State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Carolina Coach Co.' 7 coach
line A filed schedules and rates for "through service" between Dur'"Accord, Beaver v. Scheidt, 251 N.C. 671, 111 S.E.2d 881 (1960), dis-

cussed in 39 N.C.L. REv. 324 (1961), where the Court said that if the Department of Motor Vehicles has improperly deprived the defendant of his
license due to a mistake of law or fact, he cannot contemptuously ignore the
quasi-judicial determination made by the Department; his remedy is to apply
to the Department for a hearing as provided for by G.S. §20-16(c) or to
apply to the superior court as provided for by G.S. § 20-25. See also Callanan Road Improvement Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 507 (1953), where
the United States Supreme Court held that an action by the Interstate Commerce Commission not appealed from is final.

To determine whether the

action is right or wrong, a direct attack in such circumstances is the proper
procedure; the validity of the Commission's order cannot be collaterally
attacked.
14253 N.C. 493, 117 S.E.2d 490 (1960).
15
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-47 (1958).

"E.g., Waddell v. Carson, 245 N.C. 669, 97 S.E.2d 222 (1957); Paul v.
Neece, 244 N.C. 565, 94 S.E.2d 596 (1956).
1254 N.C. 668, 119 S.E.2d 621 (1961).
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ham and Raleigh. Coach line B challenged the legality and authority of these schedules and rates. The Utilities Commission recognized that if A combined two separate authorities which it held,
"through service" between Durham and Raleigh might be proper.
However, the Commission did not decide that question, but noted
that A had not attempted to combine the two authorities for a period
of twelve years and stated that any right which may have existed
for a combination had been lost by failure to exercise it during this
period.
The Commission relied upon its Rule 9 which provides that the
non-use of an authorized service for a period of thirty days or longer
without the written consent of the Commission shall be considered
good cause for cancellation of such service. On appeal the superior
court's reversal of the Commission's order that the defendant abandon its through service was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The
Court stated that a discontinuance or non-use of a service is not cancellation under Rule 9, but is only cause for cancellation, and that
Rule 9 is not self-executing. The existence of the cause must be
determined before cancellation can be ordered. Therefore, the Commission erred in deciding that non-use amounted to an automatic
cancellation.

AGENCY AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AGENCY

Family PurposeDoctrine
In Grindstaff v. Watts,' a case of first impression, the Court held
that the family purpose doctrine does not apply to the operation of
motorboats. The Court stated that public policy does not require
that the doctrine be extended to instrumentalities other than motor
vehicles operating on public highways. This decision brings North
Carolina into accord with other jurisdictions which have dealt with
the problem of extending the family purpose doctrine.'
The instant case is the subject of a Note in this volume of the
3

Law Review.
-254 N.C. 568, 119 S.E.2d 784 (1961).
'E.g., Calhoun v. Pair, 197 Ga. 703, 30 S.E.2d 180 (1944); Felcyn v.
Gamble, 185 Minn. 357, 241 N.W. 37 (1932); Pflugmacher v. Thomas, 34
Wash. 2d 687, 209 P.2d 443 (1949).
'Note, 40 N.C.L. REv. 647 (1962).
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Thsiimony bf Agent to Trove Agency

It is universally field that agency and its extent cannot be proved
In Sealey v. Albany Ins. Co.'
by the mere declaration of the agerit
an- agent offered to testify that he had authority to cancel an insurance policy. The trial judge refused to allow the agent's testimony
as proof of his authority.' On appeal the Supreme Court reversed,
pointing out that this exclusionary rule of evidence applies only to
e&tra-judicia declarations'of the agent, and that the agent may of
course testify under oath as to the fact of agency.'
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

Application for Review
G.S. § 97-47 provides that the Industrial Commission may review any award, but that "no such review shall be made after twelve
months from the date of the last payment" awarded under that
article. In Baldwin v. Amazon Cotton Mills' plaintiff made application for review within the twelve months period but the review
hearing was not actually held until more than twelve months after
the last payment of compensation. The Court, for the first time,
squarely ruled that the fact that the Industrial Commission did not
actually hear the claim until after the twelve months period had
elapsed did not bar the plaintiff's right to review.'
Pre-existing Conditions
The fact that an employee is suffering from a pre-existing condition which makes him more susceptible to injury does not necessarily
'E.g., Kelly v.Arave, 41 Idaho 723, 243 Pac. 366 (1925) ; Estes v. Aaron,
227 Mass. 96, 116 N.E. 392 (1917); Mally v. Excelsior Wrapper Co., 181
Mich. 568, 148 N.W.443 (1914); State v.Lassiter, 191 N.C. 210, 131 S.E.
577 (1926). See generally Annot., 80 A.L.R. 604 (1932).
r253 N.C. 774, 117 S.E.2d 744 (1961).
'The trial court also refused to admit the agency contract inevidence, and
on appeal this too was held to be error.
E.g., Jones v.Carolina Power & Light Co., 206 N.C. 862, 175 S.E. 167
(1934) ;Hill v.Bean, 150 N.C.436, 64 S.E. 212 (1909) ;New Home Sewing
Mach. Co. v.Seago, 128 N.C.158, 38 S.E. 805 (1901).
8253 N.C.740, 117 S.E.2d 718 (1961).

'The Court pointed out that other cases, though not expressly deciding
this point, have used language from which this rule could be implied. See,
e.g., Harris v.Asheville Contracting Co., 240 N.C.715, 83 S.E.2d 802 (1954),
where the Court stated, "The parties to this appeal are expressly authorized
by statute, G.S. 97-47, to apply to the Commission to review the award made
inthis proceeding, if there is a change inthe condition of the plaintiff; provided, the request for such review is made within the time prescribed by the
statute." Id. at 720, 83 S.E.2d at 805. (Emphasis added.) See also Paris v.
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bar him from recovering compensation in case- of injury and disability which,.is -proximately caused by an accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment."0 But the employment must
have some definite discernible relation to, the accident. 1 It has been
held that an employee who is seized with-an epileptic seizure,' 2 or
like attack.3 which causes him to fall, may still be awarded compensation if a particular hazard inherent in the working conditions also
contributes to the fall and consequent injury. Alifred v.. AllfredGardner,Inc.' 4 is the most recent North Carolina case involving this
somewhat rare occurrence. There claimant, who was subject to
"black-outs," lost consciousness while driving an automobile in the
course of his employment and collided with a pole. The Court, in
reaffirming its prior position, held that where a combination of the
employee's predisposition to injury and the hazards of the employment produce the accident, the resulting injury is compensable. 5
Carolina Builders Corp., 244 N.C. 35, 92 S.E.2d 405 (1956); Dail v. Kellex
Corp., 233 N.C. 446, 64 S.E.2d 438 (1951).
o"The hazards of employment do not have to set in motion the sole causative force of an injury in order to make it compensable. By the weight of
authority it is held that where a workman by reason of constitutional infirmities is predisposed to sustain injuries while engaged in labor, nevertheless the leniency and humanity of the law permit him to recover compensation
if the physical aspects of the employment contribute in some reasonable degree
to bring about or intensify the condition which renders him susceptible to
such accident and consequent injury." Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233
N.C. 88, 92, 63 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1950).
" However, compensation cannot be recovered where the incapacity is
primarily due to disease or to the physical 'condition of the employee at the
time when he was doing his usual and ordinary work. See, e.g., New Staunton Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 304 Ill. 613, 136 N.E. 783 (1922); Cox
v. Kansas City Ref. Co., 108 Kan. 320, 195 Pac. 863 (1921) ; Hicks v. Meridian Lumber Co., 152 La. 975, 94 So. 903 (1922). See generally Annot.,
28 A.L.R. 204 (1924).
12 Baltimore Dry Docks & Shipbuilding Co. v. Webster, 139 Md. 616, 116
Atl. 842 (1922). But in Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 63
S.E.2d 173 (1950), recovery was denied when plaintiff felt the epileptic
seizure coming on, parked his truck, and lay down on the seat in a place of
apparent safety. The Court held that there was no showing that any hazard
of the employment contributed in any degree to the unfortunate occurrence,
and that it was solely the force of his seizure that moved him from his position
of safety to his injury.
1 Gonier v. Chase Co., 97 Conn. 46, 115 Atl. 677 (1921) (spells of unconsciousness); Ramlow v. Moon Lake Ice Co., 192 Mich. 505, 158 N.W.
1027 (1926) (delirium tremens resulting from shock of accident) ; Freedman
v. Spicer Mfg. Corp., 97 N.J.L. 325, 116 Ad. 427 (1922) (fainting when
inoculated against influenza).
14253 N.C. 554, 117 S.E.2d 476 (1960).
'5 The Court felt that two circumstances fixed liability on the defendants:
(1) a blackout to which the claimant had a predisposition; (2) the blackout
occurred at a time when the duties of the claimant's employment required
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Waiver and Estoppel
In Ashe v. Barnes 6 plaintiff, one of seven employees of the defendant, was injured in an accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment. Defendant, at the time of the accident, had not
given the notice required to exempt himself from the Workmen's
Compensation Act.17 However, he had taken out accident insurance
covering each of his employees. Plaintiff received the benefits of
this insurance and then brought this action to recover workmen's
compensation payments. From an award of compensation by the
Commission, defendant appealed on the ground that plaintiff, by
accepting the benefits of the insurance, was estopped to claim under
the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Court, in affirming the
award, held, in accord with the majority rule,18 that " 'in general,
the doctrines of waiver and estoppel do not apply in workmen's
compensation cases....
The Court also considered whether defendant was entitled, under
G.S. § 97-42,2o to a deduction for the payments made by the insurance company. In construing this provision for the first time the
Court held that it applies only to payments made by the employer and
does not authorize an employer to substitute an accident policy for
the benefits required by the Workmen's Compensation Act.2
him to be driving an automobile. It was the combination of the two that
produced
the accident.
16255 N.C. 310, 121 S.E.2d 549 (1961).
17 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-3 (1958),
provides that every employer is presumed to have accepted the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act
unless he has given the notice required by G.S. § 97-4. The latter section provides, "The notice of nonacceptance of the provisions of this article shall be
given thirty days prior to any accident resulting in injury or death: Provided,
that if any such accident occurred less than thirty days after the date of employment, notice of such exemption or acceptance given at the time of employment shall be sufficient notice thereof." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-4 (1958).
"E.g., Bell v. Tennessee Coal, Iron, & R.R., 247 Ala. 394, 24 So. 2d 443
(1945); Alabam Freight Lines v. Chateau, 57 Ariz. 378, 114 P.2d 233
(1941); Kennedy-Van Saun Mfg. & Eng'r Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 355
Il. 519, 189 N.E. 916 (1934).
1 255 N.C. at 313, 121 S.E.2d at 551, quoting from 100 C.J.S. Workmen's
Compensation § 389 (1958).
o "Any payments made by the employer to the injured employee during
the period of his disability . . .which by the terms of this article were not
due and payable when made, may ...be deducted from the amount to be paid
as compensation." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-42 (1958).
" It would seem that the employer might reach the desired result by
having the insurance made payable to himself and then paying it over to the
employee. Such payments might then be considered payments by the employer under G.S. § 97-42.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE

(PLEADING AND PARTIES)
PLEADING
Alternative Statements

In Bryant v. Occidental Life Ins. Co.' plaintiff purported to
allege two separate causes of action based upon the defendant's delay
in acting upon the plaintiff's intestate's application for life insurance.
The plaintiff alleged, in what was designated the first cause of action,
that her intestate had made an application for life insurance and had
paid the amount of the first premium, and that the defendant delayed
unreasonably in acting upon the application. Plaintiff contended
that such delay together with retention of the premium constituted
an acceptance of the application, entitling her to recover under the
policy. In the second cause of action, which sounded in tort rather
than contract, essentially the same facts were alleged with the further
contention that had the defendant rejected the application within a
reasonable time, the intestate could have obtained insurance from
another company; and, therefore, because of the defendant's negligent failure to act upon the application, the plaintiff was entitled to
recover damages. On the defendant's motion to strike, the trial court
stated that the two causes of action were mutually repugnant and
inconsistent and gave the plaintiff an opportunity to elect which
cause he wished to retain. On the plaintiff's refusal to elect, the trial
court struck the second cause of action.
On appeal the Court, confining its decision to the matters raised
by the motion to strike, held it was error to dismiss the so-called
second cause of action on the ground that the allegations therein
were mutually repugnant and inconsistent with the first cause of
action. The Court pointed out that the allegations of the first and
second causes of action were entirely consistent and, except for minor
differences, were identical.
Amendments
In Dixon v. Briley2 action was brought for wrongful death of
plaintiff's intestate. After the defendant had filed his answer, he
moved for leave to amend to set up the alleged imputed negligence
253 N.C. 565, 117 S.E.2d 435 (1960).
2253 N.C. 807, 117 S.E.2d 747 (1961).
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of the intestate's father as a bar to that portion of the recovery which
would inure to the father. The trial court held as a matter of law
that the matters alleged in the proposed amendment did not constitute a defense, either absolute or pro tanto, to the plaintiff's action
and denied the defendant's motion to amend. On appeal, the Court
held that it was error to deny the amendment as a matter of law and
that the defendant was entitled to have his motion considered and
passed upon by the court as a discretionary matter.8
In Modern Elec. Co. v. Dennis4 the defendant sought to amend
his answer prior to trial in order to correct mistakes contained
therein. The original answer contained allegations to the effect that
the defendant had complete control and supervision over certain
operations. In the amended answer it was alleged that the plaintiff,
and not the defendant, had complete power and authority to supervise and control the operations. The amendment was allowed and
plaintiff objected, asserting that such an amendment was improper
in that it substantially changed the defense originally set forth by
the defendant.
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court noted that
amendments authorized by G.S. § 1-163 are divided into two classes:
(1) amendments before trial, or during trial when the opposing
party is given an opportunity to investigate any new matter brought
out in the amendment, and (2) amendments offered during or after
the trial for the purpose of conforming the pleadings to the facts
offered or admitted in evidence. As to the first class of amendments,
the trial court has broad discretionary powers, but as to the second
class, the right to amend is more restricted.5 The Court pointed
out that the defendant amended his complaint prior to trial for the
purpose of correcting a mistake and setting out what he contended
were the true facts.' The Court then concluded that under such
'Woody v. Pickelsimer, 248 N.C. 599, 104 S.E.2d 273 (1958); Pink v.

Hanby, 220 N.C. 667, 18 S.E.2d 127 (1942) ; Cody v. Hovey, 219 N.C. 369,
14 S.E.2d 30 (1941) ; Tickle v. Hobgood, 212 N.C. 762, 194 S.E. 461 (1938);
Townsend v. Williams, 117 N.C. 330, 23 S.E. 461 (1895).
'255 N.C. 64, 120 S.E.2d 533 (1961).

" Perkins v. Langdon, 233 N.C. 240, 63 S.E.2d 565 (1951); Freeman v.

Thompson, 216 N.C. 484, 5 S.E.2d 434 (1939).
'N.C. GFN. STAT. § 1-163 (1953), provides, with respect to mistakes in
the pleadings, "The judge or court may, before and after judgment, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms as may be proper, amend any pleading,
process or proceeding, by adding or striking out the name of any party; by
correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect .....
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circumstances there was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge
in allowing the amendment since the plaintiff had sufficient time to
prepare its case for trial after the motion to strike had been disallowed.
Burden of Proof
In General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Distributors,Inc.,7 the plaintiff sought to recover personal property consigned by it to the defendant and stored in the defendant's warehouse under a warehouse
agreement executed between the parties. Plaintiff alleged that it
was the owner of the goods and was entitled to immediate possession,
and that the property was being wrongfully detained by the defendant. The defendant admitted that plaintiff was the title holder, but
denied the allegations as to the plaintiff's right to possession and as
to wrongful detention. On the issue whether the plaintiff had wrongfully taken its inventory from the defendant's warehouse," the trial
court placed the burden of proof on the defendant. On appeal the
Court, holding this to be error, said that the burden of proof as to
the plaintiff's alleged right of immediate possession and the defendant's wrongful detention of the property was on the plaintiff. The
Court stated: "The burden of proof of an issue ordinarily rests on
the party who asserts the affirmative thereof." 9
Conflicting Statements
The problem of conflicting statements in pleadings was recently
considered in Hunnicutt v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co."0 The defendant
insurance company had issued an automobile liability policy to one
John Robert Huskey, covering a 1953 Ford. In a prior action,
Huskey had been adjudged negligent in the operation of a 1947
Chevrolet, and the plaintiff had obtained a final judgment. The
judgment being returned unsatisfied, this action was brought to
recover from the defendant the amount of Huskey's legal liability to
the plaintiff as established by the judgment.
'253 N.C. 459, 117 S.E.2d 479 (1960).
The Court on appeal stated that the pleadings raised issues of fact as to
whether the plaintiff was entitled to immediate possession and whether defendant wrongfully detained the property, and the issue submitted by the trial
court was not sufficient to determine these questions.
0253 N.C. at 468, 117 S.E.2d at 486. Accord, Benner v. Phipps, 214 N.C.
14, 197 S.E. 549 (1938); Wilson v. Inter-Ocean Cas. Co., 210 N.C. 585, 188
S.E. 102 (1936) ; McPherson v. Williams, 205 N.C. 177, 170 S.E. 662 (1933).
10255 N.C. 515, 122 S.E.2d 74 (1961).
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The plaintiff alleged that the 1947 Chevrolet was "owned by
either John Robert Huskey, his mother, or some other member of
his household." Under the terms of the policy, if Huskey owned
the 1947 Chevrolet at the time of the collision the policy did not
cover his liability. Conversely, if the automobile was owned by his
mother, or some other member of his household other than his wife,
the 'policy would be operative, and the defendant liable." Before
evidence was offered, the defendant demurred ore tenus to the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. The trial
court's overruling of the demurrer was reversed on appeal.
The complaint clearly alleged alternative statements of fact as
to the ownership of the car, one of which was not legally sufficient to
allow recovery under the terms of the insurance policy. The Court
held that in such a case, where only a single cause of action is alleged
and there are alternative statements of fact, one of which is legally
sufficient to constitute a cause of action and the other is not, they
neutralize each other, and a demurrer will lie.' 2

Contribution
In Herringv. Jackson" the Court once again considered whether
the insurer of one joint tortfeasor has the right to enforce contribution from the other alleged joint tortfeasor under G.S. § 1-240."4 In
an earlier action the injured third party had obtained a consent judg" Under the terms of the policy, Huskey was insured while operating the
1953 Ford described in the policy and while temporarily using a substitute
automobile when the Ford named in the policy was withdrawn from normal
use due to breakdown or repairs, provided that such substitute was not owned
by either Huskey or his wife.
"Accord, Lewis v. Lee, 246 N.C. 68, 97 S.E.2d 469 (1957); Lindley v.
Yeatman, 242 N.C. 145, 87 S.E.2d 5 (1955). A contrary result would be
reached under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal Rule 8(e) (2)
provides in part: "When two or more statements are made in the alternative
and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not
made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements."
The Court noted that the plaintiff, under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-163 (1953),
might move for leave to amend his complaint.
255 N.C. 537, 122 S.E.2d 366 (1961).
""[A]nd in the event the judgment was obtained in an action arising
out of a joint tort, and only one, or not all of the joint tort-feasors, were made
parties defendant, those tort-feasors made parties defendant, and against
whom judgment was obtained, may, in an action therefor, enforce contribution from the other joint tort-feasors; or at any time before the judgment
is obtained, the joint tort-feasors made parties defendant may, upon motion,
have the other joint tort-feasors made parties defendant ... " N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-240 (1953).
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ment against the present plaintiff, and such judgment was satisfied
entirely by the plaintiff's insurer. Contemporaneously with the payment of the judgment, the plaintiff executed a "loan receipt" agreement, its purpose being to confer upon the plaintiff's insurer a right
to enforce contribution from the alleged joint tortfeasor.'
The trial court dismissed the action, and on appeal the Supreme
Court affirmed. The Court pointed out that the right to enforce
contribution, if any, must be based on G.S. § 1-240,16 and under the
decisions of this state it is settled that the insurance carrier of one
joint tortfeasor cannot enforce contribution under G.S. § 1-24017
because the insurance company is not deemed to be a joint tortfeasor
as contemplated by the statute.' 8
The Court stated that the present action was prosecuted solely
for the benefit of the insurance company; therefore, the plaintiff was
not the real party in interest and under G.S. § 1-73 could not maintain the action. 9
Counterclaims
In York v. Cole 20 the plaintiff brought action to have a conveyance of realty to the defendants set aside because of alleged fraud
and coercion and to recover certain property belonging to the plain5
Under this agreement it was stated that the plaintiff received the sum required to pay the judgment against him from the insurance company as a loan,
such loan to be repayable only in the event and only to the extent of any
recovery which may be had by the plaintiff from the defendant as a joint
tortfeasor. The agreement further provided that the plaintiff agreed to cooperate fully with the insurance company and would allow the suit to be
brought in his own name if necessary, to the end that all right of contribution
which he had or might thereafter acquire could be enforced. Finally, it was
provided that the expense of the litigation, if any, would be borne by the
insurance company, and if an action was brought, it would be under the
exclusive control of the insurance company.
"oPotter v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., 242 N.C. 67, 86 S.E.2d 780 (1955).
17 Squires v. Sorahan, 252 N.C. 589, 114 S.E.2d 277 (1960) ; Lumbermen's
Mut. Cas. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 211 N.C. 13, 188 S.E.
634 (1936).
" "A most liberal construction of the statute will not permit the writing
into it of the liability insurance carrier of tort-feasors when only tort-feasors
and judgment debtors are mentioned therein." Gaffney v. Lumbermen's Mut.
Cas. Co., 209 N.C. 515, 519, 184 S.E. 46, 47-48 (1936), quoted with approval
in Lumbermen's Mut Cas. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., supra
note 17, at 17, 188 S.E. at 636.
"8It thus appears that where the insurer has paid the entire judgment no
one can sue for contribution under G.S. § 1-240. For a discussion of the
problem of the insurer as the real party in interest, see Note, 38 N.C.L. Rv.
99 (1959).
20254 N.C. 224, 118 S.E.2d 419 (1961).
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tiff alleged to have been wrongfully converted by the defendants.
The defendants set up a counterclaim for services rendered to the
plaintiff and for money expended in caring for her in their home.
The Court in a per curiam opinion held that the plaintiff's demurrer
ore tenus to the defendants' counterclaim was properly overruled.
The Court stated: "A complainant who seeks to have an instrument,
obligation, or transaction canceled or set aside must return or offer
to return whatever he may have received from the defendant."2 1
Cross Actions
A cross action is the allegation of a cause of action by a defendant
against the plaintiff or a third party.2 2 The cross-complaint, therefore, must meet the requirements for a complaint by setting forth a
28
concise statement of ultimate facts constituting a cause of action.
In Freel v. Center, Inc. 24 the Court held that a demurrer to the defendant's cross action was properly sustained when the allegations
contained therein were but mere conclusions of the pleader, not supported by proper allegations of fact.
In City of Durham v. Reidsville Eng'r Co.25 plaintiff instituted
an action for breach of contract against the defendant (hereinafter
referred to as Construction Company) and its surety. The plaintiff's
cause of action was founded on alleged undisclosed defects in both
materials and installation which were not discovered until after the
city had accepted the work in question. The Construction Company
and its surety had executed a "maintenance bond" to guarantee satisfactory performance of the work for a period of two years after its
acceptance by the city.
The Construction Company's surety filed a cross action against
the supervising engineers alleging the existence of a contractual
obligation on the part of the engineers to the surety to properly
supervise the performance of the contract by the Construction Company. The cross action further alleged periodic inspection and final
approval of the project by the supervising engineers. The surety
" Id. at 225, 118 S.E.2d at 420. Accord, Pure Oil Co. v. Baars, 224 N.C.
612, 31 S.E.2d 854 (1944).
2Perkins v. Perkins, 249 N.C. 152, 105 S.E.2d 663 (1958) ; C.I.T. Corp.
v. Watkins, 208 N.C. 448, 181 S.E. 270 (1935); American Nat'l Bank v. Hill,
169 28N.C.
235,
85 S.E.
(1915).
Cases
cited
note 209
22 supra.
24255 N.C. 345, 121 S.E.2d 562 (1961).
2,55 N.C. 98, 120 S.E.2d 564 (1961); also discussed under CoNr"Ac'rs,
Supervising Engineer, infra.
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asserted that if the city was entitled to a judgment against it, then
it was entitled to a judgment against the engineers for negligence in
failing to properly supervise the work. A demurrer to the cross
action was overruled. On certiorari, the Court held that the demurrer should have been sustained because the cross action failed
to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. From its
examination of the contract between the city and the Construction
Company, the Court found that the engineers were not parties to the
contract and in no way bound themselves as surety for the Construction Company. Furthermore, the contract specifically provided that
the inspection of the project should not relieve the Construction
Company of any obligation to do sound and reliable work, and that
any omission by the engineers to disapprove of any work should not
be construed to be an acceptance by the city of any defective work.
The Court further noted that even if the cross action had stated a
good cause of action, it could not have survived a demurrer for misjoinder of parties and causes.
It is generally held that a defendant can not, by a cross action,
litigate a question against a third party when the issue thus attempted
to be raised is not essential to a full and complete determination of
the cause of action alleged by the plaintiff.2" Here the surety's cross
action against the engineers was not founded upon or necessarily
connected with the subject matter of the plaintiff's suit and was,
therefore, improper.
A similar result was reached in Manning v. Hart. 7 Plaintiff
brought an action to recover for personal injuries resulting from a
collision between the automobile in which she was a passenger and
the defendant's truck. The defendant denied negligence, pleaded
contributory negligence, and set up a cross action against the plaintiff as well as against the driver and owner of the car. The defendant contended that the plaintiff was the agent of the owner
under the family purpose doctrine, and, therefore, if the plaintiff was
negligent as alleged,2" he was entitled to recover on his cross action
against the owner under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
.- E.g., Clark v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 247 N.C. 705, 102 S.E.2d 252
(1958) ; Hobbs v. Goodman, 240 N.C. 192, 81 S.E.2d 413 (1954) ; Wrenn v.
Graham, 236 N.C. 719, 74 S.E.2d 232 (1953); Schnepp v. Richardson, 222
N.C. 228, 22 S.E.2d 555 (1942).
255 N.C. 368, 121 S.E.2d 721 (1961).
It was alleged that the plaintiff and the driver of the automobile were
engaged in a joint enterprise, and that the alleged negligence of the driver

was imputed to the plaintiff.
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The plaintiff's demurrer to the cross action was held to have been
properly sustained. The Court stated that the cross action against
the owner failed to allege sufficient facts to establish the plaintiff as
the agent of the owner under the family purpose doctrine or otherwise; therefore, the cross action could not withstand a demurrer.
The general rule in North Carolina is that in order for a defendant to maintain a cross action in the plaintiff's suit, it is necessary
that the cross action be germane to, founded upon or connected with
the subject matter in litigation between the plaintiff and the defendant. 9 In the present case the existence of the agency relationship between the owner and the plaintiff was necessary to connect
the subject matter of the cross action with that of the plaintiff's
action, and, hence, without such agency relationship the cross action
80
was improper.
Defective Statement of a Cause of Action
The problem of a defective statement of a good cause of action
was again considered by the Court in Jacobs v. Highway Comm'n.8'
Petitioner had instituted special proceedings in accordance with
chapter 40 of the General Statutes to recover damages for the taking
of a leasehold interest in certain property by the Highway Commission. The petitioner alleged ownership of the leasehold interest, the
taking of the property by the Commission under statutory authority,
and that he had been damaged by the taking. He also requested an
appraisal of his damages according to law. However, the petitioner
did not state the names of all the parties "who own or have, or claim
to own or have, estates or interests" in the land as required by G.S.
§ 40-12. Because of this omission the trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer ore tenus on the ground that the petition failed
to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
On appeal to the Supreme Court this was reversed. The Court
held that the petition stated a good cause of action and that the failure

" Clark v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 247 N.C. 705, 102 S.E.2d 252
(1958); Kimsey v. Reaves, 242 N.C. 721, 89 S.E.2d 386 (1955); Wrenn v.
Graham, 236 N.C. 719, 74 S.E.2d 232 (1953); Schnepp v. Richardson, 222
N.C. 228, 22 S.E.2d 555 (1942).
"Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-137 (1953), the defendant must assert his
cause of action by way of counterclaim or cross action in the plaintiff's action
where the issues raised in the plaintiff's action, if answered in his favor, will
necessarily establish facts sufficient to defeat the defendant's cause of action.
Bullard v. Berry Coal & Oil Co., 254 N.C. 756, 119 S.E.2d 910 (1961).
81254 N.C. 200, 118 S.E.2d 416 (1961).
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to. name all parties who owned- or claimed any interest in the land
was such a defect that did not go to the substance' of the case. • The
Court conclided that the petition contained a- defective statement of
a good cause of action and that the action should not have been
dismissed upon demurrer until the time foi obtaining leave to amend
had expired.82
Joinder of Causes and Parties
In Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Waters3 an 'action was brought on a
note and to foreclose a deed of trust securing the same. The defendants admitted the indebtedness to the plaintiff and the execution
of the deed of trust in question. For a further answer and defense
the defendants alleged that they had owned three lots, one of which
had been conveyed to the plaintiff as security and the other two
conveyed to third party purchasers. It was further alleged that
through mutual mistake of the parties concerned, the defendants had
conveyed to the plaintiff and to the third party purchasers lots other
than the ones intended to be conveyed. The defendants sought to
have the purchasers of the other two lots joined as parties defendant
in order that the conveyances might be reformed to correspond with
the true intention of the parties. The Court held that the plaintiff's
demurrer to the further answer and defense on the grounds of misjoinder of parties and causes was properly sustained.
In order for the joinder to be proper under G.S. § 1-123'4 all
parties must be affected by all causes of action. In the present action
it is clear that the plaintiff and the additional defendants were not all
interested in all of the lots in question. Further, the respective
causes of action contained in the complaint and further answer did
not arise out of the same transaction and were not connected with
8 Accord, East Carolina Lumber Co. v. Pamlico County, 250 N.C. 681,
110 S.E.2d 278 (1959) ; Elliott v. Goss, 250 N.C. 185, 108 S.E.2d 475 (1959) ;
Skipper v. Cheatham, 249 N.C. 706, 107 S.E.2d 625 (1959) ; Adams v. Flora
MacDonald College, 247 N.C. 648, 101 S.E.2d 809 (1958); Lindley v. Yeatman, 242 N.C. 145, 87 S.E.2d 5 (1955); Carolina Builders Corp. v. New
Amsterdam Cas. Co., 236 N.C. 513, 73 S.E.2d 155 (1952); Davis v. Rhodes,
231 N.C. 71, 56 S.E.2d 43 (1949). In the case of the defective statement of
a good cause of action, the plaintiff may move for leave to amend under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-131 (1953).

s255 N.C. 553, 122 S.E.2d 387 (1961).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-123 (1953), provides, in part: "[T]he causes of
action so united must all belong to one of these classes, and, except in actions
for the foreclosure of mortgages, must affect all the parties to the action, and
not require different places of trial, and must be separately stated."
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the same subject of action. Therefore, there was a misjoinder of
parties and causes. 5
In Jones v. Douglas Aircraft Co."6 plaintiff brought action to
recover for the wrongful death of his intestate. It was alleged that
the defendant negligently failed to cut off high voltage current on
certain transmission lines after it had undertaken and agreed to do
so, and that the intestate, relying on the defendant's performance of
these duties, was electrocuted when a crane which he was operating
came into contact with the charged power lines. The defendant
denied negligence and set up a cross action against Boyd & Goforth,
Inc., the contractor in charge of the work, for contribution. In the
cross action it was alleged that the intestate was on the premises by
virtue of a contract between Boyd & Goforth and the intestate's
employer; that the intestate received such information as he had
regarding the .work to be done, including whether or not the power
line was energized, from the additional defendant; and that such
additional defendant failed to warn the intestate that the power lines
were energized.
Boyd.& Goforth demurred to the cross action for misjoinder of
parties and causes and for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. While the Supreme Court affirmed the sustaining of the demurrer to the cross action for failure to state a
cause of action,8 7 it pointed out that the cross action was not subject
to a demurrer for misjoinder of parties and causes. The additional
defendant had contended that the cross action did not relate to and
did not stem from the alleged cause of action set forth in the complaint."8 However, the Court stated that the allegations of the com"Accord, Burleson v. Burleson, 217 N.C. 336, 7 S.E.2d 706 (1940);
Holland v. Whittington, 215 N.C. 330, 1 S.E.2d 813 (1939); Smith v. Greensboro Joint Stock Land Bank, 213 N.C. 343, 196 S.E. 481 (1938). The Court
further noted that G.S. § 1-73, relied upon by the defendants to support the
joinder, allows the trial court to bring in all parties who have such an interest
in the subject matter of the action that a final determination of the controversy
cannot be made without their presence. But the Court pointed out that this
section is subject to the limitations expressly incorporated in G.S. § 1-123
and cannot be used to engraft upon an existing action an independent action
which is in no way essential to a final determination of the orginial action.
Moore v. Massengill, 227 N.C. 244, 41 S.E.2d 655 (1947).
"253 N.C. 482, 117 S.E.2d 496 (1960).
"'The Court held that the cross action failed to state a cause of action
against the additional defendant because it failed to allege facts sufficient to
show a breach of duty upon the part of Boyd & Goforth proximately causing
the death of the plaintiff's intestate.
" The additional defendant relied upon Hobbs v. Goodman, 241 N.C. 297,
84 S.E.2d 904 (1954), as grounds for sustaining the demurrer. In Hobbs
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plaint and the cross complaint were in complete accord as to what
caused the death of the intestate, and, therefore, there was no attempt
in the cross action to set up a cause-of action based on facts different
from those on which plaintiff's action was based.89
The Jones case was again considered by the Supreme Court on
the defendant's motion to amend his cross action against Boyd &
Goforth.4 0 In the lower court a consent judgment was entered
whereby the original defendant, Douglas, paid $50,000 to plaintiff
in complete discharge of its liability. Upon paying such judgment
Douglas transferred to its trustee the power to prosecute the action
against Boyd & Goforth for contribution under G.S. § 1-240. Douglas then attempted to amend its cross action.
In a per curiam decision the Supreme Court affirmed the trial
judge's refusal to allow the amendment. The Court held that by
the consent judgment and the assignment thereof, the original parties
had settled their controversy, and, therefore, there was no case left
in court in which the original defendant could proceed against the
additional defendant for contribution. The Court further stated that
due to the assignment of all the original defendant's rights to its
trustee the original defendant was no longer the real party in interest
41
and could not maintain the suit.

Reply-Departure
In Nix v. English plaintiff sought recovery for personal injuries sustained while riding as a passenger in the defendant's car.
The complaint alleged that the defendant drove the car at an excessive rate of speed on a dangerous winding road without sufficient
the plaintiff alleged she was injured when a store sign fell on her. The defendant in a cross action against his landlord alleged that plaintiff was not
injured by the falling sign, but rather by a part of an awning negligently
erected by the landlord. The demurrer to the cross action was sustained.
The Court stated that the original defendant was not entitled to set up a cross
action against the additional defendant on an entirely different state of facts
which invoked principles of law not germane to the subject matter of the
plaintiff's cause of action.
" The defendant cannot raise issues by way of cross action which are not
essential to a full and complete determination of the plaintiff's action. Hobbs
v. Goodman, supra note 38.
40254 N.C. 323, 118 S.E.2d 764 (1961).
"Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Green, 200 N.C. 535, 157 S.E. 797 (1931). The
Court also noted that the denial of the motion to amend was an exercise of
the trial court's discretion and would not be interfered with unless there was
an abuse of discretion. Accord, Hood v. Elder Motor Co., 209 N.C. 303, 183
S.E. 529 (1936); McKeel v. Latham, 203 N.C. 246, 165 S.E. 694 (1932).
42254 N.C. 414, 119 S.E.2d 220 (1961).
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brakes and without proper control, and as a result the' car left the
road causing injury.'to the plaintiff, The defendnt denied all allegations'.of negligence contained in the complaint. As a further
defense the defendant alleged that she was a diabetic, taking insulin
to control her condition; that while operating the car in question
in a lawful manner, she was suddenly overcome by an attack of
insulin shock and lost consciousness, thus causing her to lose control
of the car; that shehad never had such an attack while awake. The
defendant also alleged that the plaintiff knew of her diabetic condition, and if she were negligent in failing to anticipate such an attack,
the plaintiff was likewise negligent in failing to anticipate it.
The plaintiff by reply admitted the allegations of the answer with
respect to the defendant's diabetic condition and the fact that the
defendant was driv'ing in a lawful manner at the time of the accident.
The plaintiff algo pleaded gross negligence on the part of the defendant in"
attempting to operate the car when she should have known
she was subject to insulin attacks and when she had knowledge of
an impending diabetic coma. However, the plaintiff did not seek
leave* to amend the original allegations contained in her complaint
as to the defendant's gross -negligence. The case was submitted to
the jury solely on the theory of the reply:
The Supreme Court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff, holding that it was error to permit such a reply as filed by the plaintiff
and to submit the case to the jury on the allegations of the reply
rather than those contained in the complaint. The Court stated that
reply is' a defensive pleading, its purpose being to support, not to
c6ntradiWt,_the complaint.4" The Court pointed out that here the
allegations .f the complaint and reply were in no manner related.
The plaintiff's reply, rather than supporting the allegations of the
complaint, attempted to set up an entirely new cause of action inconsistent with that set forth in the complaint.
This decision is in accord with the well settled rules in North
Carolina that the plaintiff cannot set up in his reply a cause of action
entirely different from that contained in the complaint, 44 and that
' "[T]he plaintiff may reply to the new matter ... and he may allege
in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, any new matter not
inconsistent with the complaint, constituting a defense to the new matter in
the answer .... ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-141 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
"Phillips v. Hassett Mining Co., 244 N.C. 17, 92 S.E.2d 429 (1956);
Scott v. Jordan, 235 N.C. 244, 69 S.E.2d 557 (1952); Miller v. Grimsley,

220 N.C. 514, 17 S.E.2d 642 (1941); Berry v. Hyde County Land Co., 183
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the plaintiff must recover if at all on a.cause of action-stated in the
complaint.

45

Res Judicata
In Gunter v. Winders48 plaintiff brought suit to recover for personal injuries and property damage sustained in a three car collision.
In a previous wrongful death action brought by the administrator
of a passenger in the plaintiff's car who had been killed in the accident, it was adjudged that the passenger's death was the result of
the negligence of the present plaintiff and defendant, who were defendants in that action. The present defendant pleaded the judgment
as a bar to the plaintiff's action, asserting that the prior judgment
was a final adjudication of the liabilities of the plaintiff and defendant
and was conclusive as to their liabilities inter se. The lower court
sustained the defendant's plea in bar.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed and held that the record
was insufficient to sustain a plea of res judicata because the allegations and findings in the prior action did not, on their face, establish
the joint and concurrent negligence of the present plaintiff and defendant as the cause of the accident. The Court stated that in determining whether a prior judgment is res judicata, it must be interpreted with reference to the pleadings and issues submitted to
and answered by the jury. The Court pointed out that in the passenger's suit there were no allegations of joint and concurrent acts
of negligence, but rather separate and distinct acts of negligence
were alleged against the individual defendants. Furthermore, the
issues submitted to and answered by the jury in that action were
such that they did not establish the joint and concurrent negligence
of the drivers."' The Court concluded that a judgment against two
or more defendants in a tort action should not be held conclusive,
N.C. 384, 111 S.E. 707 (1922); Olmstead v. City of Raleigh, 130 N.C. 243,
41 S.E. 292 (1902). See generally 1 MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE

& PROCEDURE §§ 1263, 1265 (2d ed. 1956).
"'Manley v. Greensboro News Co., 241 N.C. 455, 85 S.E.2d 672 (1955);
Suggs v. Braxton, 227 N.C. 50, 40 S.E.2d 470 (1946).
253 N.C. 782, 117 S.E.2d 787 (1961); also discussed under TRIAL
PRACTICE, Judgments-Res Judicata-Rffect of Judgment in Favor of Passenger Against Operatorsof Two Cars as to the Rights of the Car Operators
Inter Se, infra.

"The issues submitted to the jury were: (1) was the death of the passenger caused by the negligence of the defendant Cottle as alleged in the
complaint, and (2) was the death of the passenger caused by the negligence
of the defendant Gunter as alleged in the complaint? Both issues were answered in the affirmative.
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inter se, unless their rights and liabilities were put in issue by their
pleadings.
This decision overrules prior North Carolina cases,4 and apparently aligns North Carolina with the majority view49 which holds,
in effect, that a judgment in favor of a passenger of one vehicle
against the drivers of both vehicles is not res judicata as to the
rights and liabilities of the two drivers as between themselves, unless
such rights and liabilities were put in issue by the pleadings and
litigated.
0 There
A somewhat similar situation arose in Hill v. Edwards."
Hill brought an action for damage to his automobile resulting from
a collision with an automobile driven by the defendant Edwards.
Previously, Carter, a passenger in Hill's car, had brought an action
for personal injuries against Edwards, the present defendant. Edwards, pursuant to G.S. § 1-240, moved that Hill be made an additional defendant for the purpose of contribution. Edwards alleged
that if he were negligent, Hill was also negligent, and such negligence concurred in jointly and proximately causing the injuries
sustained by Carter. There was a verdict against Edwards for
seven hundred dollars and a verdict against Hill for one half of that
amount in favor of Edwards on his cross action for contribution.
" The Court expressly overruled Lumberton Coach Co. v. Stone, 235 N.C.
619, 70 S.E.2d 673 (1952), and subsequent decisions based on its authority
to the extent that they conflict with the present decision. In Coach Co. there
was a collision between the plaintiff's bus and the defendant's truck. Plaintiff
sought to recover damages from defendant allegedly sustained in the collision.
Defendant set up as a plea in bar an action instituted by a passenger on
plaintiff's bus against both the plaintiff and the defendant. In the passenger's
suit both defendants denied negligence and alleged that the other's negligence
was the sole proximate cause of the accident. There was a settlement and a
judgment rendered on the basis of this settlement, whereby the passenger
recovered from both the plaintiff and the defendant. The Court sustained
this plea in bar. Presumably, under the Gunter decision, this would be error
because in the case of a settlement, even before the court, the rights and
liabilities of the defendants' are not put in issue with respect to each other.
Furthermore, in Coach Co. the two defendants were original defendants and,
hence, not adversaries. Therefore, the rights of the defendants as between
themselves were not adjudicated.
"E.g., Hellenic Lines v. The Exmouth, 253 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1957);
Kimmel v. Yankee Lines, 224 F.2d 644 (3rd Cir. 1955); Casey v. Balunas,
19 Conn. Supp. 365, 113 A.2d 867 (1955); Byrum v. Ames & Webb, Inc.,

196 Va. 597, 85 S.E.2d 364 (1955).

See generally

RESTATEMENT, JUDG-

§ 82 (1942), where it is stated, "The rendition of a judgment in an
action does not conclude parties to the action who are not adversaries under
the pleadings as to their rights inter se upon matters which they did not litigate, or have an opportunity to litigate, between themselves."
255 N.C. 615, 122 S.E.2d 383 (1961).
MENTs
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In the present action Edwards set up the judgment in the Carter
action as a defense and plea in bar to Hill's present action. The
Supreme Court, affirming a dismissal of the action, stated:
[W]here the plaintiff recovers judgment against the original
defendant, and the jury finds the additional defendant guilty
of negligence and that such negligence concurred in jointly
and proximately causing plaintiff's injuries and gives the
original defendant a verdict for contribution pursuant to the
provisions of G.S. 1-240, such judgment is res judicata in a
subsequent action between such drivers, based on the same
facts litigated in the cross action in the former trial.5
The plaintiff relied on Gunter as authority for overruling the plea
in bar, but the Court distinguished that case on the ground that in
Gunter the plaintiff and the defendants were all original defendants
in the prior action and, therefore, were not adversaries and could not
settle their differences inter se.
Thus it is apparent that in North Carolina where the first action
results in a judgment on the merits, a second action between the
original defendants will be barred by the first judgment only when
the co-defendants were actually adverse parties in the first suit and
had the opportunity to litigate their differences.
In Jones v. Mathis52 the defendants filed cross actions against the
plaintiff. By reply and as a pleain bar to one of the cross actions,
plaintiff alleged a final judgment in his favor against one of the
defendants. The judgment roll in the former action was not incorporated in the plaintiff's reply. Rather, the plaintiff stated that the
pleadings and judgment roll in the former action would be offered
in evidence upon the trial of the action if required. The trial court
heard the plea in bar prior to the impaneling of the jury, and, after
considering the judgment roll in the prior action, sustained the plea
in bar.
The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that it is within the discretion of the trial judge to determine whether in the circumstances
of a particular case a plea in bar is to be disposed of prior to the
trial on the merits of plaintiff's alleged cause of action.5" The Court
'Id. at 617, 122 S.E.2d at 385.

'2254 N.C. 421, 119 S.E.2d 200 (1961).
Hayes v. Ricard, 251 N.C. 485, 112 S.E.2d 123 (1960) ; Gillikin v. Gillikin, 248 N.C. 710, 104 S.E.2d 861 (1958); McAuley v. Sloan, 173 N.C. 80,
91 S.E.701 (1917).
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also stated that the defendant's contention that the trial court considered the judgment roll prematurely in that it had not been formally offered in evidence was without merit. 4
Statute of Limitation
In Speas v. Ford55 the plaintiffs instituted an action for breach
of contract in March 1955. Because of requests for extensions of
time, the defendant did not file his answer until October 1958. In
his answer the defendant set up a cross action against three additional defendants, alleging that he had been induced to enter into the
contract by their fraudulent misrepresentations. It appeared upon
the face of the cross action that the alleged fraud was discovered
by the defendant some time prior to March 1, 1955. The Court held
that the additional defendants' plea of the three year statute of limitations was properly sustained.
Ordinarily when the statute of limitations has been properly
pleaded, it raises an issue of fact to be resolved by the jury."0 However, in Speas it appeared from an examination of the defendant's
pleadings that the statute of limitations had run. When it appears
upon the face of the pleadings that the action is barred, a judgment
dismissing the cross action on that ground, as a matter of law, is
proper.5"
' Prior North Carolina cases have held that the record in the former
action, being in existence, is the only evidence admissible to prove its contents. Abernethy v. Armburst, 217 N.C. 372, 8 S.E.2d 228 (1940); Bruton
v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 217 N.C. 1, 6 S.E.2d 822 (1940); Little v.
Bost, 208 N.C. 762, 182 S.E. 448 (1935) ; Gauldin v. Madison, 179 N.C. 461,
102 S.E. 851 (1920). Jones does not appear to be in conflict with this rule
in that, while the judgment roll in the former action was not formally introduced into evidence, it was nevertheless considered by the trial court, without
objection, and was the basis for sustaining the plea in bar.
253 N.C. 770, 117 S.E.2d 784 (1961).
M Solon Lodge v. Ionic Lodge, 247 N.C. 310, 101 S.E.2d 8 (1957).
"'Mobley v. Broome, 248 N.C. 54, 102 S.E.2d 407 (1958); Latham v.
Latham, 184 N.C. 55, 113 S.E. 623 (1922). It should be noted that had the
cross action of the defendant related back to the date when the plaintiff filed
his complaint, it would not have been barred by the statute of limitations.
In Brumble v. Brown, 71 N.C. 513 (1874), the Court squarely held that a
plea of set off or a counterclaim is not barred, even though the statute has
run before it is pleaded, if it was not barred at the time the plaintiff commenced his action. However, in North Carolina Cotton Growers' Co-op.
Ass'n v. Tillery, 201 N.C. 531, 533, 160 S.E. 767, 768 (1931), the Court
stated: "'Where a counterclaim or set-off is pleaded in an amended answer
or plea, and not in the original, the statute runs against it until the filing of
the amended answer."' This is based on the theory that the counterclaim is
a separate and distinct cause of action. Accord, Norfolk & So. R.R. v. Dill,
171 N.C. 176, 88 S.E. 144 (1916).
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In Gillikin v. Bell5 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a
photographer, took pictures of the plaintiff's intestate, which tended
to reflect upon and desecrate the body. From the face of the complaint it appeared that the alleged wrongful acts of, the defendant
occurred in July 1956, and that the action was not begun until
August 1959. The Court held that the action was properly dismissed since it appeared from the plaintiff's pleadings that the statute
of limitations had run.59
Ultimate Facts

The North Carolina Supreme Court has frequently stated that
only the material, essential or ultimate facts which constitute the
cause of action, defense or counterclaim should be alleged, and not
the probative or evidentiary facts which are to be used to prove the
claim or defense.60 In Dawson Constr. Co. v. Hyde County Bd. of
Educ.6 1 the Court once again adhered to this rule. There the plaintiff's motion to strike much of the detail from the defendant's answer
and all of the defendant's counterclaim was granted by the trial court
However, the Cotton Growers case left open the question of what the
Court would do if the counterclaim or cross action were set out in the original
answer which was not filed until after the statute had run. This was the
question presented in Speas. While in Speas the Court did not specifically
consider the problem in these terms, it is apparent from the result that the
cross action will not relate back to the time of the original filing of the
complaint by the plaintiff. It should be noted that due to numerous extensions of time, the original .answer and cross action in Speas were not filed
until more than three years after the complaint. A contrary result might
have been reached had the answer and cross action been filed within the
thirty days normally allowed for the filing of an answer.
In the case of amendments to the plaintiff's pleadings, there is generally
no relation back when the amendment introduces a new cause of action. In
Stamey v. Rutherfordton Elec. Membership Corp., 249 N.C. 90, 94, 105
S.E.2d 282, 285 (1958), the Court stated: "'[T]he general rule is that an
amendment introducing a new cause of action does not relate back to the
commencement of the action, with respect to limitations, but is the equivalent
of a new suit, so that the statute of limitations continues to run until the time
of the filing of the amendment."' See generally Note, 39 N.C.L. Rav. 83
(1960).
"a,254 N.C. 244, 118 S.E.2d 609 (1961) ; also discussed under TORTS, Perjured Testimony---Defamation of the Dead, infra.
" Accord, Swartzberg v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 252 N.C. 150, 113 S.E.2d
270 (1960); Nowell v. Hamilton, 249 N.C. 523, 107 S.E.2d 112 (1959).
" Thomas & Howard Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 241 N.C. 109,
84 S.E.2d 337 (1954); Daniel v. Gardner, 240 N.C. 249, 81 S.E.2d 660
(1954); Foust v. City of Durham, 239 N.C. 306, 79 S.E.2d 519 (1954);
Parker v. White, 237 N.C. 607, 75 S.E.2d 615 (1953) ; Guy v. Baer, 234 N.C.
276, 67 S.E.2d 47 (1951) ; Long v. Love, 230 N.C. 535, 53 S.E.2d 661 (1949),
See generally 1 MCINTOSH, op. cit. supra note 44, § 981.
- 254 N.C. 311, 118 S.E.2d 753 (1961).
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and affirmed on appeal. The Court stated that the defendant's answer and counterclaim contained much evidentiary detail, conclusions
and arguments and were, therefore, properly stricken. The Court
recognized, however, that in striking much of the defendant's answer
and counterclaim some proper allegations were excluded. But this
was held not to be error because the trial judge specifically provided
for further pleading on the part of the defendant, both as to the
answer and the counterclaim. Therefore, proper allegations could
be included in the defendant's amended pleadings.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CIVIL RIGHTS

Trespass
In State v. Avent 1 the Court held that enforcement of the state's
trespass statutes 2 by a state court against Negroes and their white
companions who had refused to leave the luncheonette area of a
private business at the manager's request did not constitute state
action to enforce racial segregation. The Court stated that in the
absence of a state statute forbidding a restaurant owner to discriminate on the basis of race or color,' the owner or operator of a privately owned and operated restaurant has the right to select the
clientele he will serve, and to make such selection based on race if
he so desires.4 Therefore, the trespass statutes may be applied to
protect his rights.
The Court further stated that the trespass statutes and the judicial process by which they are enforced are merely a "legal framework" provided by the state to assist a private landowner in protecting himself and his land from trespassers without resorting to
force. The Court distinguished between state action to protect a
"plain legal right"-protection from trespassers-and the enforce1253 N.C. 580, 118 S.E.2d 47 (1961).

'N.C.

GEN. STAT. §§ 14-126, -134 (1953).
North Carolina has no such statute. For a comprehensive review of
statutes against discrimination based on race or color in places of public
accommodation, which have been enacted by twenty-four states, see KONVITZ
& LESKES, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 157 (1961).
"E.g., State v. Clyburn, 247 N.C. 455, 101 S.E.2d 295 (1958), discussed
in Note, 37 N.C.L. REV. 73 (1958); Fletcher v. Coney Island, Inc., 165 Ohio
St. 150, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956); Alpaugh v. Woverton, 184 Va. 943, 36
S.E.2d 906 (1946).
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ment of covenant's restricting land to the exclusive use of whites.'
In enforcing the trespass statutes, the Court stated, it was merely punishing those who unlawfully and intentionally invaded the rights of a
private landowner and in no way deprived the defendants of the
rights guaranteed to them by the fourteenth amendment of the federal
constitution 6 or by article 1, section 17 of the state constitution.
REGISTRATION-LITERACY TEST

The Court held in Bazemore v. Bertie County Bd. of Elections7
that the literacy test prescribed by G.S. § 163-28' was unreasonably
administered when the applicant for registration as a voter was
required to write a portion of the North Carolina Constitution from
dictation. The statute merely requires that a person be able to read
with reasonable proficiency any section of the North Carolina Constitution. Excessive reading and writing, or writing from dictation
may not be required.

CONTRACTS
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS

In Robbins v. Meyers Trading Post, Inc.,' the defendant contracted to construct a dwelling house for the plaintiffs "exactly like
house built on Endsley Ave. house #13" with certain specified exceptions. 2 After plaintiffs had paid the purchase price and taken
'The defendants contended that the rationale of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1947), discussed in Note, 27 N.C.L. REv. 224 (1949), which held
that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal
constitution prohibited a state court from enforcing racially restrictive covenants in real property deeds, was applicable to the issue here involved.
' See in accord with this view Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60
Contra, Ming, Racial Restrictions and the
COLUM. L. REv. 1083 (1960).
Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictve Covenant Cases, 16 U. CHI. L. REV.
203, 229-36 (1949).
'254 N.C. 398, 119 S.E.2d 637 (1961).
' This statute provides, "Every person presenting himself for registration
shall be able to read and write any section of the Constitution of North Carolina in the English language. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-28 (Supp. 1961),
discussed in 36 N.C.L. Rnv. 152 (1958). The constitutionality of this statute,
"when reasonably administered," was upheld in Lassiter v. Northampton
County Bd. of Election, 248 N.C. 102, 102 S.E.2d 853 (1958), aff'd, 360 U.S.
45 (1959), discussed in 37 N.C.L. REv. 396 (1959).
1253 N.C. 474, 117 S.E.2d 438 (1960).
'Defendant was obligated under the contract to complete "as a first class
turn-key job the entire construction" of the house. Id. at 475, 117 S.E.2d at
439. Considered in connection with the other terms of the contract, the Court
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possession, certain defects were discovered in the house which they
alleged were due to the use.of inferior materials. Plaintiffs sued for
breach of contract and were awarded damages in the trial court.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed. The majority held that
since the contract was free from ambiguity, the trial court had erred
in admitting parol evidence which tended to modify or alter its
terms.3
In a concurring opinion three Justices declared that while the
contract was not so clear and certain as to preclude admission of
parol evidence bearing upon the true intent of the parties"at the time
the contract was entered, reversal was required due to improper
admission of evidence relating to the measure of damages. It was
pointed out that on the previous appeal of the case4 the plaintiffs'
evidence showed that in order to remedy the alleged defects a substantial part of the completed work would have to be undone. This
being true, the correct measure of damages is the difference in value
between the house contracted to be built and that actually built, and
not the cost of remodeling the house to make it conform to the contract.5 The trial court, therefore, erred in allowing, as evidence of
plaintiffs' damages, the cost of remodeling the. house.
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

In Thompson v. ALD, New York, Inc.' plaintiff was employed

to sell automatic laundry equipment on a commission basis.

The

employment contract prohibited plaintiff from owning an interest
in a laundromat. Plaintiff purchased equipment from defendant to
set up his own laundromat. When defendant refused to pay plaintiff the commission on this sale, the latter brought suit. The Court
held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the commission because the
parties intended, at the time they made the employment contract, that
the plaintiff was to be employed to sell equipment to third parties
held that first class turn-key job meant that defendant would build a complete
house ready for occupancy as a dwelling.
This merely reaffirms prior North Carolina decisions. E.g., Bost v.
Bost, 234 N.C. 554, 67 S.E.2d 745 (1951).
'Robbins v. Meyers Trading Post, Inc., 251 N.C. 663, 111 S.E.2d 884
(1960).
5 Id. at 667,
111 S.E.2d at 887. This rule of damages was adopted early
in Twitty v. M'Guire, 7 N.C. 501 (1819), and reflects the view of a majority
of jurisdictions. E.g., Walsh v. Cornwell, 272 Mass. 555, 172 N.E. 855
(1930); Mahan v. Springer, 155 Wash. 98, 283 Pac. 667 (1930). See generally Annot., 123 A.L.R. 515, 533 (1939).
6255 N.C. 321, 121 S.E.2d 554 (1961).
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and not to himself. The Court reasoned that when the plaintiff decided to buy equipment and establish the laundromat, his purpose was
inconsistent with that for which he was hired, and therefore, his
activities constituted an abandonment of the employment contract.
The Court, in accord with the generally accepted rule, stated that
the defendant, when advised of plaintiff's activities prior to the time
of the sale, was justified in treating the contract as having been terminated by the plaintiff. 7 Therefore, at the date of the sale plaintiff's
status was that of a purchaser from the defendant rather than that of
a salesman.
In Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender,s plaintiff sought to
restrain defendant from further violations of her contract of employment with the plaintiff. Defendant had contracted not to engage,
during the term of her employment and for a period of five years
thereafter, in the same or in a similar business as that of the plaintiff
(1) in Fayetteville, North Carolina, or (2) in any other place in
North Carolina in which the plaintiff was then engaged in rendering
its service, (3) in any other place in the United States in which the
plaintiff was then engaged in rendering its service, or (4) in any
other place in the United States in which the plaintiff had been or
had signified its intentions to be engaged in rendering its service.
Shortly after defendant's resignation as hostess of plaintiff's welcoming service in Fayetteville, defendant established her own service
in the same city.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, on the
grounds that the covenant was void as against public policy in that
the restrictions were unreasonable both as to length of time and
extent of territory.
In a four-to-three decision the Supreme Court reversed. The
majority prefaced their decision with a statement of the general
law applicable to restrictive covenants in employment contracts.
Such contracts will be enforced only if they are reasonable both as
to time and territory limitations.9 Moreover, the Court must take
" It is the generally accepted rule that where an employee abandons the
contract, he terminates his employment, or at least the employer may treat the
contract as having been rescinded. E.g., Bene v. La Grande Laundry Co.,
22 Cal. App. 2d 512, 71 P.2d 351 (Dist. Ct. App. 1937); Dube v. Simard,
124 Me. 369, 129 At. 488 (1925); Douglas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
297 S.W. 87 (Mo. App. 1927).
N.C. 244, 120 S.E.2d 739 (1961).
-255
9E.g., Sonotone Corp. v. Baldwin, 227 N.C. 387, 42 S.E.2d 352 (1947).
Accord, Mattis v. Lally, 138 Conn. 51, 82 A.2d 155 (1951) , Renwood Food
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the contract as written" and is without power to vary or reform it
so as to bring the restrictions within the realm of reasonableness. 1
However, the Court, applying the "Blue Pencil" rule,1 2 held that
where the parties have made divisions of the territory, the Court
will take notice of the divisions made by the parties themselves and
enforce the restrictions in the territorial divisions deemed reasonable
and refuse to enforce the restrictions in those divisions deemed unreasonable. Thus the Court held that division (1), Fayetteville,
was not unreasonable. The reasonableness of division (2) was held
to be a jury question, while divisions (3) and (4) were rejected by
the Court as being unreasonable.
Although the Court cited one North Carolina case in support of
the rule,"3 it is believed that this decision marks the first application
of the rule in this jurisdiction. In prior cases the Court has in
14
several instances enforced only a part of a restrictive covenant.
However, those cases are distinguishable since the decisions rested
not upon the unreasonableness of the covenant, as in the present case,
but rather upon its indefiniteness. 5
Products, Inc. v. Schaefer, 240 Mo. App. 939, 223 S.W.2d 144 (1949). For
a thorough treatment of the various facets to be considered in determining
the reasonableness of restrictive covenants, see Note, 38 N.C.L. REv. 395
(1960).
"E.g., Henley Paper Co. v. McAllister, 253 N.C. 529, 117 S.E.2d 431
(1960); Noe v. McDevitt, 228 N.C. 242, 45 S.E.2d 121 (1947).
" Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 120 S.E.2d 739
(1961).
" T he blue pencil rule is followed by the majority of jurisdictions. E.g.,
Roane, Inc. v. Tweed, 33 Del. Ch. 4, 89 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1952) ; Welcome
Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Haschert, 125 Ind. App. 503, 127 N.E.2d 103 (1955)
(involving the present plaintiff and an almost identical covenant). See generally 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs § 1659 (rev. ed. 1937, Supp. 1947); Note,
26 N.C.L. REv. 402 (1948). But see Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Morris,
224 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1955), where the present plaintiff sought to enforce
an almost identical covenant, and the court held the covenant, as judged by
North Carolina case law, void for unreasonableness, both as to time and
territory limitations.
" Hauser v. Harding, 126 N.C. 295, 36 S.E. 586 (1900).
"'E.g., Wooten v. Harris, 153 N.C. 43, 68 S.E. 898 (1910); Shute v.
Heath, 131 N.C. 281, 42 S.E. 704 (1902); Hauser v. Harding, supra note 13.
"
strong dissent voiced disapproval of the "Blue Pencil" rule as being
unsound in that under the rule legality is made to depend on form rather
than substance. It was also noted that although the Court will not divide
territory under the rule, it will divide what is essentially a single restrictive
covenant.
The tenor of the dissenting opinion evidences a fear that the employer,
confident that the court will in any case render maximum enforcement, may
use his superior barganing power to coerce the employee into unreasonable
promises worded in the alternative.
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SUPERVISING ENGINEER

Under the English doctrine and that adopted by some jurisdictions in this country, an architect or engineer charged with supervising construction work and issuing his certificate of completion
upon the satisfactory performance of the work is held to act in the
capacity of an arbitrator between the parties and it not liable to
either for negligently certifying the work as being completed." However, a substantial number of jurisdictions recognize that because
the supervising architect or engineer actually occupies the dual position of employee as well as arbitrator, he may be held liable by the
employer for negligence in giving an erroneous certification.
In City of Durham v. Reidsville Eng'r Co.,"8 a case of first impression in this jurisdiction, the Court applied the English doctrine,
holding that under the terms of the construction contract before the
Court, the supervising engineers were acting in the capacity of arbitrators and could not be held liable in damages to either party to the
contract in the absence of bad faith. 9
The decision bears further examination, however, because while
the Court stated the engineers would not be liable to either party to
the contract, the holding as applied to the employer is dictum. Indeed, the only issue present for determination was whether the
contractor and its surety on a maintenance bond could hold the
supervising engineers liable in a cross-action for damages caused by
certain defects discovered after the engineers had certified the work
as complete.2 0 Moreover, the Court expressly stated that the question of the supervising engineers' liability to the plaintiff employer
was not presented for determination on the present appeal. 2
" E.g., Wilder v. Crook, 250 Ala. 424, 34 So. 2d 832 (1948); Corey v.
Eastman, 166 Mass. 279, 44 N.E. 217 (1896); Chambers v. Goldthrope,
[1901] 1 K.B. 624; Stevenson v. Watson, [1879] 4 C.P.D. 148. See generally Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1227 (1955).
l'E.g., Palmer v. Brown, 127 Cal. App. 2d 44, 273 P.2d 306 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1954); School Dist. v. Josenhans, 88 Wash. 624, 153 Pac. 326 (1915).
'255 N.C. 98, 120 S.E.2d 564 (1961); also discussed under CIVIL PROcmURE, Cross Actions, infra.
10Id. at 102-03, 120 S.E.2d at 567.
20
The surety alleged that if the contract was not properly performed, it
was due to the negligence of the engineers in failing to properly supervise the
work, and that, if the plaintiff recovered a judgment against it, it was entitled to judgment over against the supervising engineers.
21255 N.C. at 103, 120 S.E.2d at 567.
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CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
OWNER OF VEHICLE UNDER THE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT
In North Carolina, the conditional vendor is considered the

holder of legal title.' However, for purposes of the Motor Vehicle
Safety and Financial Responsibility Act2 the conditional vendee is
deemed to be the owner of the motor vehicle.

Thus, in High Point

Say. & Trust Co. v. King,3 where plaintiff sought damages from
the conditional vendor for negligence of the conditional vendee, recovery was denied.

The purpose of the act is to protect the public.' Therefore, the
responsibility imposed by the act is placed on the conditional vendee
since he is the party who has possession and use of the automobile.
EQUITABLE LIEN-CONSENT JUDGMENT

Stanley v. Cox' involved a separation agreement whereby the
parties agreed that a certain piece of improved realty would be
owned as tenants in common. The wife was given the right to
occupy the premises exclusively for her life and the husband further

agreed to make certain payments to her. A divorce judgment was
obtained, which recited that by consent of the plaintiff husband, it
was ordered that the plaintiff make the payments specified in the
separation agreement, and that such payments constitute a lien on
his property.
On these facts the Court held that an equitable lien was created
and that subsequent purchasers of the husband's interest took subject
to the lien. In so holding the Court adopted the language used in
Winborne v. Guy6 where the Court held that,
'Whitlock v. Auburn Lumber Co., 145 N.C. 120, 58 S.E. 909 (1907);
Perry v. Young, 105 N.C. 463, 11 S.E. 511 (1890); Frick & Co. v. Hilliard,

95 N.C.
117 (1886).
2

N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-279.1(8) (Supp. 1961), defines "owner" as "a
person who holds the legal title of a motor vehicle, or in the event a motor
vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or lease
thereof . . . then such conditional vendee . . . shall be deemed the owner
for the purposes of this article."
253 N.C. .571, 117 S.E.2d 421 (1960).
'Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parton, 147 F. Supp. 887
(M.D.N.C. 1957).
5253 N.C. 620, 117 S.E.2d 826 (1961); also discussed under DOMESTIC
RELATIONS,

Separation Agreements-Equitable Liens, infra.

222 N.C. 128, 22 S.E.2d 220 (1942).
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Every express executory agreement in writing, whereby the
contracting party sufficiently indicates an intention to make
some particular property, real or personal, or fund, therein
described or identified, a security for a debt or other obligation ... creates an equitable lien upon the property so indicated, which is enforceable against the property in the hands
not only of the original contractor, but of his heirs, administrators, executors, voluntary assignees and purchasers or
7
encumbrancers with notice.
Although the divorce judgment was signed by neither party, the
Court held that this did not prevent the agreement from being binding. The husband's consent was shown by the signature of his
attorneys, and the wife's consent was alleged in the complaint in
the present case which averred that she claimed that the consent
judgment created a lien. Thus there was a binding express executory agreement in writing that indicated an intention to make the
property security for the mortgage obligation.8
IMPROPER INDEXING OF DEEDS OF TRUST AND LIENS

Cuthrell v. Camden County' points out once again that pursuant
to G.S. § 161-22"° the proper indexing and cross-indexing of instruments required to be registered is an essential part of their registration. In this case the sole owner of the land was Mollie Cuthrell,
"Id. at 131-32, 22 S.E.2d at 222.
'Accord, Raynor v. Raynor, 212 N.C. 181, 193 S.E. 216 (1937), where
the father divided his land into nine shares and deeded each of his nine children a share. Two of the shares were encumbered with a mortgage, and the
deeds to the other shares provided that the grantees were to share equally in
the payment of the mortgage. The Court held that the language in the deeds
created a specific charge in the nature of an equitable lien on the land conveyed. See generally Britton, Equitable Liens-A Tentative Analysis of
the Problem, 8 N.C.L. REv. 388 (1930).
- 254 N.C. 181, 118 S.E.2d 601 (1961) ; also discussed under REAL PRopERTY, Indexing-Deeds of Trust and Liens, infra.
"0This statute provides: "The register of deeds shall provide and keep
in his office full and complete alphabetical indexes of the names of the parties
to all liens, grants, deeds, mortgages, bonds, and other instruments of writing
required or authorized to be registered; such indexes to be kept in well bound
books, and shall state in full the names of all parties, whether grantors,
grantees, vendors, vendees, obligors or obligees, and shall be indexed and
cross-indexed . . . so as to show the name of each party under the appropriate letter of the alphabet ....

Reference shall be made, opposite each

name to the page, title or number of the book in which is registered any
instrument: Provided .

.

. no instrument shall be deemed to be properly

registered until the same has been properly indexed as herein provided. .

.
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but, apparently under the belief that they had inherited one-half interest in the land, her children joined in the execution of the deed
of trust on the land to secure a note. The deed of trust was indexed
as "R. G. Cuthrell [one of the children] et al."
Subsequently Mollie Cuthrell received old age assistance for
which a lien was duly recorded. However, the index referred to the
wrong page in the lien recordation book. Thereafter, but before this
action was brought, the deed of trust was properly indexed. The
indexing of the lien, however, was never corrected.
In a suit to determine which security had priority, the Court
held that the original indexing of the deed of trust was improper
and that it was not validly recorded until the indexing was subsequently changed, which took place after the lien was recorded. Following Woodley v. Gregory" the Court held that where the sole
owner of the property is not named in the index, but is referred to
only by the abbreviation "et al.," the index is improper and the
recordation invalid.
Although the lien index referred to the wrong page number, the
Court held that this was sufficient to put a careful and prudent
examiner on inquiry; thus it was a substantial compliance with the
recordation statute.'2 And, since the lien had been properly indexed
prior to the deed of trust, it was held that the lien had priority.'"
ABSOLUTE DEED ALLEGED TO BE A MORTGAGE

In Isley v. Brown 4 the plaintiffs sought to have a deed, absolute
on its face, converted into a security for debt. They alleged that
they did not read the instrument before signing it and that they did
not know that it was a deed. The well established rule in North
Carolina has been that before an absolute deed will be converted into
a mortgage (1) it must be proved that the clause of redemption was
omitted by reason of ignorance, mistake, fraud, or undue advantage;
and (2) the intent to create a security must be established, not merely
by proof of declarations, but by proof of facts and circumstances
dehors the deed, inconsistent with the idea of an absolute purchase.'
1205 N.C. 280, 171 S.E. 65 (1933).

In Johnson Cotton Co. v. Hobgood, 243 N.C. 227, 90 S.E.2d 541 (1955),
the index referred to the wrong book and page. The Court held the registration nevertheless valid where the cross-index was accurate.
See generally Note, 6 N.C.L. REv. 107 (1927).
12

14253

N.C. 791, 117 S.E.2d 821 (1961).

"Perkins v. Perkins, 249 N.C. 152, 105 S.E.2d 663 (1958); Note, 26
N.C.L. Rav. 405 (1948).
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The principal case held against the plaintiffs because they had failed
to read the deed. In stating the law as to when an absolute deed
may be held to be a mortgage, the Court said,
[I] t must be alleged and proven that the clause of redemption
was omitted by reason of ignorance, mistake, fraud or undue
advantage. This must be established by proof of declarations
and proof of facts and circumstances, dehors the deed, inconsistant [sic] with the idea of an absolute purchase. 6
In the principal case the Court failed to mention that the intent
to create a security interest must be shown. What the Court said as
to the proof of the omission of the defeasance clause by facts dehors
the deed had been previously said of the proof of the intention.
Furthermore, the Court now calls for proof of declarations and facts,
whereas previous statements had required proof not merely of declarations but of facts. This case will be the subject of a Note in this
volume of the Law Review.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL LAW

Accessory Before the Fact
In State v. Green1 the Court held that the crime of accessory
before the fact could not be considered a lesser included offense
within the substantive crime of murder. If found that a person
indicated as a principal was actually an accessory, then he must be
acquitted of the principal crime and tried under a new indictment
as an accessory.
In two later cases2 the Court implied that the rule adopted in
Green was overruled, but this remained in doubt due to the singular
fact situations presented in these later cases.' In the recent case of
18 253 N.C. at 792, 117 S.E.2d at 823.
1 119 N.C. 899, 26 S.E. 112 (1896).
State v. Bryson, 173 N.C. 803, 92 S.E. 698 (1917) ; State v. Simmons
179 N.C. 700, 103 S.E. 5 (1920).
' In Bryson the defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree
upon an indictment of murder in the first degree. On appeal the defendant

contended that the evidence justified his conviction only as an accessory before

the fact, and that having been put in jeopardy upon the murder charge he

could not subsequently be tried as being connected with the murder in any
way. The Court pointed out that G.S. § 14-5, which prohibits a later trial
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State v. Jones4 the defendant was convicted of first degree murder
and appealed on the grounds that the judge refused to instruct the
jury on the law of accessory before the fact. He would only be
entitled to this instruction if the crime of accessory was a lesser
included crime in the principal offense of murder. The Court held
that it was error to refuse the instruction requested and granted a
new trial. This indicates that the rule in North Carolina is now,
if not before, that an accessory before the fact is a lesser included
crime in the principal crime charged in the indictment.
An accessory before the fact has been defined as one who
procures, counsels, or commands another to commit a felony
for him but is not himself present, actively or constructively,
when the felony is committed. If such a person were present
actually or constructively at the commission of the crime, he
would be a principal and not an accessory.5
G.S. § 14-5 preserves the distinction between an accessory before
the fact and a principal. This distinction is further implied in G.S.
§ 14-6 which makes the maximum sentence for an accessory before
the fact life imprisonment, whereas a principal in the crimes enumerated in the statute can be punished by death. When considering
the fact that the legislature has made a statutory distinction between
the two offenses by providing for them in two different statutes, it
for the same offense if the defendant has once been tried as an accessory or
as a principal, sustained the defendant's contention, provided the trial court
erred in trying him for the substantive felony of murder in counseling, procuring or commanding another to slay the victim. However, the Court held
that since G.S. § 15-170 authorized conviction of a lesser crime than that
charged in the indictment and the jury had found that the defendant had
participated in the crime as an accessory, he could not complain that he was
convicted of a lesser crime than murder in the first degree, because, as an
accessory, G.S. § 14-6 authorized a higher punishment than that actually imposed by the trial court. The Court further stated that the effect of G.S.
§ 14-7, which authorizes the trial of an accessory either with, after, or in the
absence of a prior conviction of the principal, was to abolish the distinction
between an accessory and a principal. In Simons the question arose on a
petition for writ of certiorari, the defendant contending that an accessory
before the fact, for which he was convicted, was not a lesser included offense
within the crime of arson, with which he was charged. The Court denied
the petition because of the failure of the defendant to make a timely appeal,
but said by way of dictum that Bryson had substantially overruled an earlier
case and held that the crime of accessory before the fact was included within
the charge of the principal crime. Neither case, however, definitively established this rule.
'254 N.C. 450, 119 S.E.2d 213 (1961).
1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURB § 110 (Anderson 1957).
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may well be that the Court has adopted a position contrary to the
legislative intent by holding that accessory before the fact is a lesser
degree of the principal offense.
It seems that the Court reached a just result in Jones because in
the fact situation there the defendant would not be prejudiced if found
to be an accessory before the fact.' However, accepting the Court's
ruling literally, a defendant could be convicted as an accessory before
the fact upon an indictment as a principal even though his defense
was that he did not in any way participate in the crime. In this
situation he would be severely prejudiced for he would not logically
expect state evidence of or a trial court instruction on his participation as an accessory before the fact. It is therefore submitted that
the Court should restrict its ruling in Jones to the factual situation
presented there.
Corpus Delicti-Corroborationof Confession
A conviction cannot be had on the extrajudicial confession
of the defendant, unless corroborated by proof aliunde of the
coipus deliciti. Full; direct and positiV;e evidence, however,
of the corpus delicti, is not indispensable. A confession will
be sufficient if there be such extrinsic corroborative circumstances, as will, when taken in connection with the confession, establish the prisoner's guilt in the minds of the jury
7
beyond a reasonable doubt.
An essential element of both crime against nature and carnal
knowledge is penetration.8 In State v. Whittemore9 the only evidence of penetration shown was that contained in the confession of
the defendant. The defendant stated, extrajudicially, that he had
"rubbed his privates through the lips of her privates." The prosecutrix stated that the defendant had placed his privates at her privates
"In Jones the defendant had been convicted as a principal and given the
maximum sentence; the ruling here resulted in a new trial with the possibility of conviction of a lesser offense. It should also be noted that the defendant did not deny his participation in the crime but contended that he was
an accessory before the fact.
7
Vogt v. United States, 156 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1946). (Emphasis
is by the Court.) Quoted with approval in Masse v. United States, 210 F.2d
418, 420 (5th Cir. 1954).
' State v. Bowman, 232 N.C. 374, 61 S.E.2d 107 (1950).
o 255 N.C. 583, 122 S.E.2d 396 (1961); also discussed under CRIMIIAL
PROCEDURE, Involuntary Confession--Mental Capacity and Time of Essence-

Defense of Alibi, infra.
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and was extremely emphatic in her use of the word "at." The Court
held that this testimony by the prosecutrix was sufficient to resolve
the doubt contained in the confession, and that the confession was,
therefore, admissible. The Court said,
We have said that Barbara's use of the word "at" was not,
standing alone, sufficient to establish penetration. It left the
question too conjectural. But the defendant's explanation of
what occurred is, we think, sufficient to remove the doubt as
to the meaning of the word "at."1
It is submitted that the holding of the Court is not productive
of fundamental fairness. It seems elementary that, in relation to
the sexual act, a "placing at" is not the same as "an insertion into."
It is paradoxical to say that two terms, mutually exclusive, can
corroborate each other.
Highway Robbery
In State v. Stewart" the petitioner was sentenced in 1945 to
eighteen to twenty years upon a plea of guilty to a charge of highway
robbery. In 1961 the defendant petitioned for writ of habeas corpus
for his release, contending that a conviction for highway robbery
subjected him to a maximum penalty of ten years. The trial court
denied the petition, holding that the sentence was not excessive under
G.S. § 14-87.12 On petition for writ of certiorari the Supreme Court
remanded. The Court pointed out that although G.S. § 14-87
authorizes a maximum sentence of thirty years upon a conviction
of robbery with firearms or other dangerous weapons, the defendant's
plea here was guilty of robbery with no mention of firearms. Therefore, the offense was governed by G.S. § 14-2,'" which limited the
10 255 N.C. at 589-90, 122 S.E.2d at 401.

N.C. 571, 122 S.E.2d 355 (1961).
"Any person or persons who, having in possession or with the use or
threatened use of any firearms or other dangerous weapon, implements or
means, whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened, unlawfully
takes or attempts to take personal property from another or from any place
of business, residence or banking institution or any other place where there
is a person or persons in attendance, at any time, . . . shall be guilty of a
felony and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for
not less than five nor more than thirty years." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-87
(1953).
" "Every person who shall be convicted of any felony for which no specific punishment is prescribed by statute shall be imprisoned ... not exceed1255

12
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maximum sentence to not more than ten years. 14
Highway robbery was once considered an aggravated form of
common law robbery,' 5 but this distinction is not set out in the
General Statutes of North Carolina. It would seem therefore that
the decision in the instant case is reasonable as the term "highway
robbery" no longer contains its historic nefariousness.
Presumption of Malice-Deadly Weapon
In State v. Guss'8 the deceased challenged the defendant to a fight
and he declined. The deceased then started toward the defendant
with his hand in his pocket and somebody in the immediate area
shouted "cut him up." The defendant then drew a pistol an6d fired,
fatally wounding the deceased. The deceased did not have a knife
upon his person when he was examined by the officers who arrived
soon thereafter. This was the evidence presented by the state, and
upon this evidence the jury found the defendant guilty of second
degree murder. While reversing the decision on other grounds, the
Court raised, but did not answer, the question whether the evidence
by the state, in itself, rebutted the presumption of malice inferred
17
from the use of a deadly weapon in a homicide.
In order to reduce a homicide to manslaughter, it must appear
that the act of the defendant was the result of provocation by the
person slain. The defendant must show even stronger provocation
when he uses a deadly weapon because the intentional use of a deadly
weapon warrants the inferrence of malice.' 8 Mere words are not
adequate provocation, no matter how insulting or reproachful, but, if
these words indicate a present intent to do the defendant serious
bodily harm and the victim possesses a present ability to do such
harm, then such action is adequate provocation.' 9
North Carolina has held that where a victim directs words to
the defendant which are in themselves inadequate provocation to
reduce the homicide to manslaughter, the malice can be rebutted if
ing two years... or if the offense be infamous... not less than four months
nor1more than ten years ... ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-2 (1953).
Accord, In re Sellers, 234 N.C. 648, 68 S.E.2d 308 (1951).
See, e.g., State v. Burke, 73 N.C. 83, 86 (1875).
16254 N.C. 349, 118 S.E.2d 906 (1961); also discussed under CRImINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE, Self-Defense and CharacterEvidence-Competence to
Prove Guilt or Innocence, infra.
17 Id. at 351, 118 S.E.2d at 907.
"81 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 5, § 276.
19
Id. at § 277.
'
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a mutual affray immediately follows such provocation.2 ° It would
seem that in the instant case the state's evidence precludes any possibility of a conviction for murder in the 'first or second degree. Taken
in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence shows verbal
provocation, admittedly inadequate, accompanied by an intent to do
serious bodily harm manifested by the physical action of the deceased which, by the aforestated definition, rebuts the malicious
intent.
Self-Defense
In State v. Guss2l the defendant presented the following evidence:
the deceased was angry with the defendant; he had previously
warned the defendant to stay away from a certain girl; the defendant was with the girl when confronted by the deceased; the
deceased advanced toward the defendant with a knife in his hand;
a friend of the deceased advanced toward the defendant from the
rear; the defendant drew a pistol and killed the deceased at a distance
of about fifteen feet. The trial judge instructed the jury that the
defendant must have retreated to avoid the conflict, if there was a
possibility of doing so, before he could rely on a plea of self-defense.
The Court held this to be error and stated that where a felonious
assault is made on a man and he is without fault, he may stand his
ground and kill his attacker to avert his own death or serious bodily
harm. This is true whether the facts, as they appear to him, be
real or apparent.2 2
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Argument to the Jury
"Every defendant 'should be made to feel that the prosecuting
officer is not his enemy,' but that he is being treated fairly and
justly. '' 23 With this philosophy in mind, the Court has on several
occasions held the use of derogatory remarks made by the solicitor
20 State v. Hill, 20 N.C. 628 (1839).
2 254 N.C. 349, 118 S.E.2d 906 (1961); also discussed under CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE, Presumption of Malice-Deadly Weapon, supra, and
CharacterEvidence-Competence to Prove Guilt or Innocence, infra.
2"State
v. Washington, 234 N.C. 531, 67 S.E.2d 498 (1951); State v.
Thornton, 211 N.C. 413, 190 S.E. 758 (1937); State v. Blevins, 138 N.C.
668, 50 S.E. 763 (1905).
22 State v. Davenport, 156 N.C. 597, 613, 72 S.E. 7, 14 (1911),
quoted
with approval in State v. Tucker, 190 N.C. 708, 712, 130 S.E. 720, 722
(1925).p
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to the jury about the defendant to be error. Thus the Court has
held that a solicitor may not refer to the defendant as "a small time
racketeering gangster"2 4 or a "professed bootlegger." 25 And in
State v. Wyatt 0 the Court held that referring to the defendants as
"two of the slickest confidence men we've had in this court for a
long time" was an impropriety that should have been corrected by
the trial judge, and that his refusal to do so constituted reversible
error.
In State v. Tucker2 7 the Court held that the defendant's looks
should not be brought into account unless it was for the purposes of
identification. The Court stated that it would be manifestly unjust
for a person to be convicted because of his facial features-a factor
which the solicitor was obviously trying to interject when he asked
the jury to look at the defendant and notice his demeanor.
When ruling on the propriety of derogatory statements by a
solicitor, the North Carolina Court has not considered the probable
truth of the solicitor's statements. In other jurisdictions the admissibility of such remarks by the prosecuting attorney has turned on
the probable truth of his statements. The fact that other jurisdictions
have allowed the prosecuting officer to refer to a defendant as "a
bootlegger," 8 "a hoodlum,"2 9 and "a sex pervert"3 0 supports the
assumption that North Carolina has adopted an attitude which seems
more calculated to meet the ends of justice.
CharacterEvidence-Competence To Prove Guilt or Innocence
In State v. Guss8 1 the Court held that it was error for the trial
court to instruct the jury to consider evidence by the defendant of
his good character first on his credibility, and " 'secondly, as substantive evidence bearing directly upon his evidence.' ,,2 The Court
stated that where a defendant testifies in his own behalf and introduces evidence of his good character the character evidence goes to
the determination not only of the credibility of the testimony of the
2, State v. Correll, 229 N.C. 640, 50 S.E.2d 717 (1948).
25 State v. Tucker, 190 N.C. 708, 130 S.E. 720 (1925).
3'254 N.C. 220, 118 S.E.2d 420 (1961).
2? 190 N.C. 708, 130 S.E. 720 (1925).
Gates v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 327, 285 S.W.2d 728 (1956).
3'
State v. Ayers, 305 S.W.2d 484 (Mo. 1957).
20
Revill v. State, 210 Ga. 139, 78 S.E.2d 12 (1953).
254 N.C. 349, 118 S.E.2d 906 (1961); also discussed under CRIMINAL
LAW, Presumption of Malice-Deadly Weapon and Self-Defense, supra.
512254 N.C. at 350, 118 S.E.2d at 907. (Emphasis is by the Court.)
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defendant but also to the determination of his guilt or innocence.3 3
In this connection it should also be noted that where the state
offers evidence of the defendant's character, when the defendant has
not placed his character in issue, the evidence is competent only on
the issue of the credibility of the defendant's testimony.3 4 Also, evidence of the defendant's character is inadmissible if the defendant
does not testify in his own behalf and does not put his character in
issue.35
Defective Warrant
G.S. § 14-189.1 provides that it is unlawful to disseminate or to
aid in dissemination of obscene matters. The statute further provides a definition of obscenity.3 6 In each case the obscenity must be
sufficiently described in order to put the defendant on notice as to
what particular obscene matter he is charged with disseminating.3
The evident purpose of this requirement is to prevent retrial of the
defendant for the same acts under another general warrant."' Thus
is State v. Barnes39 the Court held that a warrant which merely set
out the relevant words of G.S. § 14-189.1 was insufficient. The
Court further stated that if the obscenity is sufficiently described,
the obscene matter need not be attached to the warrant or indict83

Accord, State v. Worthham, 240 N.C. 132, 81 S.E.2d 254 (1954) ; State
See also STANSBURY, NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 108 (1946).
" .g., State v. Taylor, 121 N.C. 674, 28 S.E. 493 (1897).
" State v. Hare, 74 N.C. 591 (1876) ; STANSBURY, op. Cit. supra note 33,
§ 104; see State v. Nance, 195 N.C. 47, 141 S.E. 468 (1928). But see State
v. Adams, 245 N.C. 344, 95 S.E.2d 902 (1957) (character evidence admissible
to show motive).
" "A thing is obscene if considered as a whole its predominant appeal is
to the prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or
excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in
description or presentation of such matters. A thing is obscene if its obscenity is latent, as in the case of undeveloped photographs. Obscenity shall be
judged with reference to ordinary adults, except that it shall be judged with
reference to children or other especially susceptible audience if it appears
from the character of the material or the circumstances of its dissemination to
be especially designed for or directed to such an audience. . . ." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-189.1(b) (Supp. 1961). For a discussion of United States Supreme Court decisions dealing with obscenity statutes, see Note, 36 N.C.L.
REv. 189 (1958).
"'See State v. Robbins, 253 N.C. 47, 116 S.E.2d 192 (1960); State v.
Cox, 244 N.C. 57, 92 S.E.2d 413 (1956), discussed in Note, 35 N.C.L. Rav.
118 (1956).
8 See State v. Cox, supra note 37; Note, 35 N.C.L. REv. 118 (1956).
*'253 N.C. 711, 117 S.E.2d 849 (1961).

v. Davis, 231 N.C. 664, 58 S.E.2d 355 (1950).
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ment. 40 The Court concluded that " 'want of the requisite precision
and certainty [in the warrant or indictment] which may, at one time,
postpone or ward off the punishment of guilt, may, at another, present itself as the last hope and only asylum of persecuted innocence.' "41
Involuntary Confession-Mental Capacity
In State v. Whittemore42 the defendant was not allowed by the
trial judge to introduce evidence of his mental capacity for purposes
of refuting the voluntariness of his confession. The defendant had
an estimated I.Q. of eighty and was crippled with cerebral palsy
from birth. The Supreme Court held this exclusion to be error.
Mental capacity alone is not sufficient to void a confession but is
a factor in determining whether the purported confession was voluntary. The totality of the circumstances is the guide to whether the
confession was voluntary or involuntary. 48 "The limits in any case
depend upon a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the
power of resistance of the person confessing. What would be overpowering to the weak of will or mind might be utterly ineffective
against an experienced criminal.""
Time of the Essence-Defense of Alibi
The time named in a bill of indictment is not usually an essential
element of the crime charged, and the state may prove that it was, in
fact, committed on some other date. 45 In State v. Whittemore" the
indictment alleged a specific date; most of the state's evidence pin"°Accord, Thomas v. State, 103 Ind. 419, 2 N.E. 808 (1885); Commonwealth v. Wright, 139 Mass. 382, 1 N.E. 411 (1885).
" 253 N.C. at 718, 117 S.E.2d at 853, quoting from State v. Owen, 5 N.C.
452, 458 (1810).
"2255 N.C. 583, 122 S.E.2d 396 (1961); also discussed under CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE, Corpus Delicti-Corroborationof Confession, supra,
and Time of Essence-Defense of Alibi, infra.
" Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Fikes v. Alabama, 352
U.S. 191 (1957); Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 881 (1950); Turner v.
Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
"Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-155 (1953), State v. Gentry, 228 N.C. 643, 46
S.E.2d 863 (1948). But see Note, 40 N.C.L. REv. 327 (1962), where the
author suggests that the time of assault and death is still considered by many
jurisdictions as a substantive element of the crime of murder.
"255 N.C. 583, 122 S.E.2d 396 (1961); also discussed under CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE, Corpus Delicti-Corroborationof Confession, and Involuntary Confession--Mental Capacity, supra.
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pointed the time of the crime at the date alleged; the defendant
offered an alibi as to his presence at the time-charged in the indictment. The state thereafter introduced further evidence which contained conflicting facts as to when the crime was committed. The
trial judge instructed the jury that if they found that the defendant
ever committed the acts alleged they should return a verdict of
guilty. The Supreme Court held this to be reversible error. The
Court stated the defense of an alibi raises an exception to the general
rule that time is not of the essence in criminal cases; otherwise, a
defendant who relied upon a specific time in his defense would be
seriously prejudiced if, without warning, the state attempted to
7
prove that the crime was committed at some other date.1
Unlawfd Evidence-Lie Detector
In State v. Foye4 8 the defendants were indicted for robbery and

murder. Defendant A offered an alibi in his defense. The state
attempted to refute the alibi and offered testimony to the effect that
defendant B, who had implicated defendant A, had taken a lie detector test which showed that B was telling the truth. The Supreme
Court held the admis"sion of this evidence to be error and granted a
new trial. The Court stated that the results of lie detector tests,
uniformly, are held inadmissible in evidence whether the evidence
is offered directly49 or indirectly, 0 as in the present case. Such
evidence is excluded because lie detectors have not, as yet, been
scientifically accepted as reliable and accurate. 5'

DAMAGES
FAIR MARKET VALUE

In Davis v. Ludlum' plaintiff sought to recover damages allegedly
caused to her building by defendant's negligent demolition of an
"'Accord, People v. McCullough, 38 Cal. App. 2d 387, 101 P.2d 531 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1940).
" 254 N.C. 704, 120 S.E.2d 169 (1961); also discussed under EVIDFNcE,
Result of Lie Detector Test Inadmissible, infra.
' For

a collection of cases to this effect, see Baer, Radar Goes to Court,

33 N.C.L. REv. 355, 364 (1955) ;Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1952).
"5P lv. Aragon, 154 Cal. App. 2d 646, 316 P.2d 370 (Dist. Ct. App.
1957); Leeks v. State, 95 Okla. Grim. App. 326, 245 P.2d 764 (1952).
"1See 3 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 990 (3d ed. 1940).
~255 N.C. 663, 122 S.E.2d 500 (1961).
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adjacent building. The trial court; sitting without: a jury, found
that the difference 'in- the fair market value- of plaintiff's property,
immediately before and*after the demolition was $11,500, and that
the estimated cost of repair was approximately the same. However,.
after considering the deterioration of the building, the diminution in
its value resulting from the changed use of the adjacent property and
the exposure of defects hidden by the building demolished, the trial
court further found that the damages actually suffered by plaintiff as
a result of defendant's negligence were $3500. It awarded damages
in the smaller amount, and on appeal by the plaintiff, the Supreme
Court affirmed. The Court pointed out that .the action being for,
negligence, the plaintiff was entitled to recover only such damages as
resulted directly from defendant's act.. The plaintiff -was not entitled
to recover for diminution in the value of his property. resulting from
exposure of defects in his wall or from changed use of the adjacent.
property.' Therefore, there was no inconsistency in the finding by
the trial court of the difference in the fair market 'value of plaintiff's
property before and after the demolition and the award of a smaller
amount. The latter represented the damages to plaintiff's building
resulting directly from defendant's negligence.
This result seems to be in accord with past decisions which have
held that the measure of damages for fiegligent injury to real prbperty is the difference in value of the property immediately before and
immediately after the injury, provided this difference represents the
damages proximately resulting from the defendant's act.'
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION

In Godwin v. Vinson,4 the automobile of the defendant, a traveling salesman, was wrongfully attached by plaintiff. The attachment
was later set aside.5 During the attachment, however, the defendant
was unable to continue the payments on his car and the rental payments on another car which he needed in his business. The Wachovia Bank and Trust Company, which held a lien on defendant's
car, filed an intervening petition to assert its lien, and obtained pos'Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N.C. 512, 23 S.E.2d
894 (1943); Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 222 N.C. 504-, 23 S.E.2d 681
(1943).
3 E.g., Owens v. Blackwood
Lumber Co., 212 N.C. 133, 193 S.E. 219
(1937).
' 254 N.C. 582, 119 S.E.2d 616 (1961).
'Godwin v. Vinson, 251 N.C. 326, 111 S.E.2d 180 (1959).
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session of the vehicle. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion in
the cause to recover for the loss of use and the loss of equity in the
automobile resulting from the wrongful attachment. The trial court
awarded recovery, but in his instructions to the jury, the trial judge
stated that if the jury found that the defendant was entitled to
recover for loss of equity in the vehicle they should award any
amount from one dollar to one thousand six hundred and thirtyseven dollars, the amount claimed by the plaintiff. On appeal by the
plaintiff, the Supreme Court awarded a new trial on this issue.
The Court stated that under G.S. § 1-440.10, the defendant was
entitled to recover the actual damages sustained as a result of the
wrongful attachment. 6 As for his loss of equity, the Court stated
the measure of damages to be the fair cash value of the equity at the
time and place of seizure, with lawful interest on such value from the
time of seizure to the time of rendition of the judgment.
This is apparently the first case in this state on the measure of
damages for loss of equity. It is interesting to note that in its
statement of the rule the Court apparently departed from the general
rule that interest is to be awarded in the discretion of the jury,7
for here it is implied that interest will be given as a matter of law.
*A showing of actual loss for the recovery of compensatory damages has
long been required by the Court. Lieb v. Mayer, 244 N.C. 613, 94 S.E.2d
658 (1956).
"Generally, it is only in actions brought in contract that the court can
render judgment for interest on the amount found by the jury. Satterwhite
v. Carson, 25 N.C. 549 (1843). In tort cases the rule is different. Where
the tort is destruction of property, the jury may, in their discretion, allow interest on the value of the property from the date of its destruction, in addition
to the actual value. Harper v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 161 N.C. 451, 77
S.E. 415 (1913).

Also, interest has, in the past, been allowed on a judgment

only from the first day of the term in which the judgment was rendered.
Chatham'v. Mecklenburg Realty Co., 174 N.C. 671, 94 S.E. 447 (1917).
However, in this case interest was awarded from the time of seizure to the
rendition of the judgment. Cf. Jackson v. City of Gastonia, 247 N.C. 88,
100 S.E.2d 241 (1957), discussed in 36 N.C.L. REv. 421 (1958). For a
general discussion of interest given as a matter of law or at the discretion
of the jury, see McCormick, Interests As Damages, 9 N.C.L. Rav. 237, 249
(1931).
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
ALImoNY WITHOUT DIVORCE

In Schlagel v. Schlagel' the wife brought an action for alimony
without divorce under G.S. § 50-16. After being duly served, the
husband failed to file an answer. Upon motion by the plaintiff the
clerk of the superior court entered a judgment by default and inquiry
and calendared the judgment on the issues docket for hearing at the
next term of court.
At the hearing the trial judge, ex mero motu, ruled that an action
brought under G.S. § 50-16 was not a proper action for judgment by
default and inquiry and, therefore, the judgment was null and void.
Upon appeal the plaintiff argued 2 that under G.S. § 1-209 the
clerks of the superior courts are authorized to enter all judgments
by default final and default and inquiry as authorized by G.S. §§ 1211, 1-212 and 1-213; and that G.S. § 1-212 provides for judgments
by default and inquiry in all other actions, except those mentioned
in G.S. § 1-211. Since an action for alimony without divorce is not
mentioned in G.S. § 1-211, such action must come under the provisions of G.S. § 1-212; otherwise, litigation brought under the provisions of G.S. § 50-16 would not be an "action" at law.'
At first glance this seems to be a logical conclusion. The Court
held, however, that in a suit for alimony without divorce brought
under G.S. § 50-16 the clerk of court could not enter a judgment by
default and inquiry because this would be directly contrary to G.S.
§ 50-10.4
The Court reasoned as follows. First, the plaintiff, in order to
obtain affirmative relief under the provisions of G.S. § 50-16, must
meet the requirements of G.S. § 50-7 for divorce from bed and
board.5 Second, G.S. § 50-10 applies to actions for divorce from
-253 N.C. 787, 117 S.E.2d 790 (1961).

'Brief for Plaintiff, p. 3, Schlage v. Schlage, 253 N.C. 787, 117 S.E.2d
790 (1961).
'Id. at pp. 3-4.
'"The material facts in every complaint asking for a divorce shall be
deemed to be denied by the defendant . . . and no judgment shall be given

in favor of the plaintiff in any such complaint until such facts have been
found by a jury.. . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-10 (1950).
'Ollis v. Ollis, 241 N.C. 709, 86 S.E.2d 420 (1955); Best v. Best, 228
N.C. 9, 44 S.E.2d 214 (1947) ; Pollard v. Pollard, 221 N.C. 46, 19 S.E.2d 1
(1942).
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bed and board under G.S. § 50-7.6 Third, an action under G.S.
§ 50-16 has precisely the same effect as an action under G.S. § 50-7.
Therefore, the provisions of G.S. § 50-10 are applicable to suits for
alimony without divorce under G.S. § 50-16 and require that the
material facts be found by a jury."
CONSENT JUDGMENTS

In Stancil v. Stancil the Court was faced with the issue whether
a consent judgment for alimony pendente lite and counsel fees could
be enforced by a contempt proceeding. Prior North Carolina decisions have uniformly held that a husband cannot be held in contempt
for failure to discharge the provisions of a consent judgment in
divorce proceedings9 unless such judgment is an order of the court.' 0
Contrary to other jurisdictions," it appears that the subtleties of the
f6rm of the judgment'I play a major role in determining the subse-'
quent right of the wife to enforce the consent judgment by contempt.
The North Carolina Supreme' Court has made a distinction
between consent judgments which merely approve an agreement
between the parties and consent judgments which order that the
agreement be performed. While the Court will not enforce by contempt a consent judgment which is merely a contract between the
parties entered into with the sanction of the court,'" where the decree
'Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957); Carpenter v.
Carpenter, 244 N.C. 286, 93 S.E.2d 617 (1956).
' The Court stated: "[J]urisdiction over the subject matter of divorce
and actions affecting the marriage relationship is given only by statute, and
in the grant, judgments in favor of the plaintiff affecting the marriage are
prohibited, except upon a finding of the material facts by a jury." 253 N.C.
at 790, 117 S.E.2d at 793.
8255 N.C. 507, 121 S.E.2d 882 (1961).
'Holden v. Holden, 245 N.C. 1, 95 S.E.2d 118 (1956); Davis v. Davis,
213 N.C. 537, 196 S.E. 819 (1938); Webster v. Webster, 213 N.C. 135, 195

S.E. 362 (1938).

" Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N.C. 181, 22 S.E.2d 576 (1942) ; Dyer

v. Dyer, 212 N.C. 620, 194 S.E. 278 (1937).
REv. 405 (1957).

See generally Note, 35 N.C.L.

" Most jurisdictions hold that once the agreement of the parties is incorporated into the court decree, or is simply restated in the form of a decree, the contract is superseded by the court order and has the full force and
effect of a decree enforceable by contempt. See, e.g., Ex parte Dukes, 155
Ark. 24, 243 S.W, 863 (1922); Hargis v. Hargis, 252 Ky. 198, 66 S.W.2d
59 (1933); Sessions v. Sessions, 178 Minn. 75, 226 N.W. 701 (1929); Karteus v. Karteus, 67 N.D. 297, 272 N.W. 185 (1937).
12 See cases cited note 9 supra.
"Holden v. Holden, 245 N.C. 1, 95 S.E.2d 118 (1956); Davis v. Davis,
213 N.C. 537, 196 S.E. 819 (1938); Webster v. Webster, 213 N.C. 135, 195

S.E. 362 (1938).
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satisfies certain technical requirements, it will be considered'an order
of the court, and enforcement by contempt will be allowed.
In Dyer v. Dyer"' the decree stated that by the consent of the
parties the husband was to pay. the wife a certain sum "pending
further orders of this court."' 5 This was held sufficient to be an
order of the court rather than a mere sanction of the contract of the
parties and, therefore, was enforceable by contempt.
In Edmundson v. Edmundson" the decree recited.that failure to
abide by the decree would subject the husband to penalties for contempt. The Court held that the defendant could be held for contempt
for failure to meet the requirements of the order. The fact that the
decree specifically stated that failure to comply would result in contempt was held to be controlling.
In Stancil v. Stancil'7 the decree"8 ordered the husband to pay
the wife a certain sum for alimony and'subsistence, but did not contain the words "pending further order of the court"; nor was there
any specific mention of contempt. Nevertheless, the Court held that
the judgment was a court order and would support a contempt
proceeding.
While Stancil does not give a definitive answer as to when a
consent judgment will be held to. be an order of the court, it does
seem to indicate that less is required to find a, court order than
previously indicated.
CUSTODY

In a recent custody case, In Re Hughes, 9 the Supreme Court
expressly held that it is the residence of minor children, and not their
domicile, which is important for custody jurisdiction purposes. Subsequent to the decision in Allman v. Register,2 ° the Court has been
1,212 N.C. 620, 194 S.E. 278 (1937).

Id. at 621, 196 S.E. at 279.
222 N.C. 181, 22 S.E.2d 576 (1942).

1'255 N.C. 507, 121 S.E.2d 882 (1961).

'8 'IT IS NOW, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the defendant pay to
the plaintiff alimony and subsistence for herself the sum of $250.00 per
month ...

until final determination of this action .

. . .'"

Id. at 507-08, 121

S.E.2d at 883.
1254 N.C. 434, 119 S.E.2d 189 (1961).
20233 N.C. 531, 64 S.E.2d 861 (1951). In this case the children were
residing in North Carolina, but the Court found that they were domiciled in
Virginia. The Court, therefore, concluded that North Carolina was without
jurisdiction to make a custody award except in conformity with a prior Virginia decree which awarded custody to the mother.
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moving steadily in this direction."' In 1957, in a per curiam decicision," the Court quoted with approval the following statement from
Finlay v. Finlay:2
The jurisdiction of a state to regulate the custody of infants found within its territory does not depend upon the
domicile of its parents. It has its origin in the protection
that is due to the incompetent or helpless ....

For this, the

residence of the child suffices though the domicile be elsewhere ....

24

The Court in Hughes adopts this statement as "the correct rule." 25

In a dictum in another custody case, In re Orr,26 the Court went
even further than it did in Hughes by quoting the Supreme Court of
Florida 7 to the effect that,
The law is and has been from time immemorial that each
state is not only empowered, but is charged with the duty,
to regulate the custody of infants within its borders. This is
true even though the parents may be residents of another
state. .

.

.

For this, the residence of the child suffices,

though the domicile be elsewhere.28
Thus it seems clearly established that in North Carolina mere
residence of the child is all that is necessary for the court to have
jurisdiction to determine custody.
DIVORCE

In a case of first impression, the North Carolina Supreme Court
refused to uphold a divorce where jurisdiction was predicated solely
upon G.S. § 50-18.29
21 See Lennon v. Lennon, 252 N.C. 659, 114 S.E.2d 571 (1960) ; Cleeland
v. Cleeland, 249 N.C. 16, 105 S.E.2d 114 (1958); Holmes v. Sanders, 246
N.C. 200, 97 S.E.2d 683 (1957) ; Richter v. Harmon, 243 N.C. 373, 90 S.E.2d
74422(1956).
Holmes v. Sanders, supra note 21, at 201, 97 S.E.2d at 685.
28240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).
2"Id. at 431,
148 N.E. at 625.
25254 N.C. at 437, 119 S.E.2d

at 191.

26254 N.C. 723, 119 S.E.2d 880 (1961).
2T

Di Giorgio v. Di Giorgio, 153 Fla. 24, 13 So. 2d 596 (1943).
'11d. at 27, 13 So. 2d at 597-98.
"9"In any action instituted and prosecuted under this chapter [Divorce
and Alimony], allegation and proof that the plaintiff or the defendant has
resided or been stationed at a United States army, navy, marine corps, coast
guard or air force installation or reservation or any other location pursuant
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In Martin v. Martin80 the husband, a United'States Army officer,
instituted an action for absolute divorce on the ground of two years
separation and alleged that he had been a resident on the Fort Bragg
Military Reservation for more than six months next preceding the
commencement of the action. The wife, who was present at the trial,
contended that the residence requirement set out in G.S. § 50-18 involved domicile, and averred that the plaintiff did not intend to make
North Carolina his home permanently or for an indefinite period.
In evident reliance upon G.S. § 50-18, the trial judge instructed
the jury that if they found that the plaintiff had been stationed at
Fort Bragg pursuant to military duty for six months prior to the
bringing of the action, they should answer the issue of residence in
favor of the plaintiff. The defendant excepted to this charge. The
jury found for the plaintiff, and judgment was entered in accordance
with the verdict.
On appeal this portion of the charge was held to be erroneous in
that it omitted the "requirement of intent to adopt North Carolina
as [a] legal residence,"'" and a new trial was awarded. The Court
interpreted the word "residence" as used in the statute to embrace
the traditional prerequisites of "domicile" as previously defined. 2
An increasing number of states now have so-called "servicemen's
statutes" which provide for divorce jurisdiction without a finding
of domicile." Still other states have general statutes which establish
bases other than domicile for jurisdiction in divorce cases. 4 It
seems reasonable to assume that our legislature intended to follow
these states in the enactment of G.S. § 50-18.3" Yet the Court chose
to military duty within this State for a period of six months next preceding

the institution of the action shall constitute compliance with the residence
requirement set forth in this chapter . . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-18 (Supp.

1961).

"6253 N.C. 704, 118 S.E.2d 29 (1961).
32253 N.C. at 710, 118 S.E.2d at 34.
" Bryant v. Bryant, 228 N.C. 287, 45 S.E.2d 572 (1947). For a complete
review of the legal requirements for domicile in divorce actions, see 38 N.C.L.
REv. 154, 176-87 (1959).
"GA. ConE ANN. § 30-107 (Supp. 1961); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 601502 (1949); NEB. REv. STAT. §42-303 (1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-4
(1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1272 (1961); TEx. RE v. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 4631 (1960) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-97 (1960).
"See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1208.1 (Supp. 1961); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 46-1-3 (1954); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 166, § 55 (Supp. 1959);
N.Y. CIvn PRACTICE ACT § 1166.
" For a full exploration of the probable intent underlying enactment of
G.S. § 50-18, see Ligon, Is Domicile a JurisdictionalPrerequisiteto a Valid
Divorce Decree?, 3 JAG J. 9 (1961).
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to -void this action by holding that the statute did not change the
former jurisdictional prerequisites of residence and animus inanendi.0
-This case is the subject of a Note in this volume of the Law
Review.

s7

In Israel v. Israel,38 another divorce case, the Court held that a
serviceman's 'domicile remained in this state (the domiciliary state
at the time of enlistment) unless there was a showing that he intentionally changed his home and intended to make some other state
his home permanently or for an indefinite period.
The serviceman, husband, a native of North Carolina, brought
an action for divorce, alleging that he had been a resident of North
Carolina for more than six months prior to the commencement of
the action. The wife contended that since the plaintiff had lived in
various other localities during his nineteen years in service, he was
no longer domiciled in North Carolina. The trial court instructed
the -jury as a matter of, law that unless the plaintiff intentionally
changed his home and intended to make some other state his home
permanently or for an indefinite period, his residence (domicile)
would remain in North Carolina. The Supreme Court held that
the charge as presented to the jury was correct and free of error.
The Court quoted with approval the following rule from Central
Mfgs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Freidman:9
The domicile of a soldier or sailor in the military or naval
service of his country generally remains unchanged, domicile
being neither gained nor lost by being temporarily stationed
in the line of duty at a particular place, even for a period of
years. A new domicile may, however, be acquired if both
the fact and the intent concur.40
This decision reaffirms the position taken by the Court in Hart

42
v. Coach Co. 41 and conforms to the majority view.

,' See

note 4 supra.

" Note, 40 N.C.L. RIv. 343 (1962).

8255 N.C. 391, 121 S.E.2d 713 (1961).

,'0213 Ark. 9, 209 S.W.2d 102 (1948).

' Id.at 13, 209 S.W.2d at 104.

"241 N.C. 389, 85 S.E.2d 319 (1955). This was an automobile accident
case involving a serviceman, a native of Virginia, who was stationed in North
Carolina at the time of the accident but who had been transferred out of the
state before suit was brought. He contended that he was a resident of North
Carolina at the time of the accident and therefore not subject to service of
process under the nonresident motorist statute.' However, the Court affirmed
the trial court's ruling that he was a nonresident at the time of the accident.
" E.g., Ellis v. Southeast Constr. Co., 260 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1958);
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In Wicker v. Wicker43 the husband brought an action for absolute divorce alleging adultery. The wife denied the allegation and
contended that a finding of no adultery in a previous proceeding44
was res judicata to this action. The previous action, a habeas corpus
proceeding to determine the custody of children of the marriage, was
heard by a trial judge who, sitting without a jury, found as a fact
that the wife had not committed adultery.
In a per curiam decision the Supreme Court held that the finding
in the previous action was not res judicata since G.S. § 50-1045 requires that, in a divorce action, the material facts as to the grounds
for a divorce must be found by a jury.

While the Court did not elaborate, it seems clear that a finding
in a custody proceeding cannot be resjudicata in a divorce action.
It has been held4 6 repeatedly in North Carolina that in order for a
judgment in one action to be res judicata to another action, the
following three elements must concur: (1) identity of parties;. (2)
identity of subject matter; and (3) identity of issues. It would
seem that in the action for divorce there is neither identity of subject
48
matter4 7 nor identity of issues.
In Moody v. Moody49 the wife instituted an action for divorce

in 1960 pursuant to G.S. § 50-6."0 The complaint alleged that the
Kopasz v. Kopasz, 107 Cal. App. 2d 308, 237 P.2d 284 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951);
Stevens v. Allen, 139 La. 658, 71 So. 936 (1916).
's255 N.C. 723, 122 S.E.2d 703 (1961).
"In re Wicker, 253 N.C. 431, 117 S.E.2d 13 (1960).
" "The material facts in every complaint asking for a divorce shall be
deemed to be denied by the defendant... and no judgment shall be given in
favor of the plaintiff in any such complaint until such facts have been found
by a jury. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-10 (1950).
'Troy Lumber Co. v. Hunt, 251 N.C. 624, 112 S.E.2d 132 (1960);
Stansel v. McIntyre, 237 N.C. 148, 74 S.E.2d 345 (1953); Huffman v. Pearson, 222 N.C. 193, 22 S.E.2d 440 (1942).
' In a custody proceeding, the subject matter is the custody of minor
children. G.S. § 17-39, which authorizes the procedure of habeas corpus,
provides: "When a contest shall arise on a writ of habeas corpus . . . in
respect to the custody of ... children, the court or judge ... may award the
charge or custody of the child or children . . . either. to the husband or to
the wife . . . ." In the present action the subject matter was the marriage

relationship.
" The issue before the court in a custody proceeding is which party shall
have custody of the child. G.S. § 17-39 provides that custody will be awarded
"with such provisions and directions as will, in the opinion of such court or
judge, best promote the interest and welfare of the children." In the present
action the issue was whether the defendant wife had committed adultery, as
alleged in the complaint.
'1253 N.C. 752, 117 S.E.2d 724 (1961).
"0N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950): "Marriages may be dissolved and the
parties thereto divorced from the bonds of matrimony on the application of
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defendant suffered a brain injury in 1954 and that the parties had
lived separate and apart since that time. However, the plaintiff
further alleged that the defendant was not incurably insane, but
merely incompetent because of his injury and that he had never
been confined to an institution for treatment of the mentally disordered. It was also alleged that the separation on the part of the
plaintiff was with the intent to terminate the marital relation and
that immediately prior to the separation the defendant had expressed
such an intent.
The defendant demurred on the ground that the complaint did
not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for absolute
divorce under G.S. § 50-6. The trial court sustained the demurrer
and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court stated:
From these allegations the conclusion is inescapable that the
separation arose by reason of the brain injury suffered by the
defendant, and that he was not then rational to the extent he
could form the intention to remain separate and apart from
the plaintiff. Furthermore, it does not appear from the complaint that defendant has since been mentally competent for a
period of time sufficient to bring the case within the provisions of G.S. 50-6.51
To the extent that the Court seems to be requiring mutual consent to separate in order to entitle one to a divorce under G.S. § 50-6,
it can find support in several prior North Carolina decisions. 5 2 However, language in Byers v. Byers53 and Taylor v. Taylor" seems to
indicate that the intent of one of the parties to separate is sufficient,
either party, if and when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart
for two years, and the plaintiff or defendant in the suit for divorce has resided in the State for a period of six months. This section shall be in addition
to other acts and not construed as repealing other laws on the subject of
divorce."
' 253 N.C. at 757, 117 S.E.2d at 727.
E.g., Young v. Young, 225 N.C. 340, 34 S.E.2d 154 (1945) ; Williams v.
Williams, 224 N.C. 91, 29 S.E.2d 39 (1944).
222 N.C. 298, 22 S.E.2d 902 (1942), where the Court stated: "There
must be at least an intention on the part of one of the parties to cease cohabitation, and this must be shown to have existed at the time alleged as the
beginning of the separation period .... " Id. at 304, 22 S.E.2d at 906.
. 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945). There the Court stated that to maintain an action under G.S. § 50-6 mere allegations of separation and residence
is sufficient, and "nothing else appearing, the establishment of these allegations by proof would entitle the plaintiff to a divorce .... The statute so

provides. ... " Id. at 82, 33 S.E.2d at 493-94.
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and that mutual consent is not necessary. It seems safe to assume,
however, that where one of the parties is mentally incompetent at
the time of the separation, the Court will not allow a divorce action
under G.S. § 50-6.
This case will be the subject of a Note in this volume of the Law
Review.
PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF SECOND MARRIAGE

In Williams v. Williams,5 a special proceeding for the allotment
of dower, A, the admitted first wife of W, the decedent, petitioned
the court for dower. Thereafter B filed an interplea in which she
alleged she was the surviving widow. B offered in evidence a marriage certificate, proof that at W's death they had lived together as
man and wife for nearly five and one-half years, and that her name
appeared on his death certificate as the surviving spouse. At the
close of this evidence, a motion for judgment as of nonsuit as to the
intervenor, B, was allowed.
Upon appeal, B, relying upon the prior North Carolina decision
of Kearney v. Thomas,"6 contended that the second marriage was
presumed to be valid until the contrary was proven.5 7 However,
instead of presuming B's marriage to be valid, the Court held that
the burden was upon B to show that W's prior marriage to A, which
was admitted to be valid, had been invalidated or dissolved."'
Williams is the subject of a Note in this volume of the Law
Review. 9
5254 N.C. 729, 120 S.E.2d 68 (1961).
225 N.C. 156, 33 S.E.2d 871 (1945). In this case the plaintiffs, children
of the first marriage, were heirs at law of Alexander Kearney. The defendant was the second wife. Plaintiffs contended that the property which
was the subject of the suit descended to them on the death of their father
free of any dower claim of the defendant because the second marriage was
bigamous and therefore void. But the Court presumed that the second marriage was valid.
, Such a presumption is recognized in a majority of jurisdictions. E.g.,
Parker v. American Lumber Corp., 190 Va. 181, 56 S.E.2d 214 (1949). There
the court stated: "The decided weight of authority, and we think the correct
view, is that where two marriages of the same person are shown, the second
marriage is presumed to be valid. . . ." Id. at 185, 56 S.E.2d at 216.
"' There was a vigorous dissent. Justice Rodman, speaking for the dissent, stated: "If Kearney v. Thomas is not the law in North Carolina, we
ought, I think, to expressly overrule it, specifically stating what the law is."
254 N.C. at 733, 120 S.E.2d at 72. (Denny and Bobbitt, JJ., concurred in the
dissenting opinion.)
" Note, 40 N.C.L. Rav. 118 (1962).
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SEPARATION AGREEMENTS-EQUITABLE LIENS

In Stanley v. Cox 6° the plaintiff brought an action under G.S.
§ 41-1061 to quiet title to realty. The complaint alleged that H, husband of the present defendant, had instituted an action for absolute
divorce against W, the present defendant, on the ground of two years
separation. While this action was pending, H and W entered into
a separation agreement in which H agreed to make certain payments
for the use and benefit of W. Subsequently H's divorce action was
tried, and the divorce was granted. The judgment in that action
recited that the parties had entered into a separation agreement and
stated the following :62

By consent of the plaintiff, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND DECREED that the plaintiff shall pay to the
defendant each, every and all the payments specified in the
aforesaid agreement... and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED
AND ADJUDGED that said payment shall be and remain a
lien upon the estate and property of the plaintiff ....

Plain-

tiff consents to the last paragraph of the foregoing decree:
HARRY R. STANLEY
NORMAN A. BOREN
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
Plaintiff, who was one of the attorneys for H in the divorce
action, purchased from H one-fourth undivided interest in certain
property which H and W owned as tenants in common.

W claimed

a lien on the entire property including the plaintiff's one-fourth interest by virtue of the provision in the divorce decree.
In attacking the defendant's claim for a lien on the entire property, plaintiff contended that the lien was to secure alimony and that
at the time of the decree a consent judgment for alimony entered in
an action for absolute divorce was unenforceable as a decree of the
court. He also contended that the lien upon H's property could not
be enforced as a contract because W did not sign the consent
judgment.
The Court pointed to the legal definition of "alimony"' in North
80253 N.C. 620, 117 S.E.2d 826 (1961); also discussed under CREDIT
TRANSACTIONS, Equitable Lien--Consent Judgment, supra.
" 1N.C. GEN. STAT.1§41-10 (1950).
253 N.C. at 627, 117 S.E.2d at 831.

"Now, 'alimony' in its legal sense may be defined to be that proportion
of the husband's estate which is judicially allowed and allotted to a wife for
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Carolina and stated that "the agreement referred to in the divorce
judgment is an executed separation agreement and property settlement, and is not alimony or a contract for alimony."" The Court
concluded that the consent part of the judgment created an equitable
lien on the described property which was enforceable against all
except those having superior title or claim or who took without
notice.
While this seems to be the first instance where our Court has
held that the provisions of a consent judgment in a divorce action
created an equitable lien, it is entirely consistent with prior North
Carolina decisions regarding equitable liens. 5

EMINENT DOMAIN
FAIR MARKET VALUE

The general rule in North Carolina is that where only a portion
of a tract of land is taken by the Highway Commission in an eminent
domain proceeding, the measure of damages is the difference in the
fair market value of the land immediately before and after the taking,
less any special or general benefits accruing to the owner as result of
the utilization of the part taken.1 This rule is now codified in G.S.
§ 136-112(1). The statute was applied for the first time in Templeton V. Highway Comm'n,2 where the Court held that it was error
for the trial court to exclude, on the issue of damages, evidence of
the benefits accruing to the remaining portion of the owner's land
as a result of the condemnation. Such evidence was relative on the
actual damages suffered by the owner as a result of the taking.
The Court in Templeton also reiterated the general rule in
her subsistence and livelihood during the period of their separation." Rogers

v. Vines, 28 N.C. 293, 297 (1846), quoted with approval in Hester v. Hester,

239 N.C. 97, 79 S.E.2d 248 (1953), and Taylor v. Taylor, 93 N.C. 418
(1885).

N.C. at 629, 117 S.E.2d at 832.
" See Winborne v. Guy, 222 N.C. 128, 22 S.E.2d 220 (1942), where the
Court stated: "[E]very express executory agreement in writing, whereby the
contracting party sufficiently indicates an intention to make some particular
property ... a security for a debt or other obligation .. . creates an equitable lien upon the property so indicated .... 1" Id. at 131-32, 22 S.E.2d
8'253

at 222.
'E.g., Proctor v. Highway Comm'n, 230 N.C. 687, 55 S.E.2d 479 (1949).
2254

N.C. 337, 118 S.E.2d 918 (1961).
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North Carolina that loss of revenue8 to the owner's sport fishing
business as a result of silt deposits created by the Commission in
clearing the highway and the cost of removal of such deposits4 were
not separate items of damage. Evidence of such deposits is relevant
only as a factor which affects the fair market value of the remaining
land after the taking.'

EQUITABLE REMEDIES
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

Tull v. Doctors Building, Inc.1 presented a new situation to the
Court. The plaintiff had paved several lots located within a subdivision restricted to residences only, and used the lots for parking
in conjunction with its office building nearby. The plaintiff sought
to have the restriction, imposed by covenants in the deeds, removed.
In affirming the trial court's denial of the relief sought, the Court
stated the general rule that such restrictions will not be removed
unless the conditions have changed so radically as to practically destroy the objects and purposes of the restrictions;2 the subdivision
must have substantially lost its character as an exclusively residential
area.3 All jurisdictions follow this rule, but as to what constitutes
'The Court has generally stated that loss of profits is not an element of
damages in such cases. Pemberton v. Greensboro, 208 N.C. 466, 181 S.E.
258 (1935); State v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 199 N.C. 199, 154 S.E. 72
(1930); and that mere inconvenience alone is not an injury for which there
can be recovery. Elks v. Commissioners, 179 N.C. 241, 102 S.E. 414 (1920).
See generally Comment, 35 N.C.L. REV. 296, 305 (1957).
'Cf. Western Carolina Power Co. v. Hayes, 193 N.C. 104, 136 S.E. 353

(1927).

"Any evidence which aids the jury in fixing the fair market value of the
land, and its diminution by the burden put upon it, is relevant and should be
heard; any evidence"which does not measure up to this standard is calculated
to confuse the minds of the jury and should be excluded." Abernathy v.
South & Western Ry., 150 N.C. 97, 109, 63 S.E. 180, 185 (1908). See also
Gallimore v. Highway Comm'n, 241 N.C. 350, 355, 85 S.E.2d 392, 396
(1954), where the Court, speaking of similar items of damages, stated:
"[S]uch adverse effects are not separate items of damage.., but are relevant
only as circumstances tending to show a diminution in the overall [sic] fair
market value of the property."
'255 N.C. 23, 120 S.E.2d 817 (1961).
2Rombauer v. Compton Heights Christian Church, 328 Mo. 1, 40 S.W.2d
545 (1931); Booker v. Old Dominion Land Co., 188 Va. 143, 49 S.E.2d 314
(1948).
'Kokenge v. Whetstone, 60 Ohio App. 302, 20 N.E.2d 965 (1938).
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a sufficiently radical change the courts sometimes differ. 4
Most courts would concur with the decision of the North Carolina Court in the instant case. In Pitts v. Brown5 minor violations
of the restrictions, such as operating a small flower shop in the rear
of one residence, a small garage behind another, and a refrigerator
and stove repair shop in back of another, were considered not to be
such radical changes as would destroy the purposes of the restrictions. Similarly in Holling v. MargiottaPthe use of a lot within the
restricted area for free parking, and of part of a garage apartment
for storage for an adjacent grocery was deemed to be an insubstantial
commercial use.
Clearly in the present case the: commercial use of the property
within the subdivision was negligible, but as to how great a change
is necessary for cancellation of the restrictions is still an open question in North Carolina.
VESTED RIGHTS ACQUIRED PRIOR TO CHANGE IN A
ZONING ORDINANCE
In another case of first impression the Court held in Stowe v.
Burke7 that the defendant did not acquire a vested right where he
began construction of an apartment house in an area which by a
subsequent change in the zoning ordinance was restricted to onefamily residences, unless such construction was begun in good faith.
The defendant as an inducement for purchase had represented to
plaintiff, buyer of a lot in another tract, that the land in question
would be restricted to one-family dwellings. Announcement of an
impending zoning change to restrict the area to residences only was
given newspaper publicity, and public hearings were held at which
defendant did not appear to object to the proposed change. In the
interim, the defendant hurriedly began excavation and construction,
hoping to acquire a vested right so as to come within the exception
for existing nonconforming uses' when the ordinance was finally
changed.
' See, e.g., Hurd v. Albert, 214 Cal. 15, 3 P.2d 545 (1931); Morgan v.
Matheson, 362 Mich. 535, 107 N.W.2d 825 (1961). See generally Annot.,
76 A.L.R. 1348 (1932).
215 S.C. 122, 54 S.E.2d 538 (1949).
- 231 S.C. 676, 100 S.E.2d 397 (1957).
'255 N.C. 527, 122 S.E.2d 374 (1961).
' The new ordinance here, as is usually the case, contained a clause exempting from operation of the ordinance existing nonconforming buildings
and uses.
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Ordinarily When substantial construction has begun the builder
acquires a vested right.' The Court, adopting the prevailing view,1"
pointed out that this is true only where the construction was instituted in good faith reliance on the former zoning laws.
The Court's position is in accord with Schechter v. Zoning Bd.,1
a recent Pennsylvania decision. In that case plaintiff's request for
a variance from an ordinance to use part of his property in a farmresidence area as a drive-in theatre was denied by the township.
Thereafter the variance was issued in compliance with an order of
the county court. Within a few days the town revoked the permit
and appealed the county court's order. Plaintiff was notified of
this action by registered mail; nevertheless, he began construction.
The Court held that the resulting cost was not incurred in good faith
reliance on his permit, and that this was a mere attempt to acquire
a vested right.

EVIDENCE
BLOOD TESTS

In State v. Paschal the defendant was charged under G.S. § 20138 with operating an automobile while intoxicated. The trial court
admitted testimony concerning the defendant's negative reply to an
inquiry as to whether he would like to take a blood test. On appeal
the admission of this evidence was held to be prejudicial error.
The Court pointed out that where a blood speciman is obtained
at or near the time in question, subjected to a chemical analysis, and
traced and identified throughout the process, the testimony of an
expert as to the making of the test, the alcoholic content of the blood
specimen, and the effect of certain percentages of alcohol in the bloodstream is competent. The Court further stated that in those juris'As to what may or may not constitute "substantial," see Fitzgerald v.
Merard Holding Co., 110 Conn. 130, 147 AtI. 513 (1929) ; City of Lansing v.
Dawley, 247 Mich 394, 225 N.W. 500 (1929); Rice v. Van Vranken, 225
App. Div. 179, 232 N.Y. Supp. 506 (1929). See generally Annot., 138
A.L.R. 500 (1942).
"0Grantham Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 1, 97 A.2d 564
(1953); Winn v. Lamoy Realty Corp., 100 N.H. 280, 124 A.2d 211 (1956);
Pelham View Apartments v. Switzer, 130 Misc. 545, 224 N.Y. Supp. 56
(Sup. Ct. 1927).
1 395 Pa. 310, 149 A.2d 28 (1959).
1253 N.C. 795, 117 S.E.2d 749 (1961).
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dictions where the privilege against self-incrimination extends only
to the process of testifying by word of mouth or in writing, and not
to physical evidential circumstances found on the defendant's body,
evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to a blood test has been
held admissible.2
In the principal case, however, the defendant did not refuse to
submit to a blood test. There was no evidence that the test, if made,
would be made otherwise than at the defendant's expense. The
Court therefore found that the defendant's declination to take the
test was only an indication of his unwillingness to incur the expense;
hence, it was unnecessary to decide whether a defendant's refusal to
submit to a blood test for alcoholic contents was competent. However, since the testimony of the defendant's negative response to the
inquiry whether he wanted to take a blood test was susceptible of
use to the defendant's prejudice, and probably was so used, the Court
ordered a new trial.
STIPULATION-SILENCE NOT AN ADMISSION

State v. Powell' was a criminal prosecution under G.S. § 20-138
for driving an automobile while intoxicated. The indictment charged
that the defendant had previously been convicted of a like offense.4
The solicitor introduced certain papers which he and defendant's
counsel stipulated were the official records of the county recorder's
court." The solicitor stated that the records showed that on September 10, 1958, the defendant was found guilty of driving while
intoxicated. Neither the defendant nor his counsel said anything at
2 E.g.,

State v. Brock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958)

(defendant

deemed by statute to have given consent to blood test) ; State v. Smith, 230
S.C. 164, 94 S.E.2d 886 (1956); Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945,
81 S.E.2d 614 (1954). Contra,People v. Stratton, 1 N.Y. 2d 664, 133 N.E.2d
516 (1956); State v. Severson, 75 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1956); Duckworth
v. State, 309 P.2d 1103 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957). In the latter case the
dissenting judge relied upon Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957),
where the United States Supreme Court held that it was constitutional to
take a blood sample from an unconscious person for an intoxication test.
=254 N.C. 231, 118 S.E.2d 617 (1961).
'G.S. § 20-179 provides higher penalties in case of repeated convictions
under G.S. § 20-138. (The latter statute is erroneously reported in this case
as "G.S. § 14-138.")
' G.S. § 15-147 provides that in an indictment for an offense which, on
the second conviction thereof, is punished with other or greater punishment
than on the first conviction, a transcript of the record of the first conviction
shall, upon proof of the identity of the person of the offender, be sufficient
evidence of the first conviction.
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this point, nor was any other evidence offered as to the former
conviction.
In his charge to the jury the trial judge stated that the defendant,
through his counsel, stipulated that he had been previously convicted under G.S. § 20-138. The defendant was convicted and on
appeal contended that the former conviction had not been judicially
admitted or stipulated but was an issue for jury determination.
The Court ordered a new trial on the grounds that the purported
stipulation was not "definite and certain" in that the solicitor did not
state (1) that the defendant admitted the truth of the matters contained in the recorder's court record or (Z)that the defendant stipulated that he was the person to whom the record referred. The
Court further stated that the defendant's silence in the face of the
statements made by the solicitor could not be construed as an assent
to the truth of the statements unless the solicitor specified that assent
had been given.
REFERENCE TO DEFENDANT'S INSURANCE ON
CROSS-EXAMINATION

The Court has consistently held that in an action for damages it
is not permissible, in the absence of special circumstances, to introduce any evidence of the existence of liability insurance or to make
any reference thereto in the presence of the jury.' In the recent case
of Adams v. Godwin,7 however, the Court cast some doubt on the
rigidity with which that rule will be applied in the future. This was
a civil action for damages arising out of an automobile accident.
The defendant's counsel, in his cross-examination of the plaintiff,
brought out that the defendant was insured. The same information
was brought out again upon further cross-examination of the plaintiff. No objection was made by the defendant.
On this point the Court held that where the defendant opened the
line of inquiry, he could not complain if such inquiry brought out the
fact that he was insured. The Court further stated: "[I] t is now a
matter of general knowledge that the owner of a motor vehicle in
North Carolina is required by law to carry liability insurance at
least to the extent required by the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act ....,,
'Taylor v. Green, 242 N.C. 156, 87 S.E.2d 11 (1955); Jordan v. Maynard, 231 N.C. 101, 56 S.E.2d 26 (1949).
1254 N.C. 632, 119 S.E.2d 484 (1961). 8 Id.at 633-34, 119 S.E.2d at 485.
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Query whether the Court will now be less inclined to declare a
mistrial because of some reference to the fact that the defendant has
automobile liability insurance.
RESULT OF LIE DETECTOR TEST INADMISSIBLE

With the exception of one lower court decision in New York,9
the courts of this country have consistently held that the results of
a lie detector (polygraph) test are inadmissible in evidence. 10 This
rule was applied in the recent case of State v. Foye." In this case
counsel for co-defendant F elicited testimony from various witnesses
concerning the results of a lie detector test that had been administered
to F. The tenor of the testimony was such as to infer that F, who
had implicated co-defendant W in the crime, was telling the truth.
Both defendants were found guilty, but on appeal the Supreme Court
reversed. The Court stated that evidence of the result of a lie detector test is inadmissible whether it is presented indirectly, as in
the principal case, or directly. The admission of this testimony over
the objection of W was therefore prejudicial to him.
PROBATIVE FORCE OF TRADE NAME PRINTED ON
COMMERCIAL TRUCK
2
In Carter v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc."
the Court held that
evidence to the effect that plaintiff was injured by a truck bearing
the defendant's trade name was insufficient to make out a prima facie
case that the defendant was owner of the truck and that it was being
operated by defendant's agent. This decision was apparently overruled in the recent case of Knight v. Associated Transp., Inc.'3 In
this case the Court held that

where common carriers of freight are operating tractor-trailer
units, on public highways, and such equipment bears the insignia or name of such carrier, and the motor vehicle is involved in a collision or inflicts injury upon another, evidence
'People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Queens County Ct.
1938).
"°E.g., State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947); People v.
Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942); State v. Bohmer, 210 Wis.
651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933). See generally Baer, Radar Goes to Court, 33
N.C.L. REV. 355, 364 (1955) ; Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1952).
11254 N.C. 704, 120 S.E.2d 169 (1961); also discussed under CRImINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE, Unlawful Evidence-Lie Detector,supra.
12227 N.C. 193, 41 S.E.2d 586 (1947).
12255 N.C. 462, 122 S.E.2d 64 (1961).
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that the name of the defendant was painted.., on the motor
vehicle., constitutes prima facie evidence that the defendant
...

was the owner of such vehicle and that the driver thereof

was operating it for and on behalf of the defendant.

4

This decision is in accord with G.S. § 20-71.115 which was inapplicable here because the suit was instituted more than a year after
The Court, in accord with the mathe cause of action accrued.'
jority of jurisdictions, 7 held that this rule applied even in the
absence of statute.
HEARSAY

In a criminal prosecution for the rape of an eight-year-old girl,
the trial court instructed the court reporter to take the testimony of
the prosecutrix in the absence of the jury because of the difficulty
in getting her to answer questions. The court reporter then read
the testimony to the jury. This testimony was held to be hearsay
in State v. Payton.'s The Court ruled that the defendant was entitled as a fundamental right to have the jury hear the story directly
from the prosecutrix and observe her demeanor while telling it.
DECLARATION BY DECEASED OF INTENTION
BUSINESS TRIP-REs GESTAE

To Go

ON A

In Gassaway v. Gassaway & Owen, Inc. 9 the Court held that
evidence of a statement by a deceased person expressing an intention
to go on a business trip was incompetent unless a part of the res
gestae, and that in order for the declaration to be a part of the res
gestae it must be shown to have been spontaneous and made contemporaneously with the act of departure. The Court therefore held
that declarations made two days and one day before the declarant
began his fatal trip were not part of the res gestae and inadmissible.
This rule was affirmed in the recent case of Little v. Power Brake
Co.2" In Little one of the declarations was made thirty minutes
Id. at 467, 122 S.E.2d at 69.
'5 This statute provides that proof of ownership of an automobile involved
in an accident is prima facie evidence that the vehicle was being used with
the authority and consent of the owner at the time of the accident.
"0This time limitation has been repealed. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-71.1
(Supp. 1961).
" See generally 9B BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 6056 (1954).
18255 N.C. 420, 121 S.E2d 608 (1961).
'

220 N.C. 694, 18 S.E.2d 120 (1942).

20255 N.C. 451, 121 S.E.2d 889 (1961).
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prior and the other nine hours prior to the deceased's departure.
These declarations were also held inadmissible because not part of
the res gestae.
The Court has developed no clear criteria for admitting or dis-

allowing evidence of a declaration of intention or design.21 Its holding in the principal case is contrary to the prevailing view in the
majority of jurisdictions. 2

INSURANCE
ACCIDENT INSURANCE

In Richardson v. Liberty Life Ins. Co.' the Court for the first
time had occasion to construe a provision in an accident policy to
the effect that "loss of four fingers entire of a hand shall be construed
as loss of such hand." On April 24, 1958, while this policy was in
force, the plaintiff had an accident with a rip saw and cut off three
fingers of the left hand. On July 16, 1960, he accidentally severed
the fourth finger behind the first joint. Plaintiff's evidence showed
that when he used this finger it swelled. The defendant contended
that the word "entire" as used in the policy meant "whole" or
"total," and, therefore, the four fingers of a hand must be entirely
severed to meet the requirements for payment under the policy for
loss of a hand.
" For a comprehensive survey of instances when declarations of intention
have been held admissible and inadmissible by the Court, see STANSBURY.,
NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 179 (1946).
2 The leading case in this area is Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145
U.S. 285 (1892). The United States Supreme Court there held that certain
letters which the deceased had written in which he expressed an intention to
embark on a journey were admissible on the issue of the deceased's intention.
The Court cited Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 397, 404-05
(1869), to the effect that "wherever the bodily or mental feelings of an individual are material to be proved, the usual expression of such feelings are
original and competent evidence .

. .

. Such declarations are regarded as

verbal acts, and are as competent as any other testimony, when relevant to
the issue." 145 U.S. at 296.
In American Sec. Co. v. Minard, 118 Ind. App. 310, 77 N.E.2d 762
(1948), the court held in a workmen's compensation proceeding that evidence
of a declaration made by the deceased employee one hour prior to his fatal
accident that he was going to call on a business customer was admissible as
an exception to the hearsay rule. A similar result was reached in Indiana
Steel Prods. Co. v. Leonard, 126 Ind. App. 669, 131 N.E.2d 162 (1956),
where the declaration was made several hours prior to the fatal accident.
See generally Annot., 113 A.L.R. 268 (1938)..
1254 N.C. 711, 119 S.E.2d 871 (1961).
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In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff the Supreme Court held
that under the terms of the policy there was a loss of an entire finger
if a sufficient part of it had been destroyed so as to make it useless
as a finger.
This decision seems to be in accord with the majority rule that
loss of a member means loss of the usefulness of that member rather
than actual severance thereof.2
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE
v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co.3 plaintiff

In Faizan
brought
action to recover on an automobile liability policy. The defendant
denied liability on the ground that the policy had expired before the
accident in question occurred.
The policy was issued to plaintiff under the Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Act of 1957.4 The period of coverage as stated on
the face of the policy was from 12:01 A.M., February 22, 1958, to
12:01 A.M., February 22, 1959. In January 1959, defendant sent
plaintiff a notice advising him the policy would expire February 22,
1959, and that in order to renew it, he would have to pay the renewal
premium in advance and not later than February 5, 1959. Plaintiff
did not pay the renewal premium, and on February 9, 1959, defendant mailed to plaintiff a "Notice of Termination," erroneously
stating that the policy would terminate at 12:01 A.M., February 24,
1959.
Plaintiff's automobile was involved in an accident at 2:30 A.M.,
February 22, 1959. Plaintiff contended that the policy was still
in effect at the time of the accident because the defendant had not
complied with G.S. § 20-279.22 which provides that a policy issued
in accordance with the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act of 1953' shall not be cancelled until at least twenty days
after notice has been given to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
Although plaintiff admitted that his policy had been issued pursuant
to the Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act of 1957, he contended
Travellers' Protective Ass'n v. Brazington, 71 Ind. App. 130, 123 N.E.
221 (1919); Noel v. Continental Cas. Ins. Co., 138 Kan. 136, 23 P.2d 610
(1933); Beber v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 75 Neb. 183, 106 N.W.
168 (1905); Sneck v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 156 N.Y. 669, 50 N.E. 1122
(1898) ; Lord v. American Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 89 Wis. 19, 61 N.W. 293 (1894).
'254 N.C. 47, 118 S.E.2d 303 (1960); also discussed under ADMINISTRATiWyLAW, Interpretation of Statutes, supra.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309 to -319 (Supp. 1961).
"N.C. GuN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1-.39 (Supp. 1961).
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that G.S. § 20-279.22 was incorporated by reference into the 1957
act by G.S. § 20-314.6
The Court held that since section 20-310 of the 1957 act sets
out specific provisions concerning notice of termination, G.S. § 20279.22 has no application to policies issued pursuant to the 1957 act.
Therefore, the defendant was not required to give notice as required
by that section. The Court further stated that G.S. § 20-310 requires advance notice to the insured only when the insurance is
terminated or cancelled by the insurer, and not when renewal is rejected by the insured. The Court concluded that termination in the
present case was due to the plaintiff's rejection of the offer of renewal which the defendant had mailed to plaintiff. Therefore, since
the "Notice of Termination" was not required, it did not extend the
coverage period by reason of its erroneous termination date."

LABOR LAW
ARBITRATION

In Charlotte City Coach Lines, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen1 the Court had occasion to construe two sections of the North
Carolina Labor Arbitration Act 2 for the first time. Here, the collective bargaining agreement provided a definite grievance procedure, the last step of which was arbitration. A dispute arose over
the suspension by the company of a driver, and a month later the
union, without first employing the prescribed grievance procedure,
demanded arbitration of the grievance. A stay of arbitration was
' This section provides that the provisions of the 1953 act which pretain
to the method of giving and maintaining proof of financial responsibility

shall apply to filing and maintaining proof of responsibility under the 1957
act.7
"No contract of insurance or renewal thereof shall be terminated by can-

cellation or failure to renew by the insurer until at least fifteen (15) days
after mailing a notice of termination to the named insured at the address
shown on the policy.... Upon the termination of insurance by cancellation
or failure to renew, notice of such cancellation or termination shall be mailed
by the insurer to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles not later than fifteen
(15) days following the effective date of such cancellation or other termination." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-310 (Supp. 1961).
' The Court also noted that the defendant had given notice of termination
to the Commission of Motor Vehicles within fifteen days after the effective
date of termination as provided by G.S. § 20-310.
1254 N.C. 60, 118 S.E.2d 37 (1961).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-36.1 to -36.9 (1953).
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granted by the superior court upon application of the company and
the Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court found that it was clear from the terms of the contract
that the parties had not agreed to arbitrate any issue without prior
exhaustion of the grievance procedure. It was further held that the
parts of the act in question, G.S. §§ 95-36.6 and 95-36.9(b), were
in pari materia and must be construed together.
G.S. § 95-36.6 provides that absent an agreement to the contrary
the arbitrator shall have power to decide the arbitrability of a dispute.
The Court stated, however, that this was qualified by G.S. § 9536.9(b), which provides that a party against whom arbitration
proceedings have been initiated may apply for a stay of arbitration
on the ground that he has not agreed to arbitrate the controversy
involved. The Court therefore held that the court, and not, the
arbitrator, was to decide whether a party has agreed to the arbitration of the dispute.'
It should be noted that, in view of this decision, the North Carolina Labor Arbitration Act affects an arbitrator's power to determine
the arbitrability of a labor dispute in a manner quite contrary to the
attitude presently prevailing in the federal courts. The United
States Supreme Court has, in three recent cases,3 greatly extended
the role of the arbitrator in labor disputes and diminished that of the
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-36.6, -36.9(b) (1953).
' The union contended that G.S. § 95-36.9(b) was to be interpreted in the
light of G.S. § 95-36.6 so that the former authorized a stay of arbitration
only when the parties had not agreed to leave the issue of arbitrability to the
arbitrator; that their collective bargaining agreement permitted the arbitrator
to decide arbitrability and for that reason its demurrer should have been
sustained. The Court answered that such a construction of the statute
"would make the provision of N.C.G.S. §95-36.9(b) practically meaningless." 254 N.C. at 69, 118 S.E.2d at 44.
5
It was held in United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960), that whether the party seeking arbitration is right or
wrong is a question of contractual interpretation and is for the arbitrator to
decide. In United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), it was held that whether the act in question violated the collective bargaining agreement was for the arbitrator to decide and
that in the absence of an express agreement excluding a particular grievance
from arbitration only the most forceful evidence of such a purpose would
prevail. And in United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Co., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), it was held that the question of interpretation
of the contract is for the arbitrator and the courts should not overrule him
simply because their interpretation is different. These three cases have been
discussed in Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law, October Term 1959,
60 COLUm. L. REv. 901, 919-35 (1960), and Meltzer, The Supreme Court,
Arbitrability and Collective Bargaining,28 U. Cai. L. "Rzv. 464 (1961).
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courts. All three of these cases centered around the issue of arbitrability of a grievance, i.e., whether the employer had agreed to
arbitrate such a grievance. In each of these cases the gist of the
decision was that the arbitrator and not the court was to make that
determination. As noted above, the North Carolina Supreme Court
in Charlotte City Coach Lines interpreted the North Carolina Labor
Arbitration Act as extending the role of the court and limiting that
of the arbitrator in determining the arbitrability of labor disputes.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
ANNEXATION

The 1959 act1 governing extension of corporate limits was before
the Court for the first time in In re Annexation Ordinance of
Raleigh.2 There, residents in each of the annexed areas filed petition for review, as authorized by the statute,' alleging noncompliance with the statutory requirements for annexation and attacking
the constitutionality of the act. The Court pointed out that the
fundamental rule that the power to legislate cannot be delegated was
not applicable in this case,4 and held that the act did not violate
either the state or federal constitution.5
The Court, without examining de novo the finding of the lower
court that the city's plans for providing services to the annexed area
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-445 to -453.24 (Supp. 1961). The act provides
substantially the same procedure for extending the corporate limits of municipalities of less than five thousand persons as those having a population in
excess of five thousand. It sets forth standards of development which areas
to be annexed must meet, phrased in terms of population, land use, and
extent of land subdivision; outlines the municipal services the annexing municipality must undertake to provide; and outlines the procedure to be followed in annexation, including a provision for judicial review.

2253 N.C. 637, 117 S.E.2d 795 (1961).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-453.18 (Supp. 1961).

' Municipal corporations are a well-recognized exception to the rule that
the power to make laws cannot be delegated. E.g., Cox v. Kinston, 217 N.C.
391, 8 S.E.2d. 252 (1940); State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854
(1940). The Court held in the principal case that the legislature had the
right to delegate the power given in the act since it was incidental to municipal government and involved a purely local matter. 253 N.C. at 649, 117
S.E.2d at 803.
' The Court also rejected the petitioner's contentions that the act was
unconstitutional because it did not provide for trial by jury, that it did not
apply to every county in the state, and that it deprived them of their liberty
and property without due process of law.
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complied with the requirements of the act, held that these findings
were supported by competent evidence. The lower court found that
the plan for providing water and sewer services complied with the
statutory standards, even though the required timetable for extension of such services was not included.' This implies that the Court
will uphold a plan for services which substantially complies with the
statutory requirements.
In two subsequent cases involving the same act the Court clarified
its position by expressly stating that compliance with the statute must
be substantial. Moreover, these cases indicate that the Court will
impose a rigid test for finding substantial compliance.
In Huntley v. Potter7 the statutory provision before the Court
required that the annexation ordinance contain "specific findings"
that the area to be annexed was developed for urban purposes.'
Petitioners contended that the filing of a report showing on its fact
strict compliance with the statutory requirements was a condition
precedent to annexation. The Court stated that the record of the
annexation proceeding must show "complete and substantial compliance" with the statutory requirements. 9 It pointed out that substantial compliance means compliance with the essential requirements of the act. However, when the record shows prima facie
compliance, the burden of proof is on the petitioners to show a failure
of the municipality to comply with the statute. The annexation
report filed here was merely a general statement, not supported by
specific findings, that the area was developed for urban purposes.10
The Court therefore held that it did not comply with the statutory
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §160-453.15(3)(c) (Supp. 1961). The statute requires that the report set forth a proposed timetable for the construction of
water mains and sewer lines in the annexed areas and that the contracts must
be let and construction begun within twelve months of the date of annexation.
The lower court ruled that since the report did provide to let the contracts
within the required period, it sufficiently complied with the statute.
1255 N.C. 619, 122 S.E.2d 681 (1961). This case involved a Beaufort
annexation ordinance.

'N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 160-453.5(e) (1) (Supp. 1961).

6255 N.C. at 627, 122 S.E.2d at 686.
"0The report merely paraphrased the statutory definition of "area developed for urban purposes." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-4 53.4(c) (Supp. 1961).
The statute requires that at least sixty per cent of the lots in the area to be
annexed be used for residential, commercial, industrial, institutional, or governmental purposes, and that at least sixty per cent of the total acreage, not
counting that used for commercial, industrial, governmental or institutional
purposes, consists of lots and tracts of less than five acres. The Beaufort
report failed to state the percentage of the area that was so developed and
was therefore held to be a mere conclusion unsupported by facts.
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requirements."
In re Annexation Ordinance of Jacksonville2 reiterated the rule
stated by the Court in Huntley that the record must show complete
and substantial compliance with the act. The Court stated that the
plan of services must give a clear description of the basis upon which
these services will be provided by the city and that if this description
is insufficient the lower court should remand the plan for amendment.
In this case compliance by the city -was conditioned upon the performance of certain acts by the property owners within the area to
be annexed.1" The Court stated that the city was in no position to
shift to others the duty which the act imposed upon it as a condition
precedent to annexation. Therefore, it found that the proceedings
here did not satisfy the requirements of substantial compliance.' 4
DRAINAGE DISTRICTS

The Albemarle Drainage District sought to levy assessments
upon respondent's land which was outside the boundaries of the dis-

trict. The statute permitting the establishment of drainage districts15
required that the original boundaries include all the lands that were
benefited, and made no provisions for enlargement. Therefore the
Court held in In re Albemarle Drainage Dist. 6 that since the lands
in question were excluded when the district was established, they
could not now be assessed for benefits they received from the
7
drainage.'
" The lower court attempted to carve out a portion of the area, ordered
it annexed and remanded the ordinance as to the remainder. The Supreme
Court said the ordinance should have been remanded with respect to the
entire area since the statutes which allow an ordinance to be effective as to
a part of the area are applicable only when there is no appeal pending as to
that part. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-453.6(e), (h) (Supp. 1961). 255 N.C. at
632, 122 S.E.2d at 690.
12255 N.C. 633, 122 S.E.2d 690 (1961).

" The plan of services contained no plans for the municipality to provide
street maintenance or water and sewer services in the area beyond those
services presently in existence unless they were provided by the landowners
and developers in that area.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-453.15(3) (Supp. 1961), requires that the municipality make plans for extending to the new area each major municipal
service performed within the municipality at the time of annexation.
The Court also pointed out that the area is considered as a whole when

deciding whether it meets the requirements for annexation, and a portion of
the area may not be excluded merely because it, taken alone, does not meet
the standards set out by the act. 255 N.C. at 643, 122 S.E.2d at 698.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 156-62(4), -65 (1952).
10255 N.C. 338, 121 S.E.2d 599 (1961).
'7 Accord, Drainage District v. Cahoon, 193 N.C. 326, 137 S.E. 185
(1927).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

The 1961 General Assembly recognized that lands not originally
included within the boundaries of the drainage district might subsequently receive benefits through changing conditions and enacted
a new statute which permits the enlargement of the original
boundaries."
PUBLIC PURPOSE
In Morgan v. S pindale9 a taxpayer brought an action to enjoin
the town of Spindale from issuing bonds, the proceeds of which were
to be used, together with federal and state funds, for the construction
of a national guard armory outside the Spindale city limits. Plaintiff conceded that construction of an armory is normally a public
purpose which meets our constitutional requirement. 20 However, he
contended that the fact that the proposed armory was to be built
outside the corporate limits negatived a public purpose as to the
residents of Spindale. The Court rejected this contention, and held
that the location of the armory half a mile beyond the corporate
limits did not affect the purpose for which the expenditure was
made. 2 ' It stated that the test in determining whether property is
used for a public purpose is the right to enjoy 22 the property and not
the place where this right may be exercised.2
"sN.C. GEN. STAT. § 156-93.3 (Supp. 1961). This statute had not gone
into effect at the time of the litigation.
10254 N.C. 304, 118 S.E.2d 913 (1961).
"0N.C. CONST. art. 5, § 3: "Taxes shall be levied only for public purposes ....

"

The public purposes limitation has been extended by judicial

decision to all public funds. Airport Authority v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 1, 36
S.E.2d 803 (1945). As to what constitutes a public purpose, see Note, 25
N.C.L. REv. 504 (1947).
" The Court also pointed out that the fact that the property would revert
to Rutherford County if abandoned for military purposes did not defeat the
purpose of the expenditures. 254 N.C. at 307, 118 S.E.2d at 915. See also
Green v. Kitchin, 229 N.C. 450, 50 S.E.2d 545 (1948), where the possibility
that a policeman might not remain in the employ of a municipality after
receiving special F.B.I. training at city expense was held not to prevent the
expenditure from being for a public purpose-maintaining law and order.
" It was determined that the armory would also be available for Spindale
civic functions and its rifle range could be used by local law enforcement
officers.
" The Court emphasized that municipalities frequently established sewage
plants and water supply systems beyond corporate limits and that their status
as a public purpose could not be questioned. 254 N.C. at 306, 118 S.E.2d at
915. For a comprehensive article dealing with extraterritorial spending
powers, see Byrd, ExtraterritorialSpending Powers of North CarolinaCities,
Popular Government, June, 1961.
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ZONING

G.S. § 160-176 provides that notice and an opportunity to be
heard must be given before a zoning ordinance can be amended.24
Two recent cases raised the question of what constitutes sufficient
notice to the public of a proposed change in an existing zoning
ordinance.
In Walker v. Elkii25 notice was published in a local newspaper
of general circulation. It gave the time and place of the meeting and
provided that at the stated time
the changes of the Zone of the below described property to
that of Neighborhood Business . . . and . . . a proposed
change in the zoning ordinance ... to allow "Public Utility

Storage or Service Yard" in the Neighborhood Zone will be
thoroughly discussed.
Plaintiff contended that this notice referred to a single transaction,
i.e., changing the described area to "Neighborhood Business" and
allowing public utility storage or service yards in the rezoned area,
but not in other "Neighborhood Business" areas. The Court rejected the plaintiff's interpretation and held that the advertisement
was sufficient to give notice both that the described area would be
rezoned and that public utility or storage yards would be permitted
in any area zoned "Neighborhood Business."2' 6
In Hel1s v. Charlotte27 the only notice of public hearing of the
proposed change in an ordinance was also by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the city. This notice gave a boundary
description of the area to be rezoned but did not name the owner or
refer to his property by lot or block number or by reference to a map.
Plaintiff contended that although this notice might meet the statutory
requirements, it did not meet the requirements of due process. The
2 This chapter further provides that "a notice of such public hearing shall
be given once a week for two successive calendar weeks in a newspaper published in the municipality, or, if there be no newspaper . . . by posting such
notice at four public places in the municipality. ..." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160175 (1952). The provisions of the section relative to hearings and notice
are applicable to all proposed changes and amendments. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160-176 (1952).
25254 N.C. 85, 118 S.E.2d 1 (1961).
The Court pointed out that the notice used the words "these proposed
changes," which definitely indicated that two separate questions were to be
considered. 254 N.C. at 88, 118 S.E.2d at 3.
27255 N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d 817 (1961).
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Court, in accord with the majority of jurisdictions," held this notice
to be sufficient. It stated that the notice complied with the statutory
requirements and should not be rendered invalid by plaintiff's failure
to see it. Thus it seems that the required notice need not contain
detailed information in regard to the proposed changes, but is sufficient if it adequately informs the persons affected of the hearing and
of the proposals to be discussed.
The Helms case also held, in accord with the majority view,2 '
that in zoning land for residential purposes the test is not whether a
residence can be built on the property3 0 but whether it would be practical, desirable and of reasonable value." The Court stated that
zoning land for residential purposes is unreasonable, confiscatory
and illegal where it is practically impossible to use the land for such
purpose.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
PRESENTATION OF DRAFTs FOR COLLECTION

In Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Bank of Washington,' S
(seller) drew drafts on B (buyer), payable to the Bank of Halifax.
S deposited the drafts with the payee between the dates of December
23, 1959, and January 23, 1960. Upon receipt of the drafts, the
payee immediately forwarded them for collection to the plaintiff,
Branch Banking and Trust Company. Both the payee and the plaintiff accepted the drafts with the express understanding that they were
received for collection only and that although credited to the depositor's account, they might be charged back at any time before final
" E.g., Braden v. Much, 403 Ill. 507, 87 N.E.2d 620 (1949) ; Blakenship
v. City of Richmond, 188 Va. 97, 49 S.E.2d 321 (1949).
" E.g., Corthouts v. Town of Newington, 140 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112
(1953); Ehinger v. State, 147 Fla. 129, 2 So. 2d 357 (1941); Janesick v.
Detroit, 337 Mich. 549, 60 N.W.2d 452 (1953); Huntley Estates, Inc. v.
Town of Eastchester, 283 App. Div. 1090, 131 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1954).
"The city, attempting to show that a house could he built on the lots,
submitted a map showing a floor plan forty-eight feet long with three widths,
varying from seventeen to twenty feet, a design which the Court said could
be termed, at best, "unique."
" The lower court found that a residence could be built upon the property
in conformity with the municipal regulations, but did not find whether it
would be practical, desirable, and of reasonable value. The case was remanded with directions that the court determine whether or not the lots in
question had any reasonable value for residential use.
-255 N.C. 205, 120 S.E.2d 830 (1961).
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payment. They also stipulated that their liability, upon receipt of
the drafts, was limited to due care, and that neither would be liable
for failure, default, or neglect of any duly selected correspondent.
The plaintiff forwarded the drafts to defendant, the Bank of
Washington, for collection. Since B had not given defendant authority to honor the drafts, defendant presented them to B for payment.
B neither accepted nor paid when the drafts were presented originally
or pursuant to several tracers sent by plaintiff to defendant to learn
whether the drafts had been collected. Defendant failed to notify
plaintiff of B's failure to honor the drafts. On February 1, 1960,
plaintiff notified defendant to present the drafts for payment and if
not paid to return them. Defendant did so and on nonpayment returned the drafts on February Z, 1960.
The drafts were then returned to the payee, who refused to
accept them because of the lapse of time, which it contended constituted acceptance. Plaintiff admitted its liability on the drafts to the
payee and returned them to defendant for payment. Defendant refused to pay and plaintiff brought suit for the value of the drafts plus
six per cent interest during the time that defendant held them pending
collection.
By statute,2 where a drawee fails to give notice of nonacceptance
of a draft within twenty-four hours after it is presented to him, he is
deemed to have accepted it. The Court held, however, that B, and
not defendant, was the drawee of the drafts ;8 hence, the statute did
not apply. And since defendant had not accepted the drafts, it was
4
not liable on them.
The Court also held that defendant was not liable to plaintiff for
the value of the drafts because of any negligence on defendant's part.
Plaintiff had taken the drafts under the condition that it would not
be liable for neglect of its duly selected correspondent (defendant).
Hence plaintiff was not precluded from charging the drafts back to
the Bank of Halifax because of the delay by the defendant. More2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-144 (1953).
3
This holding is supported by the fact that the buyer had not authorized
the defendant to charge the drafts to its account. Plaintiff sent the drafts
to defendant for collection; thus plaintiff apparently knew that defendant
had no authority to pay the drafts until authorized by B.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-68 (1953), provides: "The acceptor by accepting
the instrument engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his
acceptance . . . ." Thus the Court held that a drawee is not liable on a
draft until he accepts it, and until he accepts it, the holder must look to the
drawer or indorser for payment.
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over, there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the plaintiff
that would preclude it from being able to charge the drafts back.
Plaintiff therefore suffered no damage as a result of any negligence
by the defendant, and the stipulation as to liability did not create
liability where none existed.5
PAYMENT BY CHECK

In Southern Auto Finance Co. v. PittmarP defendant bought a
car from a used car dealer, giving a note secured by a conditional
sales contract on the car. The dealer discounted the note and lien
to the plaintiff. A few days later the dealer sent the plaintiff a personal check for the amount of the note. Upon receipt of the check
the plaintiff marked the note paid. However, the drawee-bank refused to discount the check. Plaintiff then brought suit for the value
of the note. The defendant pleaded payment, contending that since
the dealer was the agent of the plaintiff, the dealer's worthless check
constituted a valid payment. The Court rejected the agency argument on the grounds that the evidence negatived any idea of agency,
and that the dealer's giving of his personal check was a gratuitous
act that was neither requested nor relied upon by the defendant. The
Court therefore held that the dealer's act was of no benefit to the
defendant since even a debtor cannot discharge his liability by giving
a worthless check. In so holding the Court affirmed the rule that in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the delivery and acceptance of a check does not constitute payment of the item covered by
it until the check itself is discounted by the bank on which it is
7
drawn.
Dissenting, Justice Parker argued that plaintiff's admission was not
gratuitous but validly based on the rules of commercial transactions. The
machinery set up by modern banking requires the prompt handling of negotiable instruments, and the delay by defendant was negligence which proximately caused plaintiff to lose the face value of the drafts.
0253 N.C. 550, 117 S.E.2d 423 (1960).
¢ See, e.g., Wilson v. Commercial Fin. Co., 239 N.C. 349, 79 S.E.2d 908
(1954). See generally 32 N.C.L. Rav. 491 (1954).
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PUBLIC UTILITIES
MUNICIPAL FRANCHISES

Two cases, Duke Power Co. v. Blue Ridge Elec. Membership
Corp.' and Pee Dee Elec. Membership Corp. v. CarolinaPower &
Light Co.,2 involved similar fact situations and questions of law
regarding the rights of rural electric membership corporations to
continue serving customers living in areas which are annexed into
municipalities which other power companies hold franchises to serve.
In both cases, power companies, which had franchises to serve municipal residents, were under contract to sell electrical energy to thd
membership corporations for resale to rural member consumers.
In the Duke Power Co. case the trial court granted the injunction
requested by the plaintiff, enjoining the defendant from selling electricity to consumers who were residents of the Town of Hudson.
Some of these were formerly rural customers of the defendant who
had become residents of the town due to annexation. The trial court
also ordered the defendant to remove all of its property within the
town limits unless it was sold within a specified time.
On appeal, the Supreme Court decided that the contract between

the plaintiff and defendant did not prohibit the defendant from
selling td its members merely because they resided within the cor-:
Porate limits of the town. The Court further held that the extension
of the town's boundaries so as to remove some membership customers
from a rural to an urban category did not make the original entry
of the defendant or its continued operation unlawful.8 The Court,
citing State ex rel. Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Upshur Elec.
Co-op Corp.4 with approval, stated that the membership of customers
1253 N.C. 596, 117 S.E.2d 812 (1961).
N.C. 610, 117 S.E.2d 764 (1961).
Sanitary Dist. v. City of Lenoir, 249 N.C. 96, 105 S.E.2d 411 (1958),
the Court held that a town does not need to secure the approval of a sanitary
district in order to enlarge its boundaries and cover the sanitary district;
but the mere fact that a person is brought within the town by a change in
boundaries does not deprive him or his vendor (the sanitary district) of the
privilege of buying and selling water transported through the mains of"the
vendor.
'156 Tex. 633, 298 S.W.2d 805 (1957), which held that an electrical cooperative could continue to service persons living in areas annexed to a city
who were lawful members of the co-operative at the time of the annexation.
Contra, Farmers Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 220
Ark. 652, 249 S.W.2d 837 (1952). There the court held that the co-operative's authority to serve members annexed into a town ceased on the date of
the annexation. The Arkansas court recognized, however, that this was an
2253
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of the defendant was not terminated by a change in the character of
the community from rural to urban, and that the defendant had a
right and duty to serve its members. The Court also held that it
wais also error to require the defendant to dispose of its property
within the municipal limits of Hudson. The Court stated that the
legislature had delegated power to the Utilities Commission to say
when and under what circumstances power companies shall furnish
service inside as well as outside of municipalities.
Essentially the same facts existed in the Pee Dee case where the
membership corporation was enjoined from supplying electrical energy within the town limits of Rockingham to former customers living in areas which had been annexed into the town. Pee Dee was
also ordered to dispose of and dismantle its power lines and facilities
inside the town limits.
-The Supreme Court, on reversing, found that under a franchise
from the town the commercial power company had the legal right
and duty to serve the newly annexed areas. However, the Court
pointed out that since the annexed areas were rural when Pee Dee
constructed its distribution lines, Pee Dee might continue serving
those customers who were members before the date of annexation
and who desired to continue to receive its current. But the Court
stated that Pee Dee could not, after annexation, extend its service
within the town to persons who were non-members at the time of
annexation.
In State ex rel. Utilities Comnm'en v. McKinnon' the Court held
that an exempted intracity carrier under the Bus Act of 19498 has
no territorial limitations as to the transportation of high school bands
and athletic teams, and passengers to or from religious services,
under sections 62-121.47(a) (1) and (6) where the request for
such services arises within the area for which the carrier holds a
certificate of exemption.
SERVICE DISCONTINUANCE

In State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Southern Ry.,7 Southern had
petitioned the Utilities Commission for an order authorizing the
awkward situation for a co-operative operating in good faith in a rural area
contiguous to a municipality.
r254 N.C. 1, 118 S.E.2d 134 (1961); also discussed under ADINisTRATIVE LAW, Interpretation of Statutes, supra.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §62-121.47(a)(8) (1960).
'254 N.C. 73, 118 S.E.2d 21 (1961).
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discontinuance of all rail passenger service, between Goldsboro and
Greensboro. Southern maintained that this service was incurring
a burdensome loss and that public convenience and necessity no
longer required this service.
After a hearing the Commission denied the request, and Southern
appealed on the grounds that the Commission's order was not supported by the evidence and that it was arbitrary and capricious. Both
the superior court and the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission.
The Court stated that the doctrine of public convenience -and
necessity is relative rather than abstract and absolute, and must be
considered in the light of the facts of each case; that the convenience
and necessity required are those of the public and not of an individual or individuals.8 The Court outlined the controlling criteria
to be considered: (1) the character and population of the territory
to be served; (2) the public patronage or lack of it; (3) the facilities
remaining; (4) the expense of operation as compared with the
revenue from it; and (5) the operations of the carrier as a whole.9
The Court noted that Southern was not seeking to reduce its
passenger service or other incidental or collateral service, but wanted
to discontinue all passenger service between Goldsboro and Greensboro. It was pointed out that if Southern were granted its request,
Durham, Orange and Alamance counties, which are in a central,
strategic and populous part of the state, would be left without rail
passenger service. The City of Durham would be one of five cities
in the nation with a population in excess of 70,000 without passenger
trains. The Court also pointed out that in 1958, Southern had a
net profit of about $30,000,000 and paid dividends of more than
$21,000,000; that its total surplus was $300,000,000; that the average loss on passenger traffic for Southern's entire system was $2,776
per mile of track compared with the average loss on the GreensboroGoldsboro line of $1,090 per mile of track. Furthermore, in 1957
and 1958 passenger operating deficits were a factor in authorizing
increased freight rates. In addition the Court found that Southern
had done little, if anything, to promote greater use of this service by
advertising or providing adequate station depot personnel. On the
basis of this evidence, the Supreme Court held that the Commis8 State

ex re. Utilities Comm'n v. Casey, 245 N.C. 297, 96 S.E.2d 8

(1957).
o See Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 1121, 1143 (1950); Southern Ry. v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 1086, 86 S.E.2d 839 (1955), which the Supreme Court
cited with approval.
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sion's findingsl were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence, and that the denial of the authority was not arbitrary
or capricious.1 0
In State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Carolina Coach Co." the
coach company petitioned the Utilities Commission for authority to
discontinue a seventeen mile franchise route which included the Town
of .Columbia, the county seat of Tyrrell County. In affirming the
Commission's denial of this authority, the Supreme Court relied
upon the legal principles set out in the Southern Ry. case.
UTILITY RATE BASES

In State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co. 12
Piedmont applied to the Utilities Commission for approval of a rate
increase to compensate for the increased price for gas charged by its
supplier, Transcontinental Pipe Line Company. The Commission
denied the request, but allowed Piedmont to collect the increased
rates under bond to be refunded if they were found to be excessive.
In order to determine if the increased rates were reasonable, the Commission held a hearing and chose the twelve months period ending
October 31, 1959, as a test period to find the fair value of Piedmont's
property and the rate required to produce a fair return. After the
hearing the Commission denied the rate increase and ordered Piedmont to refund all payments in excess of the old rates.
The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's holding that
the Commission's findings were not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence and that the order was arbitrary and
capricious. The Court stated that the Commission, in determining
the value of Piedmont's property to establish the rate base, erred
when it refused to consider evidence of current or replacement cost
of the property during the test year determined by "trending" original cost. The Court pointed out that trended cost is useful when,
as in the present case, it becomes necessary to fix the present value
of facilities which were constructed when cost was low. The Com" See in accord City of Princeton v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 268 Wis. 542,
554, 68 N.W.2d 420, 427 (1955): "In an application for discontinuance of
service because of loss, the commission has the duty of determining whether
a point has been reached where the financial loss in passenger service is so
disproportionate to the need of the service that the discontinuance is justifiable, irrespective of total financial earnings on the same branch line, or
irrespective of the earnings of the system."
11254 N.C. 319, 118 S.E.2d 762 (1961).
1254

N.C. 536, 119 S.E.2d 469 (1961).
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mission treated the trended cost evidence as worth no more than
minimal consideration. The Court stated that trended cost evidence
should be fairly weighed and, therefore, giving it only minimal consideration constituted error. 8
The Commission also erred in disallowing a substantial portion
of Piedmont's promotional expenses in determining operating costs.' 4
The Commission compared Piedmont's promotional expenses with
the national average and not with other companies in Piedmont's
classification. The Court pointed out that Piedmont was selling a
new product, natural gas, in competition with electricity and oil, and
that new customers had to be "sold" on it. It was also noted that
the Commission failed to take into account that Piedmont was a
rapidly expanding company and that it needed to promote its expanding facilities.
A third error of the Commission was in using the average net
investment for the test year to establish the rate base instead of
taking into account Piedmont's rapid expansion and the fact that
its investment at the end of the year was greater. The Court stated
that the investment at the end of the test year should have been
used rather than the average for the year.
"aSee Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546-47 (1898), where the United
States Supreme Court stated: "[I] n order to ascertain [fair] value, the original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements,
the amount and market value of its bonds and stock, the present as compared
with the original cost of construction . . . are all matters for consideration,
and are to be given such weight as may be just and right in each case." In
Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 52 (1909), the Supreme Court
said: "If the property, which legally enters into the consideration of the
question of rates, has increased in value since it was acquired, the company
is entitled to the benefit of such increase." See also State ex rel. Utilities
Comm'n v. State, 239 N.C. 333, 80 S.E.2d 33 (1954), where the Court held
that the Commission, by accepting book value as the rate base, had erroneously excluded present cost of replacement and all other factors specified by
G.S. § 62-124 from effective dofisideration. In Equitable Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utilities Comm'n, 160 Pa. Super. 458, 51 A.2d 497 (1947),
the court stated that reproduction cost and all other elements affecting value
are to be given their proper weight in determining the fair value of the
utility's property. Contra, Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 324 U.S. 581 (1945), holding that the Commission did not err as
a matter of law in considering legitimate original costs and not reproduction
costs. See generally Hanft, Control of Electric Rates in North Carolina,
12 N.C.L. REv. 289 (1934).
" Accord, West Ohio Gas Co. v. Commission, 294 U.S. 63 (1934), where
the United States Supreme Court took judicial notice that gas competes with
oil and electricity and stated that, within the limits of reason, advertising and
development expenses to foster normal business growth are legitimate charges
upon income for rate purposes.
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In remanding the case for further consideration, the Court stated
that it neither promulgated any new rules by this decision nor did it
enlarge or restrict the application of old rules.

REAL PROPERTY
ADVERSE POSSESSION

In Chisholm v. Hall' plaintiffs sought to remove a cloud from
their title. The defendants denied plaintiffs' ownership and claimed
title by adverse possession for twenty years, and also by adverse
possession for seven years under color of title. In the statement of
the case on appeal the defendants further claimed that they acquired
title to the property in question through several conveyances resulting from a tax foreclosure sale. However, they did not put into
evidence any record showing a sale of the property for nonpayment
of taxes. The defendants did offer evidence that they had paid the
taxes on the land for many years. But their only evidence with respect to actual occupancy was limited to the planting of grass seeds on
one occasion and the planting and harvesting of oats in another year.
The trial court directed the jury to find for the plaintiffs, and
the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court, in accord with prior decisions,2 stated that the defendants had the burden of establishing
their defense of ownership. The Court concluded that even if all of
the defendants' evidence was accepted as true, it was insufficient because it failed to show continuous possession for the statutory
period.' Therefore, the trial court correctly directed the jury to
find for plaintiffs.
COVENANT OF SEISIN
Peoples Bank & Trust Co.4

In Smith v.
the Court held that a
recital by the grantor as to its source of title was, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, a covenant of seisin. The deed
contained the following language:
374,
S.E.2d 726 (1961).
'E.g., N.C.
Wells v. 121
Clayton, 236 N.C.
102, 72 S.E.2d 16 (1952); MacClure
v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 229 N.C. 305, 49 S.E.2d 742 (1948).
' The Court stated that listing and paying taxes is no evidence of actual
possession. Accord, Faulcon v. Johnston, 102 N.C. 264, 9 S.E. 394 (1889).
'254 N.C. 588, 119 S.E.2d 623 (1961).
-255
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Grantor, . ..the owner of four-sixths undivided interest' of
the property hereby cohveyed, acquired its title under the
terms of the last will and testament of C. G. Shearin, deceased,
which -is duly probated in Nash County Registry, the said
C. G. Shearin, deceased, having acquired a one-sixth interest
under the Will of G. T. Shearin, a one-sixth interest from
R. L. Shearin, by deed registered in Book 350, page 511,
Nash County Registry (see also quit-claim deed from R. L.
Shearin to Peoples Bank & Trust Company, dated November
19, 1946, duly registered in Nash County Registry); a onesixth interest from C. H. Shearin by deed registered in Book
446, page 315, and a one-sixth interest from S. H. Shearin,
by deed registered in Book 447, page 244, Nash County
Registry.5
A covenant of seisin is defined as an assurance to the purchaser
that the grantor has the very estate in quantity and quality which he
purports to convey.0 It would seem that the Court gave a very
liberal construction to the above language in holding it to be a
covenant of seisin.
DEDICATION

In general, the dedication of a street shown on a sub-division
map is but a revocable offer as to the public, and dedication is not
complete until accepted.' If not accepted within fifteen years, the
offer may be withdrawn by compliance with G.S. § 136-96 or by
adverse possession.' If accepted by the public by opening and using
it at any time before withdrawal the dedication becomes complete
and may not thereafter be withdrawn.'
In Janicki v. Lorek'0 the Court held that a purchaser of a lot in
one subdivision could not object to the withdrawal of a street in anId. at 589-90, 119 S.E.2d at 625.
'See Pridgen v. Long, 177 N.C. 189, 195-96, 98 S.E. 451, 454 (1919);

DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
'Rowe v. City of Durham, 235 N.C. 158, 69 S.E.2d 171 (1952).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45 (1953), which prohibits one from gaining title
to a street by adverse possession, has been held not to apply to streets, alleys
and parks which have been offered for dedication if the offer has not been
accepted, or if the offer has been accepted, and the property later abandoned.
City of Salisbury v. Barnhardt, 249 N.C. 549, 107 S.E.2d 297 (1959); Lee
v. Walker, 234 N.C. 687, 68 S.E.2d 664 (1952).
'Steadman v. Town of Pinetops, 251 N.C. 509, 112 S.E.2d 102 (1960);
Town of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364, 90 S.E.2d 898 (1956).
10255 N.C. 53, 120 S.E.2d 413 (1961).
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other subdivision pursuant to G.S. § 136-96, even though both subdivisions were contiguous and were developed by the same developer.
The plat showing the street in question was filed for record in
1906, but the street was never opened. The defendants filed a
declaration of withdrawal in 1954." Shortly thereafter plaintiffs
advised the defendants that they were going to use the street in
question for access to their property. The defendants forbade plaintiffs to go upon ,the land, and plaintiffs brought an action for damages and to enjoin the defendants from obstructing their use of the
street. The parties stipulated that the street had been dedicated
more than fifteen years prior to 1954 and that the street had never
been opened or used. The trial court denied plaintiffs' claim for
damages and refused to grant the injunction.
On appeal the Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court, stated
that one purchasing a parcel of land outside the boundaries of a
subdivision has no rights with respect to the dedicated streets of the
subdivision other than those enjoyed by the public generally.' 2 The
Court found that the plaintiffs' property was in a subdivision separate from the one containing the street in question. The Court,
therefore, concluded that the plaintiffs' cause of action was barred by
the defendants' withdrawal pursuant to G.S. § 136-96.
EASEMENTS

Scott 8

In Pritchardv.
the testator devised the northern portion
of his farm to his wife and the southern portion to his son. The
wife instituted special proceedings under G.S. § 136-68 and G.S.
§ 136-69 to condemn a cartway over the lands of third parties which
were adjacent to the farm or over the portion devised to the son.
The trial court held that the plaintiff was entitled to have a cartway
across the lands of some of the defendants and directed the clerk to
appoint a jury to lay off a cartway. All of the third parties appealed,
contending that whatever rights plaintiff had to a cartway or to an
1
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1958), provides that if land dedicated for
public use as a street is not actually opened up and used within fifteen years
from date of dedication, it shall be conclusively presumed to have been abandoned by the public. The statute further provides that the abandonment shall
not be presumed until a declaration of withdrawal is executed and recorded
by those
entitled to withdraw the dedication.
"2Accord, Hemphill v. Board of Aldermen, 212 N.C. 185, 193 S.E. 153
(1937).
1254 N.C. 277, 118 S.E.2d 890 (1961).
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easement, she had no right to condemn a cartway over their lands.
The Supreme Court reversed.
The Court distinguished between a cartway condemned pursuant
to G.S. § 136-68 and G.S. § 136-69 and a way of necessity under
the general law. The Court pointed out that a way of necessity is
an easement arising from an implied grant or reservation which
arises from the presumption that whenever a party conveys property, he conveys or retains whatever is necessary for its beneficial
use. No compensation therefor is required. Conversely, a cartway
is obtained by condemnation and payment of compensation where a
property owner has no reasonable access to a public road as a matter
of legal right 4 or by permission. 5
The Court noted that it was necessary that the plaintiff be
granted access to the public road and stated that the testator must
have intended that the plaintiff have a right of access over the land
devised to the son. The Court, therefore, held that the plaintiff was
not entitled to a cartway over the land of strangers to the title of
her testator when the undisputed facts established that a cartway 6
could be laid off over the land devised to the son which, with that
of the plaintiff, constituted a single tract before the severence of title.
INDEXING-DEEDS OF TRUST AND LIENS

Cuthrell v. Camden County'7 was an action to determine priority
as between a deed of trust executed on certain lands and a subsequent
old age assistance lien. The deed of trust was not indexed under
the name of the landowners,18 and the index of the old age assistance
lien referred to the wrong page of the Lien Book. In holding the
lien to be superior, the Court said in order for registration to be
effective there must be substantial compliance with the indexing
statutes. The Court stated that there is substantial compliance if
enough is disclosed by the index to put a careful and prudent ex1 Kanupp
1Garris

v. Land, 248 N.C. 203, 102 S.E.2d 779 (1958).
v. Byrd, 229 N.C. 343, 49 S.E.2d 625 (1948).

The Court here apparently used "cartway" as meaning a "way of neces-

sity" rather than as the term is used in the statutory sense. The Court seemed
to imply that the plaintiff was entitled to a way of necessity rather than a
cartway.
11254 N.C. 181, 118 S.E.2d 601 (1961); also discussed under CREDIT

TRANSACTIONS, Improper Indexing of Deeds of Trust and Liens, supra.
"'Mollie Cuthrell was owner of the land, but her son, R. G. Cuthrell
signed the deed of trust with her, and it was indexed under "R. G. Cuthrell,
et al."
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aminer upon inquiry, and if upon such inquiry the instrument would
be found. 9
LIFE ESTATES-TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY

In Lanier v. Dawes2 ° the Court held that the effect of an absolute divorce between holders of a life estate as tenants by the entirety was to convert it into a tenancy in common for life. Thus
each tenant would have a life estate in a one-half undivided interest
in the property. Such holding is in accord with the previous position of the Court that an absolute divorce converts a tenancy by the
entirety in a fee simple estate into a tenancy in common. 2 '
QUIETING TITLE

Pittman22

was an action to remove a cloud on title
Waters v.
caused by deeds executed by plaintiff's grantor subsequent to the
plaintiff's deed. Plaintiff alleged that she was the owner in fee
simple of a one-half undivided interest in the land because she and
her divorced husband had held the land as tenants by the entirety.
Their deed was dated October 26, 1951, and was registered August
11, 1959. Plaintiff introduced into evidence three other deeds executed subsequent to, but recorded before, the deed under which she
claimed title. She alleged the later deeds were given without consideration, although they contained a recital of consideration, for
the purpose of depriving her of her interest in the land. At the
close of the plaintiff's evidence, defendants' motion for nonsuit was
granted.
On appeal the Supreme Court, in reversing, followed the well
established rule that in an action to remove a cloud from title, the
burden is on the plaintiff to show that his title is superior.23 The
Court pointed out that one way for the plaintiff to do this is to
connect the defendant with a common source of title and show that
he (plaintiff) has a better title from that source.2 4 The Court found
that plaintiff had made out a superior title under her prior dated but
later recorded deed, unless the defendants were purchasers for value.
9

Accord, Dorman v. Goodman, 213 N.C. 406, 196 S.E. 352 (1938).
N.C. 458, 121 S.E.2d 857 (1961).
Smith v. Smith, 249 N.C. 669, 107 S.E.2d 530 (1959); McKinnon,
Currie
& Co. v. Caulk, 167 N.C. 411, 83 S.E. 559 (1914).
22254 N.C. 191, 118 S.E.2d 395 (1961).
2Walker v. Story, 253 N.C. 59, 116 S.E.2d 147 (1960); Seawell v.
Boone's Mill Fishing Club, Inc., 249 NC. 402, 106 S.E.2d 486 (1959).
2 Mobley v. Griffin, 104 N.C. 112, 10 S.E. 142 (1889).
"

20255
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The Court noted that while a recital of consideration in a deed
is conclusive as between the parties, it is not binding on a third
party.2" As to third parties, the grantee has the burden of proving
consideration. The Court concluded that the defendants had the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that they were
purchasers for value,2" and, as this was a question for the jury, the
trial court erred in granting the nonsuit for the defendants.

SALES
BREACH OF WARRANTY
Smith1 plaintiff

In Prince v.
sought to recover from defendant
grocer for breach of implied warranty of fitness, when a bottled soft
drink, purchased from defendant, exploded, resulting in her injury.2
The Supreme Court affirmed a nonsuit entered by the trial court,
stating that while the manufacturer impliedly warrants the fitness
of the beverage within the container, this doctrine should not be
extended to cover the bottle or container which may become weakened by the manner in which it is handled. The Court found that
the evidence justified the inference that the explosion occurred due
to the pressure increase while the bottle was in plaintiff's possession,
and that plaintiff should have been aware of this possibility.'
This is apparently the first case in North Carolina seeking re"Skipper v. Yow, 240 N.C. 102, 81 S.E.2d 200 (1954); Whitehurst v.
Abbott, 225 N.C. 1, 33 S.E.2d 129 (1945).
°Whitehurst v. Abbott, supra note 25; Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Mitchell, 203 N.C. 339, 166 S.E. 69 (1932).
1254 N.C. 768, 119 S.E.2d 923 (1961).
2 Several cases have been brought before the Court to recover for injuries
resulting from the explosion of a bottled soft drink. These, however, have
generally been based on the negligence of the manufacturer in the preparation
of the product. E.g., Grant v. Chero-cola Bottling Co., 176 N.C. 256, 97 S.E.
27 (1918).
There is ample authority within this jurisdiction holding that implied
warranty of fitness applies to food which is intended for human consumption.
E.g., Draughon v. Maddox, 237 N.C. 742, 75 S.E.2d 917 (1953). For a
discussion of these cases, see Note, 32 N.C.L. Rxv. 351 (1954).
8 The evidence upon which the Court based this inference is not discussed
at any length by the Court. An investigation of the appellate records of the
case indicates that there was ample evidence that the pressure increase in
the bottle occurred while it was in plaintiff's possession. Testimony was
introduced, for example, by an expert witness that in his opinion the explosion could only have been caused by an external blow to the bottle, possibly
while in plaintiff's possession. Record, p. 16, Prince v. Smith, 254 N.C. 768,
119 S.E.2d 923 (1961).
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covery for injuries resulting from explosion of a bottled soft drink
on the theory of breach of implied warranty. 4 Several jurisdictions
have held that the container will be covered by the implied warranty,'
unless it is shown that the purchaser or one not in privy with the
manufacturer has improperly handled the container.' The language
of the Court indicates that it will refuse to apply the doctrine irrespective of any showing of improper handling by the purchaser.'
It is submitted that the manufacturer is in a far better position
than the purchaser to take necessary steps to prevent injuries resulting from defective containers. To insure that he assumes this
duty, the implied warranty of fitness should be extended to cover
the container as well as the product therein. Only by a clear showing
of improper handling of the container by the purchaser should the
manufacturer be relieved of liability.

TAXATION
INCOME TAx

Unitary Business Carrying on Operationsin Several States
In VirginiaElec. & Power Co. v. Currie' the plaintiff (VEPCO)
brought an action to recover income taxes paid under protest to the
state for the taxable year 1953. VEPCO was a foreign corporation
doing business as an electric power company which operated in
Northeastern North Carolina, Viriginia, and West Virginia. The
'See Brief for Appellant, p. 5, Prince v. Smith, 254 N.C. 768, 119 S.E.2d
923 (1961).
' These authorities hold that no distinction can be made between actions
for injuries caused by deleterious substances in sealed packages and injuries
caused by the containers thereof. E.g., Heller v. Rudmann, 249 App. Div.
831, 292 N.Y. Supp. 586 (1937) (plaintiff cut by defective alcohol bottle when
she unscrewed cap); Nicholas v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953)
(plaintiff allowed to bring actions for both negligence and breach of implied
warranty where soft drink bottle exploded).

'Natale v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 282, 182 N.Y.S.2d

404 (1959) (plaintiff injured by exploding bottle while attempting to open
it on a metal hasp of a gate); Soter v. Griesedieck Western Brewery Co.,
200 Okla. 302, 193 P.2d 575 (1948).
' However, the Court quotes language to the effect that the doctrine will
be denied only where there is evidence of impropr handling by the purchaser.
Soter v. Griesedieck Western Brewery Co., supra note 6 at 307, 193 P.2d at
580: Implied warranty of suitability for human consumption is not applicable

"to a bottle or container which may have become weakened by the manner or
nethod in which it is handled." (Emphasis added.)
'254 N.C. 17, 118 S.E.2d 155 (1961), cert. denied, 367 U.S. 910 (1961).
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dispute arose when-VEPCO objected to the use of the gross receipts
method of computing its income tax, as provided by G.S. § 105-13411(3),2 contending that it would subject it to excessive taxation.
Pursuant to G.S. § 105-134-11(4), 3 VEPCO petitioned the North
Carolina Tax Review Board, requesting that it be permitted to use
either its separate accounting method, or to substitute a wage and
salary method for the gross receipts method, or to use an averaging
4
of the wage and salary method and the gross receipts method.
The Tax Review Board permitted VEPCO to substitute for the
statutory method an averaging of the wage and salary method and
the gross receipts method.5 (This was VEPCO's third alternative
and subjected it to the highest tax of the three it submitted.)'
VEPCO excepted to this ruling and at a subsequent review by the
Board the exceptions were overruled.
The Court affirmed, stating that VEPCO failed to show by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence that the tax imposed by the Tax
Review Board was excessive, or that it was taxed on net income
which was not reasonably attributable to its operations in North
Carolina. The Court also pointed out that VEPCO, in its petition,
did not preclude the use of the method selected by the Tax Review
Board, nor did VEPCO show that the Tax Review Board had acted
in an arbitrary or unlawful manner by allowing it to use an alternative formula which VEPCO had suggested.
The Court did not establish any rule of thumb in the principal
case, and it seems that future disputes in this area will be settled
on a case by case basis after looking to all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular situation. However, the Court
did say that the only requirement for a valid allocation formula was
that it should not be "intrinsically arbitrary or produce an unreasonable result."'
'This is now N.C. GEN. STAT. §105-134(6)(3)(f) (1958), which is
of "gross receipts."
same except for a different definition
basically the
GEN. STAT. § 105-134(6) (3) (g) (1958).
'Now N.C.
' The gross receipts method gave a net income of $1,292,911 with a tax
of $77,574.66. The separate accounting method gave a net income of $317,144
with a tax of $19,026.84. The wage and salary method gave a net income of
$892,031 with a tax of $53,521.86. The averaging of the wage and salary
method with the gross receipts method gave a net income of $1,092,471 with
a tax of $65,548.27.
'North Carolina Tax Review Board, Administrative Order No. 27, June
28, 1955.
' See note 4 supra.
7254 N.C. at 31, 118 S.E.2d at 165. See also Hans Rees' Sons v. North
Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
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"Itemized PersonalDeductions" for Nonresident Taxpayers,
In Stiles:v. Cur~ie" the taxpaydr was a residenit of Georgia 'and
opergted: motels in Ge6rgia, South Carolina 'and North Carolina.
Fbf theyears 1954,'-1955, and 1956, in addition to taking a deduction for the business expenses related to his, North Carolina income,
the taxpayer claimed as a deduction a percentage of his total itemized
pe'rsbnal deductions Which equalled the ratio of his North Carolina
gross inco'm tbhi's total gross income. The Commissioner, pursuant to G.S. § 105-147(18)," disallowed the deductions which were
not related to the taxpayer's business in North Carolina. The taxpayer paid the assessment under protest and brought this suit for
refund.
The Court, in affirming the lower court's decision disallowing the
recovery by the taxpayer, held that the North Carolina statute in
question did"not create an arbitrary discrimination against nonresident taxpayers in violation of the United States Constitution.
This statute has been part of the law of North Carolina since
1923.10 It, was modified slightly in 1961 so that now nonresidents
may deduct certain contributions paid under the provisions of G.S.
§§ 105-147 (15) and (16) even though they are not related to the
taxpayer's business income in this state.1 While it is hard to distinguish betweeh allowing a pro rata part of the personal exemptions
to nonresidents 2 and not allowing them a pro rata part of certain
itemized deductions, this is the applicable law in North Carolina.
This seemingly "arbitrary discrimination on its face" has been held
constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in regard to a
New York statute,'" and it is unlikely that the North Carolina statute
8254 N.C. 197, 118 S.E.2d 428 (1961).

"In the case of a nonresident individual, the deductions allowed in this
section shall be allowed only if and to the extent that they are connected with
income arising from sources within the State... " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-

147(18) (1958). This statute was modified slightly in 1961. See text at
note 11 infra. The constitutionality of this section had not been presented
to the Court before.
"0N.C. Sess. Laws 1923, ch. 4, § 306(11).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-147(18) (Supp. 1961).
1
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-149(b) (1958).
1
N.Y. TAX LAW § 360(11), Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S.
60 (1920) ; this statute was subsequently challenged in Goodwin v. State Tax
Commission, 286 App. Div. 694, 146 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1955), aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d
680, 133 N.E.2d 711 (1956), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 805 (1956). A similar statute, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 880(i) (1954), was upheld in Shaffer
v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920). See also CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17301.
But cf. GA. CoDE ANN. § 92-3112(d) (1961). It should also be noted that
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will be changed since it was apparently drawn to c'onform to the
New York statute
The Court pointed out that the taxpayer had the: right to deduct
these expenses form his Georgia tax return. However, no inference
should be drawn that this solved the situation. The tax brackets in
Georgia start out at a lower rate ;14 thus*thig right did' not give him
as'great a tax, benefit as he would have gotten if this same deduction
were allowed in North Carolina.. It is also evident that there will
be a complete loss of any tax benefittb the taxpayer who is domiciled
in a state which has no income tax, law.
INTANGIBLES TAX

Ezemption in Cases of Executors Holding Intangible Personal
Property for Nonresident"Heieficiaries
In Allen v. Currie5 the action was to recover an alleged overpayment of intangible personal pioperty taxes for the years 1956
and 1957 on property which the plaintiff held'as co-executor of an
estate."
The will, after making certain bequests and stipulations,
provided that the residtie be distributed to 'six named relatives, all
of whom were nonresidents of North Carolina. The plaintiff claimed
that under the provisions of G.S. t 105-212 an exemption was allowed "if any intangible personal property held or controlled by a
fiduciary domiciled in 'this State' is so held or controlled for the
benefit of a nonresident or nonresidents .... ,,17 The plaintiff contended that as co-exectitor of the estate she was entitled to this
exemption for intangible personal property held for the benefit of
nonresidents during the time the estate was in process of administration." The Commissioner disallowed the exemption.
The trial judge held the exemption applicable to the taxpayer's
situation, and thus reversed the ruling- of the Commissioner. Howthe United States Supreme Court ir the Travis case held that a statute which
allows personal exemptions to residents but which allows no equivalent
exemption to non-residents is in violation of the United States Constitution.
Quaere whether there is a real justification for this distinction.
x,GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3101 (1961).
15254 N.C. 636, 119 S.E2d 917 (1961).
Plaintiff was a North Carolina resident, and the other co-executor was
a nonresident.
" N.C.GEN. STAT. § 105-212 (1958). This is the first time the Court has
ruled on this exemption as applied to executors.
" The refunds demanded were $10,444.65 and $6,396.36 respectively.
These amounted to three-fourths of the amounts paid since this was the percentage of the gross adjusted estate which went to the nonresidents.
id

NORTH'CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

-

[V61. 40

ever, the Court on appeal reversed the lower court and held for the
Commissioner. The initial observation of the Court was that an
executor acts in a fiduciary capacity. 9 The Court then noted the
provisions of the testator's will and concluded that since the nonresidents were to receive the "residue" under the will, no specific
property was bequeathed to them. The Court said the executor held
and controlled intangibles constituting general assets during the
process of administration, and that this was enough to defeat the
exemption provision. It is hard to see how the Court arrived at this
"specificity" requirement since the statute plainly says any intangible
property held or controlled. The Court gave no examples of what
would qualify under its "specific bequest" rule, except for possibly a
testamentary trust;20 moreover, any bequest of intangible personal
property, no matter how specific it might be, is subject to the debts
of the estate provided the general estate is insufficient to cover the
debts of the decedent.2 1 Quaere whether this would be enough for
the Court to remove a "specific" bequest from within the specificity
requirement.
It seems that this case could have been decided on the aforementioned point alone, but the Court by dictum continued and fortified its view. The Court pointed out that the statute says the fiduciary must be domiciled in this state. This left the Court with the
problem of what to do when a nonresident qualified as an executor
since he would not be considered as "domiciled" within the state.
In answer to this the Court said, "the General Assembly did not
intend the exemption should apply when the executor is a resident,
or when a co-executor is a resident, but not when a sole executor
is a nonresident."' 2 While this wording is difficult to interpret, it
seems the Court is saying that since the exemption cannot apply to
all executors, it applies to none. 3 Thus the probable conclusion of
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-163.1(8) (1958); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-2
(1950); In re Will of Covington, 252 N.C. 551, 114 S.E.2d 261 (1960);
McMichael v. Proctor, 243 N.C. 479, 91 S.E.2d 231 (1956).
The Court indicated that the exemption would definitely apply to inter

vivos trusts.

2 See Alsop v. Bowers, 76 N.C. 168 (1877); ATKINSON, WILLS § 136
(2d ed. 1953) ; Leath, Lapse, Abatement and Ademption, 39 N.C.L. REv. 313,

319 (1961).

22254 N.C. at 643, 119 S.E.2d at 923.

" The quoted sentence has been interpreted as stating that the exemption
applies when the executor or co-executor is a resident, but does not apply

when the sole executor is a nonresident.

CCH STATE TAX CAs. REP. N.C.

200-800 (1961). It is submitted that this interpretation is clearly erroneous.
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the Court appears to be that even though an executor is by definition
a fiduciary, this exemption does not apply to executors since by the
wording of the statute it cannot apply to all executors, and it would
be inequitable and not the intent of the legislature to allow it for
some while not allowing it for others. However, the Court did not
explicitly say that the exemption would not apply where there was
a "specific" bequest. In future cases where the "specific" bequest
requirement is met, it is still arguable that the statute will apply,
but any such argument would be quickly rebutted if the Court upheld
the dictum of the principal case.
It is submitted that the result of the Court in the principal case
was correct although the way in which it was reached has left a
"cloud" upon the future applicability of the exemption. It seems
that the probable reason for the insertion of this exemption in 1947
was to help banks and trust companies in North Carolina who hold
property in trust for nonresident beneficiaries. However, North
Carolina has neither published records of committee reports nor any
publication from which the actual intent of the legislature can be
deciphered. For this reason the Court, while it touched upon this
probable intent in its opinion, did not decide the case on this ground
alone.24 The problems of who is a "fiduciary" under this statute
and the breadth of the exemption were obvious from the outset.25
While the extent of the exemption still is not settled,, the principal
case has gone a long way toward the proposition that the Court will
not allow the exemption to apply to executors even though they do
fall within the broad meaning of the term "fiduciary."

TORTS
NEGLIGENCE

Foreseeability
In Herring v. Humphrey' a ten-year-old child started a bulldozer which the defendant had parked on a vacant lot, and thereby
caused it to run into and damage the plaintiff's house. The Court,
in affirming a nonsuit for the defendant, held that under the circum, The Attorney General in his brief also indicated that this was the probable intent of the legislature.
2 See generally 25 N.C.L. REv. 376, 475 (1947).
1254 N.C. 741, 119 S.E.2d 913 (1961).
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stances of this case foreseeability was essential to the basic element
of negligence.2 Thus the defendant would be liable for leaving the
bulldozer so that it could be started by an unauthorized person only
if he could reasonably have foreseen that a trespassing child would
likely set it in motion.
Ordinarily foreseeability of injury is considered an element of
proximate cause by our Court.3 It is pointed out in the principal
case, however, that the test of foreseeability is applicable in both
instances-first to determine whether the defendant was negligent,
and second to determine whether his negligence was the proximate
cause of the alleged injury.
While many courts hold in accord with North Carolina that
4
foreseeability of harm is an essential element of proximate cause,
there is a strong current of authority that foreseeability is pertinent
only to the question of negligence and does not enter into the test
of proximate cause.5
2
1d. at 745, 119 S.E.2d at 916. The Court distinguished the principal
case from Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190 N.C. 649, 130 S.E. 638
(1925), and Arnett v. Yeugo, 247 N.C. 356, 100 S.E.2d 855 (1957), stating
that the question in the latter two cases was whether the defendant should
have reasonably foreseen that consequences of an injurious nature would
likely result from the illegal parking of the vehicle. Cf. Drum v. Millen,
135 N.C. 204, 208, 47 S.E. 421, 422 (1904), where the Court stated: "There
is a distinction, we think, between the case of an injury inflicted in the performance of a lawful act and one in which the act causing the injury is in

itself unlawful ....

In the latter case the defendant is liable for any con-

sequence that may flow from his act as the proximate cause thereof, whether
he could foresee or anticipate it or not . ..

."

'E.g., McNair v. Richardson, 244 N.C. 65, 92 S.E.2d 459 (1956); Patterson v. Moffitt, 236 N.C. 405, 72 S.E.2d 863 (1952).
"E.g., Ellis v. Burns Valley School Dist., 128 Cal. App. 550, 18 P.2d 79
(Dist. Ct. App. 1933); Numan v. Bennett, 184 Ky. 591, 212 S.W. 570
(1919); Prees v. Goodrich Oil Co., 49 R.I. 120, 140 Atl. 665 (1928). It is
also well settled that foreseeability is an essential element of negligence.
E.g., Lawrenceburg v. Lay, 149 Ky. 400, 149 S.W. 862 (1912) ; Le Roux v.
State, 307 N.Y. 397, 121 N.E.2d 386 (1954). See generally Annot., 155
A.L.R. 157 (1945).
'E.g., Buckland v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 56 Idaho 703, 56 P.2d 773
(1936) ; Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931). See
generally Note, 74 U. PA. L. Rzv. 485 (1926).
According to the rule prevailing in England, the question of foreseeability is pertinent to the question of negligence; once negligence is established, however, the defendant is liable for all the direct consequences of his
act, regardless of whether or not he could have foreseen them. In re Polemis,
Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560. But see Overseas Tankship (U.K.)
Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'r Co., [1961] 2 W.L.R. 126, where the defendant
was undeniably negligent and thus the only pertinent question, according to
the Poleinis rule, would have been whether the injury was a "direct result" of
the negligence. Instead of considering that question, however, the Privy
Council based its decision upon the incorrectness of the question itself. It
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Joint-tortfeasors
In Boykin v. Bennett6 the question was raised whether the participants in a race on the public highway are joint-tortfeasors. 7 In
this case, plaintiff's intestate was killed while riding as a gratuitous
passenger in an automobile engaged in a race on a public highway
with two other cars. The drivers of all three vehicles were joined
as defendants. One of the defendants demurred on the ground that
the negligence of each defendant, if any, was independent of and
neither concurred with nor joined in the negligence of the other
defendants.' The Supreme Court overruled the demurrer and held,
in accord with the weight of authority,' that the participants were
engaged in a joint venture and were jointly and concurrently liable
for injuries proximately resulting therefrom, provided, of course,
the injured party was not a participant in the race or had not
acquiesced in it. The Court also pointed out that "a participant
who abandons the race, to the knowledge of the other participants,
before the accident and injury, may not be held liable."' 0
stated: "If defendant's liability depends on the reasonable foreseeability of
the consequent damage, how is that to be determined except by the foreseeability of the damage which in fact happened." The holding was that Polemis
"should no longer be regarded as good law." Thus foreseeability became an
essential test ot proximate cause. Overseas is discussed in Note, 36 N.Y.U.L.
R v. 1043 (1961).
8253 N.C. 725, 118 S.E.2d 12 (1961).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-141.3(b) (Supp. 1961), makes it a criminal offense
for "any person to operate a motor vehicle on a street or highway wilfully in
speed competition with another vehicle." The Court in the principal case
held that violation of this statute is negligence per se.
' The car in which the plaintiff's intestate was a passenger overturned
on a curve in the highway. The other two cars did not collide or otherwise
interfere with the operation of the car in which the plaintiff's intestate was
a passenger.
The other two drivers demurred on the ground that it appeared from the
face of the complaint that plaintiff's intestate was contributorily negligent as
a matter of law. The lower court sustained the demurrers. This was reversed on appeal because it did not affirmatively appear that the plaintiff's
intestate knew or reasonably should have known before the race that the
defendants would engage in speed competition; nor did it appear that the
intestate "failed to take such measures as a reasonably prudent person would
have taken after he learned that a race was contemplated or in progress."
253 N.C. at 727, 118 S.E.2d at 14.
'E.g., Saisa v. Lilia, 76 F.2d 380 (1st Cir. 1935); Landers v. French's
Ice Cream Co., 98 Ga. App. 317, 106 S.E.2d 325 (1958); Bybee v. Shanks,
253 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1952); Reader v. Ottis, 147 Minn. 335, 180 N.W. 117
(1920). See generally 2 BERRY, AUTOMOBILES §2398 (7th ed. 1935).
10253 N.C. at 732, 118 S.E.2d at 17.
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Standard of Care
In Sparks v. Phipps" the thirteen-year-old plaintiff was seriously injured when his bicycle struck defendant's automobile. 12 The
trial judge charged the jury in part as follows: "Now the plaintiff
... contends that in this case the defendant... saw, or should have
seen, a thirteen-year-old boy riding a bicycle on the highway . . .
and, therefore, realized that that would require a higher order of
care."' 3 Plaintiff appealed the trial court's judgment for the defendant, contending that the trial judge committed error in stating
the quantity of care required of the defendant as a contention of the
plaintiff, rather than as the law of the case. The Court found, however, that the trial judge had "adequately declared, explained, and
applied the law arising on the evidence" 4 in other portions of his
charge to the jury.
Negligence is generally defined as the failure to exercise that
degree of care which an ordinarily prudent man would exercise in
like circumstances.' 5 While the standard of care is invariable,'" the
degree of care varies with the exigencies of the occasion,17 and must
be determined by the circumstances in which the plaintiff and the
defendant are placed with respect to each other.' 8
The principal case holds, in accord with numerous North CaroN.C. 657, 122 S.E.2d 496 (1961).
I2Defendants evidence was to the effect that the plaintiff was riding his
bicycle down a moderately declining hill with his head down. As he approached the defendant's automobile, which was traveling in the opposite
direction, he angled into the defendant's line of traffic. Defendant applied his
brakes and pulled over on the shoulder. Just as defendant stopped, plaintiff
rode into defendant's left front fender.
13255 N.C. at 661, 122 S.E.2d at 498. (Emphasis added.)
1,Id.at 662, 122 S.E.2d at 499.
15
E.g., Barnes v. Caulbourne, 240 N.C. 721, 83 S.E.2d 898 (1954);
Pritchett v. Southern Ry., 157 N.C. 88, 72 S.E. 828 (1911).
IRea v. Simowvitz, 225 N.C. 575, 35 S.E.2d 871 (1945). But see Jackson v. Stancil, 253 N.C. 291, 116 S.E.2d 817 (1960), discussed in Note, 39
N.C.L. REv. 294 (1961), where the Court said by way of dictum that the
phrase "highest degree of care" establishes a different and higher standard
11255

by which the common carrier's conduct is measured.
" Diamond v. McDonald Serv. Stores, 211 N.C. 632, 191 S.E. 358 (1937).
The Court has employed various phrases to state the degree of care. Dunn v.

Bomberger, 213 N.C. 172, 195 S.E. 364 (1938) (care not to willfully or
wantonly injure); McAllister v. Pryor, 187 N.C. 832, 123 S.E. 92 (1924)
("the greatest degree of care"); Turner v. Southern Power Co., 154 N.C.
131, 69 S.E. 767 (1910) ("the highest degree of care"); Haynes v. Raleigh
Gas Co., 114 N.C. 203, 19 S.E. 344 (1894) ("the utmost degree of care").
IsRea v. Simowitz, 225 N.C. 575, 35 S.E.2d 871 (1945).
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lina decisions19 and with the great weight of authority,"0 that a
motorist must exercise a higher degree of care when he sees or reasonably should see children on or near the highway.
Rear-end Collisions
Smith v. Rawlins"' raised the question whether a following
motorist who collides with a vehicle ahead could ever obtain a nonsuit in an action by the driver of the latter vehicle.22 In that case
the Court implied, apparently for the first time, that the mere fact
that a following motorist collides with a vehicle ahead furnishes some
evidence that the following motorist was negligent. This question
was answered affirmatively in Clark v. Scheld.23 In Clark the Court
stated that while the above rule was generally true, the relative
duties owed by drivers of vehicles traveling in the same direction
" 'are governed ordinarily by the circumstances in each particular
case.' "24

Violation of a Statute as Negligence
Generally, violation of a safety statute is negligence per se.25
However, if the intent of the legislature is to protect only a limited
class of individuals, the plaintiff must bring himself within that class
in order to maintain an action based on the statute.2 6 The rule was
20 E.g., Pope v. Patterson, 243 N.C. 425, 90 S.E.2d 706 (1956) ; Greene
v. Mitchell County Bd. of Educ., 237 N.C. 336, 75 S.E.2d 129 (1953).
" E.g., Christian v. Smith, 78 Ga. App. 603, 51 S.E.2d 857 (1949)
("greater duty of care"); Woodard's Adm'r v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines,
Inc., 264 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1954) ("high degree of care"); Clouatre v. Lees,
321 Mass. 679, 75 N.E.2d 242 (1947) ("high degree of care"); Lawrence v.
Eicher, 271 P.2d 320 (Okla. 1954) (care commensurate with the danger
arising from disposition of children); Volkmann v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 248
Wis. 615, 22 N.W.2d 660 (1946) ("a special degree of care").
21253 N.C. 67, 116 S.E.2d 184 (1960).
22 See 39 N.C.L. REv. 394 & n.1 5 (1961).
22253 N.C. 732, 117 S.E.2d 838 (1961).
Plaintiff's car was hit from
behind when he stopped on the highway to avoid colliding with a vehicle
which had stopped just ahead. A fogging machine traveling in the opposite
direction had impaired visibility.
2
1'Id. at 737, 117 S.E.2d at 842.
" E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-154 (1953), as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§20-154 (Supp. 1961) (failing to give signal when stopping or turning),
Queen City Coach Co. v. Fultz, 246 N.C. 523, 98 S.E.2d 860 (1957). See 33
N.C.L.
28 Rmv. 215 (1955).
E.g., Alsaker v. De Graff Lumber Co., 234 Minn. 280, 48 N.W.2d 431
(1951); Bennett v. Odell Mfg. Co., 76 N.H. 180, 80 Atl. 642-(1911); Gaines
Leathers v. Blackvell's Durham Tobacco Co., 144 N.C. 330, 57 S.E. 11
(1907); Erickson v. Kongsli, 40 Wash. 2d'79, 240 P.2d 1209 (1952).
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applied in Benton v. Montague. 7 In this case the individual defendant set fire to grass on a certain lot which he was using under
an agreement with the corporate defendant.2" He failed to give
notice to the adjoining property owners as required by G.S. § 14136.29 The fire spread to an adjoining lot and severely burned the
three-year-old plaintiff who was playing there. The Court held that
the evidence was sufficient to make out a prima facie case of actionable negligence against the individual defendant.30 The Court "conceded that the primary purpose of the statute was to protect property,""1 but found that the language was sufficiently broad to cover
the personal injuries involved in the principal case. 2
Jenkins v. Leftwich Elec. Co."3 raised the question whether violation of an administrative safety code is also negligence per se. In
this case the plaintiff alleged that the defendant installed a switch
box in the plaintiff's home and failed to comply with the National
Electrical Code; as a result the house caught fire and was de253 N.C. 695, 117 S.E.2d 771 (1961).
2 The lot was owned by the corporate defendant and was being used by
the individual defendant under an agreement providing that it would be
cleared by the individual defendant who would be entitled to use a portion of
it for garden purposes.
. "N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-136 (1953), provides that any person who intentionally sets fire to any grassland without giving notice to adjoining land
owners and without taking care to watch such fire and to extinguish it before
it reaches adjoining lands, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. It further provides that "this section shall not prevent an action for the damages sustained
by the owner of any property from such fires." Failure to give notice as
required by this statute is negligence per se. Lamb v. Sloan, 94 N.C. 534
(1886).
" A nonsuit for the corporate defendant was affirmed. The Court found
that it was a mere licensor, and held that the owner of land is not liable for
injury caused by the acts of a licensee unless such acts constitute a nuisance
which the owner knowingly suffers to remain. 253 N.C. at 702, 117 S.E.2d
at 776.
Id. at 700, 117 S.E2d at 775.
8 The Court said: "[W]here the field, as here, is in a more or less thickly
populated community and is adjacent to inhabited lots upon which children
are known to play, a violation of the provisions of the statute would constitute
negligence. If such negligence is the proximate cause of injury to a child,
liability results." Ibid.
'8254 N.C. 553, 119 S.E.2d 767 (1961). For an excellent discussion of
this problem, see Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in
Negligence Actions, 28 TEx. L. REv. 143 (1949).
"The Building Code Council is authorized by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143138(a) (1958), to adopt a North Carolina State Building Code. NORTH
CAROLINA STATE BUILDING CODE art. XVI, provides in part. "Except as
may be otherwise provided by rules promulgated by the Building Code Council, the electrical systems of a building or structure shall be installed in conformity with the 'National Electrical Code,' as approved by the American
Standards Association and as filed in the office of Secretary of State."
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stroyed. The Court held, in accord with the majority of jurisdictions which have ruled on this point,"8 that violation of this safety
code was negligence per se.
Contributory Negligence

North Carolina decisions appear to be in conflict as to whether
a child under fourteen can be held contributorily negligent as a
matter of law. Two early cases"6 granted nonsuits because of the
contributory negligence of infant plaintiffs. These two cases were
criticized, but not expressly overruled, in a later decision 37 which
held that it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury that an
infant was incapable of contributory negligence.3 8 However, a nonsuit on the basis of the contributory negligence of an infant was
allowed in the subsequent case of Tart v. Southern Ry.8 9
Recently, in Wilson v. Bright,4 ° it was held that the contributory
negligence of a child under fourteen was not a question of law, but
one of fact. The Court stated that whether the nine-year-old plaintiff was capable of contributory negligence presented a jury question, with a rebuttable presumption that he was incapable.
Despite this apparent conflict in the cases, there seems to be no
"5E.g., Langazo v. San Joaquin Light & Power Corp., 32 Cal. App. 2d
678, 90 P.2d 825 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939) (violation of electric-transmissionline regulations); Hyde v. Connecticut Co., 122 Conn. 236, 188 Atl. 266
(1936) (violation of Public Utility Commission rule on the proper place for
discharging bus passengers); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Moses, 42 Ohio App.
220, 182 N.E. 40 (1931) (violation of I.C.C. regulation on headlights);
Rinehart v. Woodford Flying Serv., 122 W. Va. 392, 9 S.E.2d 521 (1940)
(violation of air traffic rules).
Several jurisdictions have held that proof of deviation from administrative regulations is only evidence of negligence. E.g., Ursprung v. Winter
Garden Co., 183 App. Div. 718, 169 N.Y. Supp. 738 (1918) (violation of
Building Code). See Morris, supra note 33, at 185.
"Foard v. Tidewater Power Co., 170 N.C. 48, 86 S.E. 804 (1915);
Baker v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 150 N.C. 562, 64 S.E. 506 (1909).
:'Fry v. Southern Pub. Util. Co., 183 N.C. 281, 111 S.E. 354 (1922).
""The responsibility of an infant for contributory negligence is not
necessarily a question of law and some expressions in our reports apparently
to the contrary are misleading and contrary to the accepted and approved
principle which governs in such cases ....
We cannot approve all that was
said, with respect to this question, in Baker v. R.R.... and Foard v. Power
Co.... " Id. at 290, 111 S.E. at 359.

The Court in Fry states the test for contributory negligence of an infant:
"while a child of tender years is not held to the same degree of care as one
of mature years in avoiding an injury arising from the negligent act of another, it is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to determine, in his action
to recover damages therefor, whether, under the circumstances, and considering his age and capacity, he should have avoided the injury complained of by
the exercise of ordinary care. . . ." Ibid.
"202 N.C. 52, 161 S.E. 720 (1932).
40255 N.C. 329, 121 S.E.2d 601 (1961).
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reason why a child under fourteen should not be found contributorily
negligent as a matter of law where the evidence admits of but one
conclusion and the fact is one about which reasonable minds cannot
differ. There is authority in other jurisdictions holding binding
instructions for the defendant proper in such circumstances. 41
The question of contributory negligence was also presented in
Johnson v. Southern Ry.42 In this case plaintiff suffered personal
injury and property damages when the pickup truck he was driving
was struck by defendant's train at a railroad crossing. Plaintiff
alleged and offered to prove that the automatic signal light at the
crossing failed to give warning of the approaching train.4" The
Court, in reversing a nonsuit for the defendant, held that the momentary failure of an automatic signaling device was not evidence of
negligence on the part of the railroad,44 but that the evidence taken
as a whole was sufficient to establish defendant's negligence as the
proximate cause of the collision.
The decision therefore turned upon the question whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The Court
held that the failure of the signal was relevant on the question of
plaintiff's contributory negligence, and that although plaintiff was
not relieved from his duty to look and listen for an approaching train,
he could have relied to some extent on the apparent safety to be
implied from the silence of the signal.
This decision is consistent with the view taken by the Court that
the failure of an engineer to give warning of an approaching train
by ringing a bell or blowing a whistle45 does not justify the operator
of a vehicle in assuming that no train is approaching. 4 He still has
a duty to look and listen 4r before attempting to traverse the crossing. 48
"1 E.g., Teague v. St. Louis S. W. Ry., 36 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1929), cert.
denied, 283 U.S. 827 (1931); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Hawkes, 34 Del. 25,
143 Ati. 27 (1928); Blackwell v. Union Pac. R.R., 331 Mo. 34, 52 S.W.2d
814 (1932).
12255 N.C. 386, 121 S.E.2d 580 (1961).
"' Plaintiff also alleged that the train failed to give any warning of its
approach, and that the view at the crossing was obstructed by two box cars.
" Where, as in the principal case, there is additional evidence of negli-

gence, the failure of the automatic signaling device may be considered with
the other evidence, particularly where the railroad has had notice of its defective condition. See generally Annot., 99 A.L.R. 729 (1935).
"E.g., Godwin v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 220 N.C. 281, 17 S.E.2d 137
(1941); Norton v. North Carolina R.R., 122 N.C. 910, 29 S.E. 886 (1898).
,See cases cited note 45 supra.
'" Some courts say the traveler has a duty to stop before traversing a railroad crossing. See, e.g., Scholl v. Philadelphia Surburban Transp. Co., 356
Pa. "'217,
A.2d 732
The 51
operator
of a (1947).
vehicle "is not required to leave his vehicle and go

1962]

NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
LAST CLEAR CHANCE

Th Court in Arvin v. McClintok 49 recognized the doctrine of
last clear chance,5 ° but held that the doctrine is not applicable where
the plaintiff is contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Although
this holding is in accord with many prior North Carolina cases, 5
there was a strong dissent on this point in the principal case,52 which
contended that the view taken by the majority of the Court did not

accurately express the correct legal principle. In support of the
view taken by the dissent, it has been suggested that this exception
to the last clear chance doctrine, unique to North Carolina, 53 is as
illogical5 4 as it is confusing. 55
The last clear chance doctrine was also before the Court in
upon the tract on foot to make his observations. Yet, it is his duty to take
such precautions as an ordinarily prudent man would take under the same or
similar circumstances." Johnson v. Southern Ry., 255 N.C. 386, 390, 121
S.E.2d 580, 582 (1961).
"253 N.C. 679, 118 S.E.2d 129 (1961).
50 "The contributory negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery where it is made to appear that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided the injurious consequences to
the plaintiff, notwithstanding plaintiff's negligence; that is, that by the exercise of reasonable care defendant might have discovered the perilous position
of the party injured or killed and have avoided the injury, but failed to do
so." Ingram v. Smoky Mtn. Stages, Inc., 225 N.C. 444, 447, 35 S.E.2d 337,

339 (1945).
In referring to this rule the Court has often employed the phrase "doctrine
of discovered peril." See, e.g., Wade v. Jones Sausage Co., 239 N.C. 524,
80 S.E.2d 150 (1954). The doctrine of discovered peril requires that the
perilous position of the plaintiff be actually discovered by the defendant. As
the Court requires only that the defendant might have discovered the peril
of the injured party, it seems the Court is actually applying the doctrine of
discoverable peril. See Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 545 (1958).
51
E.g., Dowdy v. Southern Ry., 237 N.C. 519, 75 S.E.2d 639 (1953);
Ingram v. Smoky Mtn. Stages, Inc., supra note 50; Redmon v. Southern Ry.,
195 N.C. 764, 143 S.E. 829 (1928).
- Three Justices dissented to this statement but concurred in the result,
stating that the evidence was insufficient to shox* that the defendant saw or
should have seen the perilous position of the plaintiff's intestate in time to
avoid injuring him. 253 N.C. at 686, 118 S.E.2d at 134.
" See Note, 33 N.C.L. REv. 138, 139 (1955).

"See Dowdy v. Southern Ry., 237 N.C. 519, 528, 75 S.E.2d 639, 645

(1953) (dissenting opinion): "It is stated in the majority opinion that the
doctrine of last clear chance 'does not apply when the plaintiff is guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.' Conversely, may it not be said
with equal force that one may not be adjudged contributorily negligent as a
matter of law when the doctrine of last clear chance applies ?"
" See Note, 33 N.C.L. REv. 138 (1955), where the author points out the
problem of determining the point at which ihere contributory negligence becomes contributory negligence as a matter of law, which bars the submission
of the issue of last clear chance to the jury.
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Green v. Charlotte Chem. Lab., tnc.6 In this case the Court reasoned that since the doctrine presupposes negligence on the part of
te plaintiff,5 7 it is inapplicable as between defendants who are conThis holding is in accord with the estabcurrently negligent."8
lished majority view.5 9
PERJURED TESTIMONY-DEFAMATION

OF THE DEAD

Plaintiff's intestate was killed in a head-on collision between ar
automobile driven by the intestate and a truck owned by the county
coroner, inhis individual capacity, and driven by his agent. The
coroner instituted an action as a result of this collision and Gillikin,
as administrator of the intestate, set up a counterclaim." A nonsuit
was entered on the counterclaim and the four cases" here discussed
were brought by Gillikin as a 'result of occurrences prior to and
during'that trial.
In the first case6 " plaintiff alleged that the coroner conspired to
suborn perjured testimony in the prior action" and that he perpetrated a fraud on the plaintiff by the perjured testimony, thereby
preventing him from recovering for the wrongful death of his
intestate.64 The Court held (1) that although perjured testiI ."254 N.C. 680, 120 S.E.2d 82 (1961), discussed in Note, 40 N.C.L. Rv.
633 (1962).
Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N.C. 185, 185 S.E. 627 (1936).
"[O]ne defendant may not resist recovery by plaintiff on the ground
that a co-defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.... The
doctrine has application only as between plaintiff and a defendant." 254 N.C.
at 689, 120 S.E.2d at 88.
. " E.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Parmenter, 170 Fed. 140 (9th Cir.
1909); Shield v. F. Johnson & Son Co., 132 La. 773, 61 So. 787 (1913);
Kimbriel Produce Co. v. Mayo, 180 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). See
generally 38 Am. JUR. Negligence § 227 (1941). But cf. Colorado & So. Ry.
v. Western Light & Power Co., 73 Colo. 107, 214 Pac. 30 (1923), where the
court seems to have recognized the possibility of applying the doctrine as
between persons charged with successive acts of negligence so as to show the
later act was the sole proximate cause of the injury.
" The appellate records do not disclose the nature of the counterclaim, but
apparently it was for the wrongful death of the plaintiff's intestate.
"xGillikin v. Ohio Farmers Indem. Co., 254 N.C. 250, 118 S.B.2d 605
(1961); Gillikin v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., .254 N.C. 247, 118 S.E.2d
606 (1961); Gillikin v. Bell, 254 N.C. 244, 118 S.E.2d 609 (1961); Gillikin
v. Springle, 254 N.C. 240, 118 S.E.2d 611 (1961).
62
Gillikin v. Springle, supra note 61.
e'Plaintiff alleged that he was nonsuited in the prior action because the
coroner, the insurer of the vehicles and a commercial photographer coerced
witnesses, concealed the truth, and conspired with others to show that the
collision was caused by the negligence of the plaintiff's intestate.
'Plaintiff also alleged that the coroner defamed the intestate by asserting
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mony65 and the subornation of perjured testimony are criminal offenses, neither are torts supporting a civil, action for damages,66' and
until the
(2) that plaintiff could not recover for fraud unless and
7
vacated.1
was
recover
to
right
the
him
judgment denying
In the second case6" plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a commercial photographer, took pictures falsely depicting conditions at
the collision and permitted the use of these pictures at the prior trial.
Plaintiff also alleged that these. derogatory pictures were distributed
throughout the county. Thus, the Court, for the first time, was
called Upon to decide whether one may reco-ver damages for the
defamation of a dead person. It held that since there was no common law right to recover for defamation of a dead person6 9 and no
such right had been created by statute in North Carolina 0 the plait/tiff had failed to state a cause of action. 1
*Thedefendant in the third case' was the holder of the coroner's
surety bond. In this case plaintiff based his right to recover on
the refusal of the coroner to hold an inquest in regards to the collision. The Court held that a judicial officer cannot be held account-*
able in an action for damages for the manner in which he performs
his duties even though it is alleged that he acted corruptly and
maliciously s and, thus, it follows that no right of action exists
that he was drunk when he drove the automobile and by exhibiting derogatory pictures of the intestate, and that he prostituted the office of coroner to
his personal advantage. These allegations were considered by the Court in
Gillikin v. Bell and Gillikin v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., respectively.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-209-10 (1953).
"Accord, Brewer v. Carolina Coach Co., 253 N.C. 257, 116 S.E.2d 725
(1960); Godette v. Gaskill, 151 N.C. 52, 65 S.E. 612 (1909).
°'Accord, Scopano v. United States Gypsum Co., 166 Misc. 805, 3
N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
" Gillikin v. Bell, 254 N.C. 244, 118 S.E.2d 609 (1961); also discussed
urider CIVIL PROCEDURE, Statute of Limitation, supra.
"'Fleagle v. Downing, 183 Iowa 1300, 168 N.W. 157 (1918); Hughes v.
New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 312 Mass. 178, 43 N.E.2d" 657
(1942).
o See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (Supp. 1961). Some states have statutes
making defamation of the dead a criminal offense, but they generally' are
construed to create no civil liability. E.g., Saucer v. Giroux, 54 Cal. App.
732, 202 Pac. 887 (Dist. Ct. App. 1921); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 138
Tex. 434, 160 S.W.2d 246 (1942).
" The Court also found that this conduct would not create civil liability
for perjury or subornation of perjury for the reasons given in Gillikin v.
Springle.
"' Gillikin v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 254 N.C. 247, 118 S.E.2d
606 (1961).
Accord, Ravenscroff v. Casey, 139 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 745 (1944), rehearing denied, 323 U.S. 814 (1944) (police and
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against the surety on the coroner's official bond. 74

The defendant in the fourth case 5 was the insurer of
both ve-

hicles involved in the collision. In this case plaintiff alleged that the
defendant conspired to defeat his right of action in the prior litigation. The Court held that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action
76
entitling him to damages in a civil action.
TRESPASS

At early common law, every unauthorized entry into the close of
another was a trespass, imposing liability upon the trespasser.77 The
modern trend, however, is to limit liability to invasions which are intended, or negligent, or the result of abnormally dangerous activity. 7
The first time our Court was faced with the question whether an
unintentional and non-negligent entry to land constituted trespass it
followed the common law rule. 79 When again faced with this question, however, the Court reversed its former position, s" and held, in
accord with the weight of authority,"' that an unintentional entry on
the land of another does not subject the actor to liability, absent a
showing of negligence. This latter holding was reaffirmed in the
a county judge); Burgin v. Sullivan, 151 Ala. 416, 44 So. 202 (1907)

(mayor acting as a magistrate); Furr v. Moss, 52 N.C. 525 (1860)

(justice

of the peace) ; Price v. Cook, 120 Okla. 105, 250 Pac. 519 (1926) (county
attorney). See generally Annot., 173 A.L.R. 836 (1948).
" For cases holding in accord with the principal case that the surety on an
official bond is not liable on the bond where the principal has judicial immunity, see Phelps v. Dawson, 97 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1938); Anderson v.
Manley; 181 Wash. 327, 43 P.2d 39 (1935).
"' Gillikin v. Ohio Farmers Indem. Co., 254 N.C. 250, 118 S.E.2d 605

(1961).

" This holding was based on the reasons given in Gillikin v. Springle.
See text at note 62 supra.
"E.g., Gregory v. Piper, 9 B. & C. 591, 109 Eng. Rep. 220 (K.B. 1829).
See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 166, comment b (1934).
". E.g., Edgarton v. H. P. Welch Co., 321 Mass. 603, 74 N.E.2d 674
(1947); Puchlopek v. Portsmouth Power Co., 91 N.H. 440, 136 At. 259
(1940). See generally PROSSER, TORTS § 13 (2d ed. 1955).
" Newsom v. Anderson, 24 N.C. 42 (1841). In this case the defendant
innocently cut down a tree on his own land, the top of the tree falling on the
plaintiff's land. The trial judge charged that "the plaintiff could not recover,
unless the tree was designedly or carelessly felled by the defendant." The
charge was held to be error. See also Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371, 372
(1835), where the court stated in a dictum that "every unauthorized, and
therefore unlawful, entry into the close of another, is a trespass."
"' Smith v. Pate, 246 N.C. 63, 97 S.E.2d 457 (1957), discussed in Note, 36
N.C.L.
REv. 251 (1958).
81
E.g., Jewell v. Dell, 284 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1955). See generally Rn-

STATEmENT, TORTS § 166 (1934).
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2 In this case the defendant was
recent case of Schloss v. Hallman."
traveling in the right lane of a four lane street when another vehicle
turned into the lane immediately in front of him. In order to avoid
a collision with the other vehicle and a vehicle immediately following
him, he applied his brakes and turned his truck to the right. When
his wheel hit the curb, he lost control and ran into a billboard adjoining the street. In an action brought by the owner of the billboard, the Court held that the evidence was insufficient to establish
actionable negligence on the part of defendant.

TRIAL PRACTICE
PROCESS

Moss v. Winston-Salem1 again presented to the Court the question of the constitutionality of G.S. § 55-145 (a) (3). Under that
statute a foreign corporation is subject to suit by a resident of this
state, whether or not it is transacting business in this state, on any
cause of action arising
out of the production, manufacture, or distribution of goods
by such corporation with the reasonable expectation that those
goods are to be used or consumed in this State and are so
used or consumed, regardless of how or where the goods were
produced, manufactured, marketed, or sold or whether or not
through the medium of independent contractors or dealers.
The statute had been held unconstitutional upon the facts involved
in Putnam v. Triangle Publications,Inc.' and Erlanger Mills, Inc.
v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc.' On the other hand, the statute was held
constitutional upon the facts appearing in Shepard v. Rheem Mfg.
Co.4
82255 N.C. 686, 122 S.E.2d 513 (1961). For a recent discussion of liability for damages resulting from trespass and concussion damages, see Note,
40 N.C.L. Rav. 640 (1962).
'254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445 (1961).
2245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957), commented upon in 36 N.C.L. Rv.
458 (1958), and Note, 35 N.C.L. REv. 535 (1957).
8239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956), discussed in Note, 35 N.C.L. REv. 546

(1957).

'249 N.C. 454, 106 S.E.2d 704 (1959), commented upon in 37 N.C.L.
REv. 465 (1959).
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In the Moss case suit was brought against an Illinois corporation
as manufacturer of a power mower which caused injury to the plaintiff while being operated in North Carolina. The negligence charged
was that the manufacturer had failed to supply a guard or to advise
that a screening guard should be used. Service was made pursuant
to G.S. § 55-145 (a) (3) on the theory that the Illinois corporation
defendant had manufactured the mower with reasonable anticipation
that it would be used in North Carolina. It appeared that the defendant corporation had no agents in, or contacts with, the state of
North Carolina; that it sold the mower in question to Todd Company of Norfolk, Virginia; that it had no interest in Todd Company
and that Todd Company was an independent distributor. On the
basis of these facts the Court held the service was invalid and that
if the statute in question authorized such service it would be unconstitutional if applied in this situation in that it would deprive the
defendant of its property without due process of law and would
also unreasonably obstruct and burden interstate commerce. The
Court found that the case was controlled by its decision in Putnam
v. Triangle Publications,Inc.5
DISCOVERY-PHYSICAL EXAMINATION

In the ordinary personal injury case, it is customary for counsel
to agree that the defendant may have a physician of his choice
examine the plaintiff. When such examination is refused application must be made to the court. No statute covers the situation in
this state, but the Supreme Court has held that trial judges have
inherent power, in their discretion, to order the personal injury
plaintiff to submit to a physical examination. 6
432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957).
'Two N.C.
leading cases in North Carolina on the subject of physical examina-245

tion by defendant are Fleming v. Holleman, 190 N.C. 449, 130 S.E. 171
(1925), and Flythe v. Eastern Carolina Coach Co., 195 N.C. 777, 143 S.E.
865 (1928). In Fleming it was held that when a plaintiff shows the injured
portion of his body to the jury while testifying, the defendant has a right to
a physical examination. This examination, the Court said, could, in the
court's discretion, be made either in or out of the presence of the jury. The
Court restricted defendant's right to a physical examination to that portion
of the plaintiff's body revealed to the jury. In Flythe defendant asked for
an x-ray examination after the jury was empanelled. The examination was
denied and the Supreme Court upheld the denial both because the request had
not been made in due time and because x-rays had been introduced by the
plaintiff which the defendant's physicians were permitted to examine. It
was in the Flythe case that the Court expressly upheld the inherent power of

a trial judge to order a physical examination of the plaintiff in his discretion.
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In Helton v. J. P. Stevens Co. 7 plaintiff sued for damages

alleged to be the result of a brain injury. Defendants answered,
denying the negligence and the injury. Plaintiff refused defendant's
request that he be examined by a neurologist named by defendant,
and thereupon defendant applied to the trial court for an order requiring the plaintiff to submit to an examination by the named
neurologist. The court made the order as requested. Plaintiff excepted and appealed assigning two grounds: (1) lack of authority
on the part of the court to make the order, and (2) the selection by
the court of the neurologist named by defendants.
On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the discretionary power of
the trial judge to make the order, but reversed because the lower
court had named the neurologist designated by the defendant. The
significant language of the Court is, "It goes without saying the
exclusive duty to make the selection rests with the Court. Neither
party should have advantage in the selection."'
The Court then
quotes, apparently with approval, the following language from American Jurisprudence,
When the examination is compulsory, there is obvious propriety in the selection of the experts by the court rather than
by one or both of the parties .... The court, in making the
order . . . and in designating the experts to execute it, is

serving the interest of neither the defendants nor the plaintiff, but the ends of justice.9
In remanding the case, the Court said it was certain the trial
judge did not intend to hold the scales unevenly between the parties
when he selected the specialist named by the defendants. But, it
found that "it was the duty of the court to make the selection independently of the wishes of either."' 0 And to the end that "even
appearances of favoritism may be removed"" the Court directed
the trial court to make its own selection of the specialist to make
the examination.
This ruling of the Court raises various side questions.
(1) Is the doctor who is selected by the court to be deemed
the court's witness or the witness of the defendant? If
87254

N.C. 321, 118 S.E.2d 791 (1961).
Id. at 322, 118 S.E.2d at 792.
'Ibid., citing 17 Am. JUR. Discovery and Inspection § 45 (1957).
10 254 N.C. at 323, 118 S.E.2d at 792.

11 Ibid.
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the court's witness, presumably the court would call him
to the stand and conduct the direct examination, whereupon, both counsel for the plaintiff and defendant could
cross-examine. If he is deemed the defendant's witness, the defendant must conduct the direct examination
and cannot under normal circumstances cross-examine.
(2) Suppose the defendant has suggested to the trial judge
that Dr. X make the examination. The trial judge,
being aware of the Helton decision replies, "You should
not have suggested the name of Dr. X, although to be
perfectly frank with you I contemplated ordering plaintiff to be examined by Dr. X." May the court now
appoint Dr. X or is he. barred from so doing by reason
of defendant's suggestion?
(3) May the court ask for a list of names of specialists in
the particular field from both counsel for plaintiff and
defendant and being supplied with the same may he
choose from the list submitted by either party a name
which does not appear on the list of the other?
It is submitted that, if the procedure outlined by the Court in
the Helton case is to be followed, the trial judge should call the
physician named by him to the stand as the court's witness. He
should then be subject to cross-examination by both parties. The
jury would appreciate the full impartiality of the witness in such
a situation. But, if the defendant is required to call the doctor to
the stand as his witness, he not only loses the right of cross-examination under the general rule applicable, but the doctor appears to the
jury to be the defendant's witness. Jurors expect the physician
called by the plaintiff to be favorable to him and the physician called
by the defendant also to be favorable to the defense. Appropriate
weight is given to this fact and the testimony of both physicians is
looked upon by the jury in terms of, "Well, you know he was the
plaintiff's doctor and probably wants to help him out," or "I never
found any doctor called by the defendant yet, who every finds anything wrong with the plaintiff."
Since the plaintiff generally has the choice in calling his own
physician, be he specialist or otherwise, one may well wonder if the
scales are evenly balanced when on the one side is a physician chosen
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by the plaintiff and on the other a physician in whose selection the
defendant has had no choice. While a strict application of the maxim
"What's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander" would result
in the court naming any physician designated by the defendant, the
discretionary power of the judge is to be used in determining the
suitability of the named physician for the purpose. But, it is submitted, that too much "sauce" is denied the defendant when the trial
judge is told he cannot name a physician requested by the defendant
even though the judge finds he is an eminently able doctor for the
purpose.
REFERENCES

A compulsory reference is an interlocutory order and an appeal
therefrom will not lie forthwith unless it appears that the order
deprives the appellant of a substantial right which might be lost
were he required to await a review after final judgment. In Harrell
v.Harrell2 a wife sued for alimony without divorce. After answer
had been filed she made application for subsistence allowance pendente lite together with counsel fees. The trial court considered affidavits filed by both parties together with certain testimony but was
unable to determine therefrom the amount of the defendant's income.
Believing he should have this information, the trial court made an
order of reference and directed the referee to take evidence from the
parties and all known sources and to report his findings as to the defendant's income. He also ordered the defendant, who was in the
business of hauling produce from Florida, to pay into the clerk's
office $200 as an undertaking to pay such expenses as might be
incurred.
Defendant excepted to these orders and gave notice of appeal.
The court declined to sign the appeal entry and refused to fix an
appeal bond. The defendant again excepted and on his application
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
On certiorari the Court reversed the action of the lower court in
making the order of reference and requiring the deposit by the
defendant. It found sufficient evidence in the record upon which the
trial court could make a subsistence award and an allowance of counsel fees pendente lite. Determination of the amount of defendant's
income was deemed not necessary at this preliminary hearing. The
Court noted that it is common knowledge that references are costly
1253

N.C. 758, 117 S.E.2d 728 (1961).
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and said there was no need to put the defendant to this expense
which might well exceed the $ZO0 bond required by the trial court.
Were the defendant not allowed the appeal at this time, the Court
said, he would be deprived of a substantial right in that he would
have become saddled with the costs of an unnecessary reference.
The Court distinguished Cram v. Cram"8 in which a trial judge
had made an order of reference to ascertain the amount of the husband's income after a final hearing on the merits and a determination
in favor of the wife for alimony. Without expressly approving the
language of the Court in the Cram case, the Court noted that the
decision was inapplicable in Harrell because Cram did not involve
alimony pendente lite, but permanent alimony.
in Rudisill v. Hoyle 4 action was brought against the executor
of a deceased executrix by an administrator for an accounting. Defendant demurred on three grounds: (1) want of jurisdiction;
(2) misjoinder of parties and causes; and (3) that the deceased
executrix was the owner in fee of the entire estates of the decedent.
The trial judge overruled the demurrer. Defendant also pleaded
that he had filed a final account. The trial judge, being of the
opinion that the issues raised by the pleadings required examination of a long account, made a compulsory reference.
On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the rulings of the trial
court on the demurrer. On the question of whether, in the face of
the plea of having filed a final account, a reference could be made,
the Court declared that the plea was "not such a plea in bar as to prevent a reference."' 5 Accordingly, the case was remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings.
JUDGMENTS

Vacation of Consent Judgment on Ground of Lack of Authority of
Attorney to Consent
In Howard v. Boyce' 6 motion was made in the cause to vacate a
18 116 N.C. 288, 21 S.E. 197 (1895).
1'254 N.C. 33, 118 S.E.2d 145 (1961).
5

1d.
I at 254, 118 S.E.2d at 154. For a leading authority setting out the
types of pleas which are deemed pleas in bar and will prevent a reference until
the plea is disposed of, see Murchison Nat'l Bank v. Evans, 191 N.C. 535, 132
S.E. 563 (1926). See also on pleas in bar Solon Lodge v. Ionic Lodge,
245 N.C. 281, 95 S.E.2d 921 (1957), commented upon in 36 N.C.L. REv. 460
(1958); Sledge v. Miller, 249 N.C. 447, 106 S.E.2d 868 (1959), commented
upon in 37 N.C.L. Rtv. 468 (1959).
10254 N.C. 255, 118 S.E.2d 897 (1961).

1962--

6ORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW,

consent judgment of nonsuit approved by persons appearing as
counsel for plaintiff and -defendant. The judgment had been entered
in 1945 and the motion to vacate was filed in 1960. The motion was
denied by the trial court both for the reason that the movants failed
to show they had a meritorious cause of action and that the movants
had been guilty of laches, i.e., unreasonable delay in moving to
vacate the judgment.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed. It held that it was unnecessary for the movants to show they had a meritorious case when
their contention was that the attorney purportedly representing them
had no authority to do so. 7 Further, the Court held that'the mere
passage of a long length of time did not in and of itself establish
laches. It remanded the case to the lower court with instructions
that it determine the facts as to the existence of the authority in
the attorney and also find facts relative to the alleged laches of the
movants.
Res Judicata-Effect of Judgment in Favor of Passenger Against
Operatorsof Two Carsas to the Rights of the Car OperatorsInter Se
In Lumberton Coach Co. v. Stone S the Court held that a judgment in favor of a passenger against both motorists involved in the
two car collision which resulted in injuries to the passenger was res
judicata and operated as a bar to one of the motorists suing the
other on the theory that the judgment against both motorists in the
passenger suit, whether it be consent or otherwise, established the
joint negligence of each motorist. The same rule was applied by
the Court in Pack v. McCoy, 9 where a consent judgment entered
in a minor's action against the drivers of the two motor vehicles involved was held to bar action between the owners of the two motor
vehicles.
In reaching the above results, the North Carolina Supreme Court
went contra to the majority rule in this country.2 ° Now in Gunter v.
"'Inholding that the showing of a meritorious defense was not required
the Court was following the view expressed by Justice Bobbitt in behalf of
the majority of the Court in Owens v. Von Cannon, 251 N.C. 351, 111 S.E.2d
70018235
(1959).N.C. 619, 70 S.E.2d
673 (1952).
10251 NC. 590, 112 S.E..2d 118 (1960).
10 See criticism of the Pack case in Note, 39 N.C.L. Rsv. 90 (1960),
and
comment in 39 N.C.L. REv. 407 (1961).
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Winders"' the Court has overruled the Lumberton Coach Co. 22 case
and those cases based on it, and has fallen in line with the weight of
authority. The rule of Gunter is that a judgment in favor of a passenger against several motorists involved in the accident is not to
be deemed res judicata in an action between the motorists unless it
appears that the rights and liabilities of the motorists, inter se, were
put in issue by the pleadings in the suit brought by the passenger.
This decision will be a welcome relief to the bar in that it now
makes possible settlements in infants' friendly suits against several
motorists without running the risk that the consent judgment will
be deemed res judicata (as it was in Pack) between the motorists.
PAID ON JUDGMENT
the plaintiff was a passenger in a car
In Ramsey v.
driven by one Wilson which collided with a car driven by Camp.
On June 3, 1958, plaintiff gave a covenant not to sue to Wilson in
the amount of $1,000. This action against Camp was instituted on
July 12, 1957, prior to the giving of the covenant, and came to trial
after the covenant had been given in August 1958. On motion of
Camp, Wilson was made an additional defendant and Camp filed a
cross-action against him for contribution.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff against Camp in the
amount of $1,000 and held that Wilson was not negligent. Camp
had not pleaded the payment by Wilson for the covenant but now
moved the trial judge that the judgment against him be credited with
the $1,000 paid by Wilson. (This, if done, had the effect of satisfying the judgment to the extent of the $1,000 jury verdict.) The trial
judge refused to allow the credit and defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to but
one satisfaction and that any amount paid by Wilson to the plaintiff
in exchange for the covenant not to sue had to be credited on the
judgment against Camp. The Court restated the rule that where
a party settles with one joint tortfeasor by way of a covenant not to
sue the remaining tortfeasors are entitled to credit. 24 The fact that
COVENANT NOT TO SUE-CREDIT OF AMOUNT

Camp2"

N.C. 782, 117 S.E.2d 787 (1961); also discussed under CIVIL
PROCEDURE, Res Judicata,supra.
22235 N.C. 619, 70 S.E.2d 673 (1952).
28 254 N.C. 443, 119 S.E.2d 209 (1961).
24 On the general subject of the effect of covenants not to sue, as distinguished from the effect of releases, see Statutory Comment, 40 N.C.L. REv.
21253

88 (1961).
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the covenant not to sue was given to one who is found later by the
jury to have not been a joint tortfeasor is immaterial. Neither was
it material that the defendant Camp had not pleaded the existence of
the covenant not to sue and the payment thereunder.

TRUSTS
PRECATORY WORDS

In Clark v. Connor' the Court had to determine whether the
testator's devise to his wife was in trust or in fee simple. The testator left all his property to his wife "to take, hold, and do with as
she shall deem best and proper for the benefit of herself and our
children." The will further provided that any advancements made
to his children by him or subsequently by his widow should be
accounted for in a division of the property. In so providing the
testator stated: "the intent and purpose of this provision is that said
children shall share equally in my estate and in their mother's
estate."
The trial court held that the testator had created a trust. The
Supreme Court, reversing, discounted the words "take, hold, and
do with as she deem best and proper for the benefit of herself and
our children" as being merely precatory and not mandatory. A clear
intention to make the devise in fee simple was found. In so holding
the Court declared that prior cases are of little value in the constructions of wills, because no two wills can be interpreted the same although the language used may be practically identical. Nevertheless,
other cases are occasionally helpful.
In Young v. Young a trust was found just as readily as the
present Court found a fee where the language of the will was,
To my beloved wife I give all my estate, real, personal, and
mixed, to be managed by her (and that she may be enabled
the better to control and manage our children), to be disposed of by her to them in that manner she may think best for
their good and her own happiness. 8
1253 N.C. 515, 117 S.E.2d 465 (1961) ; also discussed under WILLS AND
ADMINIsTRATIoN,

Construction, infra.

268 N.C. 309 (1872).

'Id. at 310. The language here is very similar to language of the will in

the Clark case.
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In St. James v.- Bagley4 the question arose whether a trust had
been imposed on land by the deed conveying it to plaintiff church.
The grantor gave the land "for the purpose of aiding in the establishment of a Home for Indigent Widows or Orphans or in the
promotion of any other charitable or religious objects to which the
property hereinafter conveyed may be appropriated."' A home for
elderly women was built but subsequently burned. The church,
having no other use for the land, questioned whether it had a fee
simple title to the land. Learning of this the grantor wrote the
pastor of the church, informing him that no trust was imposed and
that he had made the conveyance in fee.
In holding that there was no trust the Court said that the expression of motive imposed no trust; precatory words are not imperative unless it is clear from the context that the grantor intended
them to be. The words declaring motive were in the recital and not
in the habendum where declarations of trust are usually found. The
Court also noted that the grantor was an intelligent man and "evidently knew how to use language declaring a trust," 6 and that an
eminent lawyer witnessed the deed.7 The Court claimed that it was
not using the grantor's letter to support its conclusion.
In Brinn v. Brinns the will passed all property to the wife of the
testator during her widowhood "to be handled as she chooses." In
so devising his property the testator made the following requests of
her in the will: (1) that she consider advancements in distributing
the property to the children and that she make such distribution as
or when she saw fit; (2) that she undertake complex insurance investments for his sons; (3) that she invest $1,000 for the benefit
of his church for ten years, and this bequest was to be continued at
the discretion of his heirs; (4) that his sister be cared for and that
she be given a proper burial; and (5) that should his wife die before
she fully executed his requests the estate should be equally divided
between his four children and his son, Preston, should be made
executor or administrator to carry out his wishes.
The Court stated that where a limited estate is devised to the
'5 138 N.C. 384, 50 S.E. 841 (1905).
Id. at 385, 50 S.E. 841.
8 Id. at 394, 50 S.E.
844. (Emphasis added.)

In the Clark case the Court cited St. James with approval for the proposition that because a prominent lawyer witnessed the instrument, this indicates that no trust was intended since none was clearly and definitely expressed.
8213 N.C. 282, 195 S.E. 793 (1938).
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first taker, words of request addressed to the devisee will usually
make him a trustee for the persons in whose favor such requests are
made. In such a situation the words of request are prima facie
testamentary and imperative and not precatory in effect. In other
words, the Court found an intention to create a trust from all the
provisions of the will, taken as a whole, despite particular precatory
expressions.
From a reading of these cases it appears that the only way to
avoid the possible thwarting of the grantor's or testator's wishes is
by more careful drafting of wills and deeds by the members of the
bar. If a trust is intended accurate technical trust language should
be employed. If the conveyance or devise is meant to be in fee
simple, any other possibility should be expressly negatived.

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
SEVERANCE AND VACATION PAY-ELIGIBILITY FOR
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS

In In re Tyson' and In re Shuler,2 the Court reached divergent
results as to the relationship between unemployment insurance benefits under the North Carolina Employment Security Law' and severance and vacation payments and supplementary unemployment
benefits provided for in collective bargaining contracts between
unions and employers. In Tyson, it was held that the severance and
vacation payments, for a projected period on a pro rata basis, precluded eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits; in Shuler,
the unemployed worker was permitted to receive both the contract
payments and the statutory benefits. The legislative policy statement4 was used in support of both results. The problem in Tyson
has given rise to much difference of opinion ;5 the decision in Tyson
is in line with the majority view. Shuler appears to be the only
supreme court decision of its kind. However, it is in accord with
most of the administrative interpretations of the relevant statutes
'253 N.C. 662, 117 S.E.2d 854 (1961).
2255 N.C. 559,
122 S.E.2d 393 (1961).

'N.C.

GEN. STAT.

'N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§§ 96-8 to -19 (1958), as amended, N.C.

§§ 96-8 to -18 (Supp. 1961).

§ 96-2 (1958).

See 57 COLUA. L. REv. 437 (1957); 36
U. PA. L. REv. 144 (1951).

MINN.

L.

REV.

GEN. STAT.

113 (1951); 100
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and with the statutes enacted to overcome the fewv administrative
and court decisions to. the -contraryY In both Tyson and Shuler;
the Emplbyment Security. Commission was overruled.7
The situations dealt with in Tyson and Shuler are basically distinguishable. In Tyson, all of the employees had been discharged
and their employment terminated when the employer, in an economy
move, had shut down the plant. In Shuler, the men were out of
work because of a temporary layoff imposed by the employer for
business reasons; the. employment relation had not been severed.
In Tyson, the duplication of severance and vacation payments and
unemployment insurance benefits, on a pro rata basis for a projected period following the discharge, would have resulted in payments substantially greater than the weekly earnings while the men
were employed. In Shuler, the duplication of the contractual supplementary unemployment benefits and the statutory unemployment insurance benefits would have amounted to substantially less than the
weekly earnings while the men were employed. Moreover, a specific statute was thought to disqualify' the applicants in Tyson.
Perhaps, however, this statute should be interpreted as applicable
only when an employee has been wrongfully discharged and then is
reinstated with reimbursement for lost pay. In any event, the statute
was, not a factor in Shuler, where the men were laid off rather than
discharged. There, the Court felt free to laud the employer for his
co-operation in bolstering the inadequate relief available under the
Employment Security Law during periods of temporary layoff.
Under most state unemployment insurance statutes, including
-

ours, 9 a worker is ineligible for benefits for any week if he performs

services during that week or if wages are payable to him "with
8 See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, No. U-172, SUPPLEMENTAL UNEMPLOYMENT
(1957, Supp. 1959); Chernick & Naef, Legal and PoliticalAspects of the Integration of Unemployment
Insurance and'SUB Plans, 12 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 20 (1958).
"Inre Tyson, N.C. Employment Security Comm'n, No. 2882 (1959); In
re Shuler, N.C. Employment Security Comm'n, No. 3008 (1960).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §96-14(8) (1958): "For any week with respect to
which he has received any sum from the employer pursuant to an order of
the National Labor Relations Board or by private agreement, consent or
arbitration for loss of pay by reason of discharge. When the amount so paid
by the employer is in a lump sum and covers a period of more than one week,
such amount shall be allocated to the weeks in the period on a pro rata
basis.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-8(10) (a) (Supp. 1961): "An individual shall be
deemed 'totally unemployed' in any week with respect to which no wages are
payable to him and during which he performs no services."
BENEFIT PLANS AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
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respect to" that week. It is believed, however, that the question
whether severance or vacation pay or supplementary unemployment
benefits constitute "wages payable with respect to" any particular
week of unemployment depends more upon the policy considerations
reflected in the two decisions under review than upon abstract or
mechanical conceptions.

WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
CONSTRUCTION

In the construction of a will, the effect to be given to the fact
that the will was witnessed by a lawyer was discussed in Clark v.
Connor.' In that case testator devised all his property to his spouse
"to take, hold, have and do with as she shall deem best and proper,
for the benefit of herself and our children."'
The Court rejected
plaintiff's contention that a trust was created and held that the wife
took the property in fee simple absolute.' In the course of its opinion
the Court noted that a lawyer had witnessed the will. From this
the Court inferred that the lawyer either wrote the will or was consulted in regard to it. Because a lawyer is familiar with the language required to create a valid trust and since, according to the
Court, the dispositive words which appeared in the will have been
held in many cases not sufficient to create a trust, the Court reasoned
that no trust was intended.4
5
In Wimberly v. Parrish
testator devised all his property to his
wife for life and at her death to one Parrish, provided Parrish stayed
with and took care of testator's wife until her death; otherwise, the
property was to pass to testator's next of kin.
1253 N.C. 515, 117 S.E.2d 465 (1960); also discussed under TRuSTS,
Precatory
Words, supra.
2
Id.at 517, 117 S.E.2d at 466.
The Court relied upon N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-38 (1950) (presumption of
a fee unless contrary plainly appears), and upon the rule of construction that
a will must be construed from its four corners in order to ascertain the intent
of the testator.
' The same conclusion was reached in St. James v. Bagley, 138 N.C. 384,
50 S.E. 841 (1905), where it appeared that the deed-in question had been
witnessed by a lawyer. Generally, if the will is drawn by a lawyer, the courts
will give more significance to the technical language used. E.g., It re
Trimble's Estate, 234 Iowa 994, 14 N.W.2d 673 (1944); Hardin v. Crow,
310 Ky. 814, 222 S.W.2d 842 (1949); Moon v. Stewart, 87 Ohio St. 349,
101 N.E. 344 (1913); Thellusson v. Rendlesham, 7 H.L. 429 (1859).
-253 N.C. 536, 117 S.E.2d 472 (1960).
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The Court held that Parrish did not take a vested remainder
because his compliance with the terms of the will was a condition
precedent to his receiving any interest in the property, and the question of compliance could only be determined after the life estate had
terminated.6 Moreover, there was a limitation over in the event
Parrish failed to fulfill the conditions. The presence of such a limitation is some evidence that the testator intended the condition to
be precedent rather than subsequent.'
In view of the general rule that the Court will construe a condition as being a condition subsequent whenever possible in order
to hold an estate vested,8 it seems that the Court could have found
the remainder vested subject to divestment. If a conditional element
is incorporated into the description of a gift to a remainderman, the
remainder is held to be contingent; but if after words giving a vested
interest, a clause is added divesting it, the remainder is said to be
vested.' The condition in the principal case was not incorporated
into the description of the gift; rather the property was given to Parrish absolutely and then made subject to the condition. However,
the Court found that the testator's primary purpose was to see that
his widow was adequately cared for and that Parrish, in no event,
was to take any interest in the property unless he performed these
duties.y0
INTEGRATION

Integration of a will is the process of embodying into one instrument several sheets of paper intended by the testator to constitute his
6 The Court relied upon the general rule that a remainder is contingent
so long as there is uncertainty as to what person or persons will be entitled to
enjoy it. Carolina Power Co. v. Haywood, 186 N.C. 313, 119 S.E. 500
(1923). It is interesting to note, however, that the uncertainty in the principal case was the event-whether Parrish would fulfill the condition.
" Because of the limitation over the Court held the present case to be distinguishable from Patterson v. Brandon, 226 N.C. 89, 36 S.E.2d 717 (1946),
where the testator used almost identical language and the remainder was held
to be vested.
' St. Peter's Church v. Bragaw, 144 N.C. 126, 56 S.E. 688 (1907). See
generally McCall, Estates on Condition and on Special Limitation in North
Carolina,19 N.C.L. REV. 335 (1941).
Whitesides v. Cooper, 115 N.C. 570, 20 S.E. 295 (1894) ; Starnes v. Hill,
112 N.C. 1, 16 S.E. 1011 (1893).
"0See in accord with this statement Helms v. Helms, 137 N.C. 206, 49
S.E. 110 (1904), where the Court stated that whether a condition is precedent
or subsequent depends upon the intent of the testator as determined by a
reading of the whole instrument. In Helms, however, the Court held that
the condition was a condition subsequent.
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will." Proof of the intent to integrate the several sheets is supplied
by demonstrating their physical connection or connection through
their internal sense or coherence.12 However, where competent
witnesses may be found to identify the several sheets as constituting.
the will, neither physical nor coherent connection is necessary.'3
In In re Sessom's Will 4 the evidence tended to show that the
writing offered for probate consisted of two sheets of paper. The
dispositive provisions appeared on the first sheet, and the second
sheet contained the designation of an executor, the attestation clause
and the signature of the testator. While there was no direct evidence
that the two sheets were fastened together at the time the will'was
executed, one witness testified that the writing offered for probate
was the same as that witnessed and signed as a will in the presence of
the testator and the witnesses. Moreover, at the time the instrument
was offered for probate the sheets were stapled together.
The Court held the two sheets to be clearly identifiable as one
will by their internal sense and coherence, and, therefore, failure of
the trial judge to instruct the jury as to rules of integration was not.
prejudicial error. 5
PROCEDURE

In In re Cox's Will' a caveat was filed in the name of the testa-.
trix's next of kin. The issue of devisavit vel non was resolved in
favor of the propounders, and the will was admitted to probate.
The present parties, who were listed as caveators in the original
proceeding, filed a second caveat, alleging that they were not in fact
parties to the first proceeding and had no knowledge of the same.
From a judgment dismissing the present action on the ground that
" In re Robert's Will, 251 N.C. 708, 112 S.E.2d 505 (1960).

See gen-

WILLS § 79 (2d ed. 1953) ; Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 477 (1954).
re Swaim's Will, 162 N.C. 213, 78 S.E. 72 (1913). On this point,
the North Carolina Court is in harmony with a majority of jurisdictions.
E.g., Bradshaw v. Pennington, 225 Ark. 410, 283 S.W.2d 351 (1955) ; Cole
v. Webb, 220 Ky. 817, 295 S.W. 1035 (1927).
"1inre Robert's Will, 251 N.C. 708, 112 S.E.2d 505 (1960) ; accord, Cole
v. Webb, supra, note 12.
1'254 N.C. 369, 119 S.E.2d 193 (1961).
" Compare In re Baldwin's Will, 146 N.C. 25, 59 S.E. 163 (1907), where
the attestation appeared on a sheet separate from that containing the testator's
signature. The Court refused probate, holding that the attestation must
appear on the same sheet as the testator's signature or be physically attached
thereto.
'0 254 N.C. 90, 118 S.E.2d 17 (1961).
erally
12

ATKINSON,
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the original proceeding constituted a bar to a second caveat, the
caveators appealed.
The Supreme Court stated that the correct procedure to raise the
question whether the caveators were actually parties to the original
caveat or had knowledge of the same was by a motion in the original
cause to set aside the judgment.-7 If successful in having the judgment set aside, those not parties to the initial caveat may then file a
second caveat.
The Court stated, however, that the trial court might have
treated the prayer to set aside the probate in solemn form as a motion
in the cause and disposed of it as such." Failure to do so was held
to be reversible error.
The purport of this novel decision is interesting in that while
a motion in the cause is the proper procedure, a second caveat would
seem to be equally proper since the trial judge risks reversal for
abuse of discretion if he fails to treat the caveat as a motion in the
cause.
"' Care must be taken to distinguish the present case from prior North
Carolina decisions where there was no question that the heirs at law were not
made parties to the caveat proceedings and had no knowledge of the same.
Under such circumstances they are not estopped to file a second caveat. E.g.,
Mills v. Mills, 195 N.C. 595, 143 S.E.- 130 (1928). In the instant case, the
very question to be determined was whether the caveators were in fact parties
to the original caveat or had knowledge of it.
The ruling as to the correctness of a motion in the cause is a sound one
in light of previous North Carolina decisions in which the Court has stated
that a decree of the probate court acting within its jurisdiction is not subject
to collateral attack. Groome v. Leatherwood, 240 N.C. 573, 83 S.E.2d 536
(1954) ; Coker v. Coker, 224 N.C. 450, 31 S.E.2d 364 (1944).
"This is in accord with prior decisions of the Court that when a party
mistakenly brings an independent action and his remedy is by motion in the
original cause, the court in its discretion may treat the complaint as a motion.
Abernethy Land & Finance Co. v. First Security Trust Co., 213 N.C. 369,
196 S.E. 340 (1938). See also Coker v. Coker, supra note 17.

